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You don’t have a map in your head, as a child. 
Later, you have the globe—the seas and the shapes— 
and you can’t ever get back to the emptiness, that mystery. 
Knowing that there are other places, but not knowing where they are, 
or how to get there. - Penelope Lively, City of the Mind.
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Building the Modern Doctor
“What treatment procedures are the best or worst, and how should professional work be organized are 
contained implicitly or explicitly in the training program”. (Light 1980: X)
“Professional authority is the legitimacy accorded to an occupational group to conduct professional work and 
have its judgments accepted by various audiences”. (Timmermans 2006: 8)
Introduction
It is around eight in the morning. I enter the Ministry of Health building in The 
Hague, pass the friendly security guard who greets me (as he does every morning)
and hold my identity card in front of the scanner that opens the revolving doors. 
I take the escalator to the fourth floor and walk along the quiet conference rooms 
where a server is setting out thermos flasks of coffee and tea. A big screen displays 
the meetings and conferences that will take place here today. I go to the elevator 
and press the button for the 11th floor.
A few weeks later, same time, another place. I enter the crowded entrance of a 
hospital in the city of Amsterdam. A few patients in wheelchairs are sitting outside 
the main entrance, smoking cigarettes, watching the trams pass by. I walk along 
the outpatient clinic where waiting rooms are filling up with patients and take the 
stairs to the first floor. I phone the resident I will be joining today. She opens 
a door and lets me into a changing room where I get dressed for a day in the 
operating room. 
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The Ministry of Health and the hospital are two of the locations we1 traveled around 
and participated in to study the reform of medical residency training—the training 
to become a medical doctor or physician.2 Besides the hospital and ministry, we 
attended conferences, workshops and medical association meetings pertaining to 
the reform. During the research, we were often stunned by the differences between 
the various worlds involved in medical educational reform. These differences were 
not only due to their diverging intentions and ideas of what adds up to a good 
residency training program, but also the completely different environments (the 
confusion of the hospital versus the far more structured—yet no less busy—spaces 
and interactions at the ministry), different ways of dressing (white lab coats versus 
black suits) and the organization of daily work. All these diverse places played a 
crucial role in the reform of medical training which we aim to unravel in this book.
In short, the reform of medical training takes in the shift from apprenticeship-
based training models of “learning-by-doing” and role modeling to structured 
training programs based on such educational insights as competency-based 
training and standardized performance assessment. The shift to structured training 
programs and measurement of residents’ competencies fits in with the wider trend 
of transparency and standardization in medical work. Theodore Porter has described 
this transition as a shift from trust, based on shared culture (social background and 
education) to “trust in numbers” (Porter 1995). 
Up until now, sociological accounts of medical education have mainly focused on 
the socialization function of medical training. These studies point out how junior 
1 In the introduction and conclusions of this book I use ‘we’ to bring these 
parts of the text in l ine with the co-authored articles that make up the book. 
I would l ike to note that putting texts in the plural obscures who has written 
(or thought up, or analyzed) what and thus who can be held responsible 
for which arguments and texts. This remark would certainly have been a 
proposition accompanying this dissertation but, unfortunately, the Free 
University of Amsterdam does not al low for the defense of propositions. 
2 Medical (residency) training or “postgraduate medical education” is the 
training of junior doctors to become a physician. In the global l iterature 
pertaining to medical work many different terms are used to describe 
doctors in various ranks. For example in The Netherlands we talk of “medical 
special ists”, in the United Kingdom these are termed ‘consultants’ and in 
the United States “attending physicians” or “attendings”. Physicians-in-
training are often referred to junior doctors, registrars (UK) or medical 
residents (US). Junior doctors who are not in training, are termed 
“interns” or “house officers”. In this book we use the US terms ‘attending 
physicians’ and ‘medical residents’. Moreover, we restricted the analysis to 
postgraduate hospital-based medical education. We use the terms medical 
education, residency training, professional training and medical training 
interchangeably. 
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doctors take on the special role and status (“medical identity”) claimed by the 
profession, and identify with and commit themselves to the professional community 
that they become part of 3 (e.g., Haas and Shaffin 1982, Light 1979, Hafferty 2000, 
Sinclair 1997). 
In the introduction of the recently published Handbook of the Sociology of Medical 
Education, Brosnan and Turner (2009: 4) argue that sociology’s narrow empirical 
focus on the world of doctors and their education has limited sociology’s ability to 
unpack current problems in medical education. Similarly, Chamberlain points at a 
contemporary lack of knowledge of how current changes in medical education are 
challenging medical practitioners’ educational activities as well as the principle of 
medical self-regulation (Chamberlain 2009). This book aims to contribute to a more 
comprehensive understanding of current transitions in medical education. The focus 
is on two closely related, yet usually distinct topics. First, we explore the changing 
objectives and processes of medical training itself, and examine how current 
reforms affect the learning process of medical residents. Second, by studying 
medical training reform we seek to gauge the dynamics of present trends in medical 
training governance.
To gain insight into the processes of medical educational reform we conducted a 
multiple-sited ethnographic research of the modernization4 of medical training in 
3 In the l iterature on medical education this process is also termed medicine’s 
‘hidden curriculum’. This body of l iterature points out that the hidden (or 
‘ informal’) curriculum is juxtaposed with the ‘formal curriculum’, which 
refers to textbooks and courses formally identif ied by the cl inical teachers. 
The hidden curriculum points at the unscripted, frequently ad hoc, and 
highly interpersonal forms of teaching and learning that take place among 
and between residents and attending physicians in the hallways, hospital 
restaurants, elevators, changing rooms, etc. (e.g., Hafferty and Franks 
1994). Yet, others (e.g., Good and Good 1989, Anspach 1988, Hafferty 2000, 
Witman et al. 2011) have shown that such hidden lessons are intrinsically 
connected with the ‘normal work’ of doing rounds and discussing patient 
cases. The term ‘hidden curriculum’ is particularly used in the medical 
education l iterature. In our analysis we stick to the concept of social ization 
as this situates our study in the field of medical sociology (the field we want 
to contribute to).
4 The word ‘modern’ is problematic from a theoretical point of view. In the 
social science l iterature (as well as in other academic and cultural f ields) it 
refers to the questioned distinction between modernism and postmodernism. 
For example Bruno Latour has stated: “ ‘postmodernism’ is the continuation 
of modernism except that confidence in the extension of reason has been 
abandoned” (Latour 1999: 308). We sti l l  want to use the term “modern” as it 
is often used in debates and l iterature about medical training reform. Here, 
‘modern’ refers to the medical doctor (and medical training) that l ives up to 
the contemporary expectations and demands of cl inical work and professional 
behavior.
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The Netherlands. For five years, we traveled around various sites that enacted the 
reform of medical residency training: in policymaking, the clinical workplace, the 
medical associations and educationalists involved in medical education, and through 
all kinds of discussion groups, projects, and conferences pertaining to the reform. 
We were interested in the shape of reform in different settings, and in how different 
practices were connected and interrelated. Drawing on insights from medical 
sociology, the sociology of professions, science and technology studies (STS) and 
political sciences, we studied the interplay of material, practical and institutional 
aspects that constitute the reform of medical residency training. 
Before further explaining our research design and theoretical foundations, let us 
take a closer look at the background of the reforms and introduce our research 
questions.
Background to medical training reform
The literature on medical education describes the development of medical training 
in three broad phases of reform (Frenk et al. 2009). The first phase started in the 
early twentieth century with the publication of the Flexner Report. Abraham Flexner, 
an American educator, introduced a science-based approach to medical learning. 
Flexner particularly focused on medical training in North America but his ideas 
were widely adopted in Europe as well (Barr 2011). Interestingly, while physicians 
stressed the influence of the shift to science-based medicine for public health, 
sociologists argued that curriculum renewal was a key element in medicine’s rise to 
power, allowing doctors to claim an esoteric body of knowledge and thus gain state 
support and public trust (Freidson 1972, Brosnan and Turner 2009). 
The second phase, starting in the 1950s, saw the introduction of problem-based 
learning as a new way of educating medical students (Stevens 2009). This phase 
comprised a shift to self-directed learning, task-based learning and project-based 
learning intended to foster adult learning and self-responsibility in medical students. 
The problem-based learning approach was mainly confined to undergraduate 
medical education, yet in the 1990s its central aspects became key elements in 
postgraduate medical education during the shift to system-based learning. 
In general, the system-based approach of this third phase aimed to improve the 
performance of health systems by adapting core professional competencies to the 
changing health care context. In several countries (including The Netherlands) 
Iris BW 3.indd   10 03-09-12   15:32
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medical associations adopted the Canadian CanMEDS framework that focuses 
on competencies beyond the core competency of medical-technical knowledge, 
including communication, organization, health advocacy, science, professionalism 
and managerialism (e.g., Frank 2005, Ringsted et al. 2006). The competency-
approach has encouraged an outcome-based model of medical education, meaning 
that physicians-in-training must demonstrate their capability to practice as a doctor 
(ten Cate and Scheele 2007, Jippes et al. 2010, Lurie et al. 2009). 
The system-based approach of medical education fits in with a much broader 
shift to system thinking in health care governance. This shift took place in the 
aftermath of the publication of the American Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) report 
To Err is Human in the late 1990s (Kohn et al. 2000).5 The IOM report revealed 
the significant number of patient deaths caused by medical errors. It argued that 
adverse events were caused not just by individual negligence but rather by systems 
of care that paid too little attention to patient safety. As a result, patient (un)safety 
was increasingly defined as a “system property” (Zuiderent-Jerak and Berg 2010), 
allowing other, non-medical professionals to gain access to clinical work. Charles 
Bosk has stated that the system-based approach has accompanied an “ideological 
shift from medical professional authority to organizational or ‘system-based’ 
authority” (Bosk 2006: 103). 
In medical education, the emphasis on patient safety was also due to the 
notorious ‘Zion case’ of the early 1990s. Libby Zion, an 18-year-old woman died 
in a hospital while being treated by a group of residents. Although the exact cause 
of her death was never established, her father brought the case to court, as he 
believed his daughter had been the victim of exhausted residents who routinely 
worked 36-hour shifts on little or no sleep. The Zion case instigated a broad debate 
about resident duty hours in the public as well as among medical professionals. 
Whereas working long hours had long been recognized as an essential element of a 
residency, now extended duty hours, especially the resulting sleep deprivation were 
increasingly seen as a danger to patient safety (Szymczak et al. 2011, Longnecker 
2006). In response, American and European regulatory bodies announced a steep 
reduction of resident duty hours in the early 2000s. In the United States, working 
5 The Dutch equivalent of ‘To Err is Human’ is “Hier werk je veil ig of je werkt 
hier niet” (2004) by the Wil lems Committee, named after its director and 
formal CEO of Shell, Rein Wil lems.
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hours were restricted to 80 per week, and in Europe, they were brought back to 48 
per week.6 
Besides these general transitions in postgraduate medical training across Western 
countries, there were also nation-specific trends that shaped residency training 
reform. In the United States, drawing on the highly topical issue of patient safety, 
reform was mainly concerned with enhancement of safe patient care in training 
situations (see Fitzgibbons et al. 2006, Ross et al 2010). In the United Kingdom, 
the emphasis was on shortening the medical training trajectory to arrive at 
a consultant-driven health care system (instead of care delivered by medical 
residents), to improve the quality of medical care delivery (for a detailed description 
and an analysis of the British case, see Chapter Three). 
In The Netherlands, the home base of our study, three policy trends stimulated 
the reform of medical training. First, the need for a more efficient, tailor-made 
occupational structure in health care to tackle upcoming health care problems, such 
as a shortage of health care workers in the light of an increasing elderly population. 
Second, another kind of medical practitioner was deemed needed, someone 
focused on medical-technical activities who was also capable of communicating with 
patients and collaborating with other health care professions. The third factor was a 
broader trend towards enhancing transparency and accountability of medical work 
(Commissie Meyboom 2002, Commissie LeGrand 2003). 
Political motives and policy strategies were by no means the only reasons behind 
the reform of medical training. In previous decades medicine itself had been 
remade “from the inside out” (Clarke et al. 2003 ) through the introduction of new 
medical technologies, innovations in molecular biology, the rapid expansion of the 
pharmaceutical industry, new ways of patient involvement and the ascendance of 
evidence-based medicine (Epstein 2007). The point, then, is not to understand 
how political demands have changed medical training, as if the latter were a 
fixed target, but rather to consider how the reform has intersected with other 
transformations that took place in the medical domain and in the health care sector 
more generally. In this book we demonstrate how reform, “fleshed out” in actual 
practice, was enacted in the interplay between the various actors as well as by the 
technologies used to arrive at a “modern” medical training practice.
6 Despite the considerable difference in the number of hours, the l imitations 
provoked similar crit icism in both continents. We elaborate on the issue of 
resident duty hours in Chapter Five.
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Research questions
The overall research aim is to reveal how medical residency has changed due to the 
interplay of policy development, transitions in the medical profession, traditional 
values and training practices, and new ideologies. In this book, we analyze the 
reform of medical training by unraveling the practices of medical training reform. In 
so doing, we aim to come to a more dynamic perspective on medical professional 
evolvement.
The central research question we address in this study is: 
How is medical training reform enacted? How do reforms influence the learning 
process of medical residents and what do they teach us about medical governance 
in general?
The following questions lead our research and analyses:
1. What are the objectives of reform in medical training? How are they enacted in 
practice?
2. How are different objectives brought together and what does this mean for the 
governance of medical training?
3. What are the consequences of reform on what and how residents learn in 
everyday clinical practice?
4. What do training reforms teach us about change processes in medical 
governance?
Point of departure: the sociology of 
medical education
The sociology of medical education was developed in the mid-nineteenth century. 
In 1957, Merton and his team published The Student Physician. In 1961, this 
was followed by Boys in White by Becker et al. Both studies were concerned with 
undergraduate medical education and described the development of medical 
students into ‘real’ physicians. Both studies are said to have an agenda, not so 
much on the issue of medical education but on advancing a particular theoretical 
perspective in sociology—structural functionalism in Merton’s case, as opposed to 
Iris BW 3.indd   13 03-09-12   15:32
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Becker’s symbolic interaction (see Hafferty 2000, Sinclair 1997, Cockerham 2009). 
But more than that, these studies set the scene for later sociological accounts of 
under- and postgraduate medical education by addressing such topics as “student 
socialization” and “dealing with clinical uncertainty” (e.g., Mumford 1970, Miller 
1970). 
In 1979, Charles Bosk published his seminal book Forgive and Remember. 
Here Bosk depicts residency training as “a moral education, the purpose of which 
is to teach young doctors the standards of practice” (Bosk 2003[1979]: xvi). 
He describes how medical residents are judged and selected on the basis of a 
social system of error making. Bosk distinguishes four types of errors: technical, 
judgmental, normative, and quasi-normative errors. The four types underlie one 
crucial dimension: whether an error is blameless or blameworthy. Bosk points out 
that technical or judgmental errors are seen as inevitable (yet unwanted) in the 
light of the inexperienced doing cognitively and manually complex labor. Normative 
and quasi-normative errors, for instance, not following up on an attending 
physician’s (implicit) orders or otherwise demonstrating unreliability, are deemed 
blameworthy and are consequential for future medical careers. 
Bosk’s practice-oriented sociological study was not elaborated on. During the 
1970s and 1980s, attention increasingly shifted to the development of the medical 
identity and the socialization of junior doctors in the medical community (e.g., 
Arluke 1978, Light 1979). Driven at that time by the rise of professional dominance 
theories (especially the work of Eliot Freidson), sociological accounts of medical 
education described how residents-in-training increasingly came to identify with 
and committed themselves to the medical professional community, developing 
a greater loyalty to colleagues than to patients (Haas and Shaffin 1982, Aspach 
1988). Donald Light nicely illustrated the medical dominance view by arguing that 
residents are not trained for dealing with clinical uncertainty but for ‘certainty’, 
pointing at the danger of an overconfident medical attitude centered in medical 
technique and disregarding patient-centered notions of health and illness (Light 
1979). 
Although the socialization of medical residents has remained an important topic 
in the sociology of medical education (e.g., Apker and Eggly 2004, Erickson 1999, 
Lingard et al. 2003), more recent accounts have (re)focused on clinical work itself. 
This literature describes the integration of junior doctors in the medical professional 
community and how residents, as they become part of the medical team, are 
gradually allowed to perform more complex clinical procedures (Hirschauer 1991, 
Iris BW 3.indd   14 03-09-12   15:32
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Prentice 2007, Johnson 2007, 2008). Prentice, for instance, has described how the 
surgical identity becomes embodied through practice in the operating room. She 
has shows how guided physical training simultaneously embodies the technical 
and social lessons of surgery (Prentice 2007). Johnson examined how medical 
simulations, which in the past decade have increasingly become part of residency 
training, are woven into the context of medical education and, as such, have 
become part of the situated learning that occurs in medical apprenticeship (Johnson 
2007, 2008). Although we are attentive to the idea of situated learning, and will 
use this concept in our analyses (see in particular Chapters Four and Five), we also 
argue that the sharp focus on medical training practice in hospitals tends to enforce 
a static approach to medical education. Such an approach tends to miss out on the 
more dynamic and fundamental shifts in the health care system, which may have 
substantial consequences for both medical professional self-regulation and the 
training of future physicians. This book aims at a more thorough understanding of 
contemporary reforms in medical residency training to come to grips with current 
changes in medical work. 
Positioning the research
To describe and analyze the dynamics and multiplicity of medical training reform 
we draw on theoretical insights from several academic disciplines. The issues 
raised in this book point at the intersections among three broad fields of scholarly 
investigation:
• Professionalism and professional evolvement (how is the medical profession 
governed, what kind of changes are taking place in professional governance and 
what does these mean for clinical work?);
• Knowledge formation and knowledge transfer (what are the complexities 
involved in the standardization of knowledge, how do different epistemic 
cultures interact and how do knowledge objects rearrange existing practices and 
the positions of actors therein?);
• Institutions and institutional change (how do institutional legacies pattern 
governance arrangements, and how do institutions evolve and change?).
Iris BW 3.indd   15 03-09-12   15:32
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These topics are key concepts in three academic disciplines. First, professions 
and professional evolvement are studied in the sociology of professions. Second, 
knowledge and knowledge formation are key issues in science and technology 
studies. Third, institutions and institutional change are studied in the realm of 
‘institutionalism’, which is part of political sciences. These theoretical approaches 
are suited to studying a diverse set of actors, objects, and entities as well as 
vested traditions of professional work that make up medical training practice and 
the governance of medical education. It is important to note that these theoretical 
approaches are not entirely different. For example, the medical profession and 
professional training are studied in all three academic disciplines. Yet, the questions 
raised and methodological approaches used are usually quite different. 
This Introduction gives us the opportunity to briefly describe some key notions of 
the three academic disciplines.
Professional dominance, autonomy, 
managerial ism
Early sociological accounts on professions sought to list the characteristics 
(‘traits’) of occupations that were deemed to define them as professions. Although 
social scholars did not always agree on their precise content, their lists typically 
included: skill based on theoretical knowledge, acquired through formal education, 
and formally assessed by examination, the existence of a code of professional 
conduct and a professional organization, and service for the public good (Millerson 
1964:4, Abbott 1988). The early accounts were lenient but in the early 1970s, 
British and North-American sociologists developed a far more critical stance 
toward professionalism and professionals. This was clearly reflected in the titles 
of books such as Professional Dominance (Freidson 1970) and Professions and 
Power (Johnson 1972). The focus was on the politics of obtaining and maintaining 
professional status (“occupational closure”) and more specifically on autonomy 
for practitioners and the exercise of power over other occupations (Harrison and 
McDonald 2008). Status was reinforced and sanctioned through wider legal and 
institutional systems such as education and (state) licensure.  
Others criticized the professional dominance theory as it could only explain how 
dominance begets more dominance and not how countervailing powers organize 
against it to recast power relations (Light and Levine 1988, Light 2010). In 
response, Light (1995) and Abbott (1988) introduced more dynamic theories on 
professional autonomy. For instance, according to Light’s countervailing power 
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theory, when one player in the field dominates, other players will react and redress 
the “excessive” power base of the dominator. Abbott, in turn, argued that the claim 
of a profession centers on its ability to control the abstract or theoretical knowledge 
that underpins its practice—and any substantial threat to the abstract nature of 
its knowledge presents a threat to jurisdiction. Routinization and standardization 
of professional work, for example, enhance the ability of other stakeholders 
(managers, the state) to undertake surveillance of professional work and offer the 
opportunity for staff economies (see Harrison and McDonald 2008). 
In the 1990s, observers of professions began to reassess the significance of 
professionalism due to changing government policies (especially in the introduction 
of the new realm of public management) and the accompanying empowerment 
of managers and managerial objectives in professional organizations.7 A 
lively theoretical debate ensued, on whether professions were becoming “de-
professionalized” due to the rationalization and bureaucratization of professional 
work through procedural guidelines (Courpasson 2000, Ackroyd and Muzio 2007), 
or if professions were able to live up to new expectations of transparency and 
accountability without compromising on their own discretionary abilities (as a form 
of “new professionalism”‘) (see Duyvendak et al. 2006, Evetts 2006, Kuhlmann 
2006, Noordegraaf 2011). Others turned to professional work itself and studied 
how medical professionals respond to changing occupational demands and the 
introduction of knowledge management systems in service provision.8 These latter 
studies show how the managerial discourse has become more internalized in 
medical practice and culture and has led to new forms of self-surveillance among 
professionals (see Waring 2007, Currie and Waring 2009). Latter scholars point out 
that such transformations of self-surveillance can also be understood as strategic 
actions of professions to maintain a significant degree of control over important 
evaluation criteria and procedures and thus to retain professional autonomy. 
Knowledge, practices, technologies
Compared to the other two academic disciplines we draw upon (sociology 
of professions and political sciences) science and technology studies (STS) 
7 Probably the most famous and most cited publication was the ‘ late Freidson’: 
Professionalism. The Third Logic (Freidon 2001).
8 These studies are particularly concerned with patient safety improvement in 
health care organizations, a highly topical issue in health care policy (and in 
health services research) since the late 1990s (e.g., Waring 2007, Curry et 
al. 2009)
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encompasses a more fluid way of thinking about social kinds. STS concerns the 
nature and power of the categories and objectives by which we organize our 
knowledge of the world (Jasanoff 2007). STS has its origins in laboratory studies 
(Latour and Woolgar 1979, Knorr-Certina 1999). This body of literature analyses 
the emergence of scientific facts. Rather than bracketing scientific knowledge as 
technical attributes or as simply factual (as if science were something external 
to society), social observers followed scientists at work to see how they establish 
the veracity of their findings. An illustrative example is a study by Shapin and 
Schaffer (1985) on the acceptance of scientific experiments in England in the 
seventeenth century. Shapin and Schaffer point to the simultaneous creation 
of three technologies that developed trust in the reliability of observations and 
reports of experiments: literary (a sober writing style on matters of fact, with no 
expression of personal opinion), technical (specific forms of appropriate laboratory 
experimentation in specific locations), and social (designation of a class of people 
taken to be reliable because they were ‘independent’ observers of the experiments 
and able to write about them) (in: Law 2008: 633). Trust, the authors show, 
is based on the dialectic interplay between social relationships and (shared) 
technologies. 
This observation points to the crucial importance of technology in STS work. The 
terms “actor-network theory” and “sociotechnical ensemble” (Bijker 1995) are 
used to suggest that objects and human should be understood as always existing 
together. Material objects and humans mutually constitute each other and should 
not be separated for analytical purposes (Pinch and Swedberg 2008, Law 1999). 
Especially since the mid-1990s, STS has moved decisively “beyond the lab” to 
analyze the broader dimensions of public engagement with science and technology, 
including in health care. These studies focus on how technologies are constituted 
in everyday patient-doctor interactions (e.g., Pols and Willems 2011) or, another 
example, how clinical guidelines become incorporated in everyday clinical practice 
and rearrange existing clinical practices as well the roles and positions of actors 
involved (Berg 1997, Timmermans and Berg 2003). This literature shares a focus 
on the complexities, variability, normativities and multiplicity of clinical practice 
(e.g., Pols 2006, de Bont and Grit 2011, Mol et al. 2010).
A more recent turn in STS work is toward the ontology of practices (Mol 2002, 
Bruun Jensen 2010). Central is the idea that reality does not have a single 
identity, but is multiple. Mol, for instance, conducted an ethnographic research 
into atherosclerosis of the leg vessels. Mol shows that what atherosclerosis is 
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differs between the sites that enact the disease: in the sheltered environment of 
the consulting room, the disease has another meaning (“slow pulsations”) than 
outside, when a patient on a walk needs to stop at every block (“painful legs”) or 
on the operating table (“vessel diameter”). Mol points out, although the disease 
encompasses different meanings and accompanying interventions, this does not 
lead to fragmentation as these practices become coordinated in everyday clinical 
work (Mol 2002). 
What does this imply for our study? It turns out that if we want to understand 
“real life” practices (whether this be a disease or residency training) we need 
to study work processes: the actual contingent, situated process of performing 
tasks, working together, and transforming something into something different 
(Timmermans 2006: 28). We thus need to participate in, and scrutinize the 
different sites of medical training reform and seek to grasp its different notions, 
materialities, purposes and practicalities, and understand how these are connected 
and coordinated to gain insight into what medical training reform both is and does.
Institutions, path dependency, institutional 
change
The third theoretical strand we draw upon is institutionalism. Institutional analysis 
helps to explain the evolvement of institutional arrangements within social policy 
systems (like the health care system) over time. Typically, institutional analysis 
emphasizes the institutional legacies of existing institutional arrangements and the 
constraining or structuring character of these very institutional arrangements to 
institutional reform. In the words of Putnam: “History matters... particular courses 
of action, once introduced, can be virtually impossible to reverse: what comes first 
conditions what comes after” (Putnam 1993: 8, cited in Tuohy 1999: 6). Putnam 
(like many other institutionalists) stresses the “path dependency” of the evolvement 
of institutions and institutional arrangements. 
There are many approaches to institutions, with accompanying definitions of 
what institutions are and do. Some focus particularly on the broad “macro level” 
political system that exerts top-down pressure on, for example, local organizational 
behavior or even more broadly, social policy reform efforts. These studies usually 
stress the structuring effect of institutions as institutions enhance the legitimacy of 
certain policy choices and decrease others, and channel decision making in certain 
directions, determining which actor has the power to do what, when and how. Such 
accounts implicitly or explicitly deny the influence of “agency” (e.g., Pierson 1994, 
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Mahoney 2000). Others, especially in the realm of sociological and organizational 
institutionalism (e.g., Scott 2008), emphasize the crucial dimension of agency 
(e.g., Powell and DiMaggio 1991). According to this approach, the (re)production of 
institutions is not a mere reflection of top-down forces, but rests upon the continual 
institutional work of local-level actors with differential access to power (Ferlie et 
al. 2005, Finn et al. 2010). The various institutional approaches possess their own 
perspectives on institutional reform. The path-dependency perspective primarily 
explains institutional continuity in terms of political processes unfolding over time, 
and mechanisms of positive feedback that reinforce political processes and lock-in 
established policy and instruments (Pierson 2000). The sociological institutional 
approach, on the other hand, envisions institutions as dynamic, changeable 
structures emerging from the dialectic relationship between structure and agency 
(Finn et al. 2010). 
Recent institutional theorists increasingly emphasize the dimension of agency. 
Discussion has thus moved away from the deterministic focus on the influence of 
top-down forces alone to the dialectic relationship between structure and agency 
(e.g., Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Finn et al. 2010, Helderman 2007, Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010). Streeck and Thelen (2005), for example, point at the interplay 
between exogenous forces and endogenous institutional changes, which may lead 
to gradual institutional transformation. New institutional arrangements, they argue, 
bring in new ambiguities as these are often subject to varying interpretations. Such 
ambiguities leave a great deal of play in the interpreted meaning of particular rules 
and in the ways the rules are instantiated in practice, providing critical openings for 
other stakeholders to exploit the opportunity to bring in new procedures, ideologies 
or knowledge structures (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
In this book, we use institutional analysis to explain existing governance 
arrangements in medical training and how these evolve over time, as well as 
how new policies become institutionalized (or not). Since medical training is a 
core institution of medical professional self-regulation, medical training reform 
is a particularly apposite lens through which to study the evolvement of medical 
governance.
This fruitful mix of academic reading , and the theoretical concepts that arise 
from the literature, provide us with the tools we need to piece together the story 
of residency training reform. The various approaches also encompass differences, 
which we will come back to and elaborate on—after we have applied them—in the 
concluding chapter.
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The study: A multiple-sited ethnography
We conducted a multiple-sited ethnography of medical training reform. For five 
years, we traveled around and participated in various sites that enacted the reform 
of medical training: the Ministry of Health, medical associations, the clinic, local 
meetings of clinical teachers, medical residents and/or educationalists, conferences 
pertaining to reform and scientific conferences on medical education. We ‘acted 
with’, observed and interviewed local actors. 
The book draws on three distinct, yet closely related research projects on 
medical training reform in The Netherlands.9 First, between 2006 and 2010 we 
were appointed evaluators of the national “InVIVO project”10, working on the 
implementation of redesigned residency training programs in pediatrics and 
gynecology. As members of the national project team (comprising gynecologists, 
pediatricians, educationalists and medical residents) we joined in all kinds of 
activities related to the reform: national conferences, meetings of the national 
project team, local activities in hospitals, workshops, and meetings of the medical 
association. Besides numerous informal interviews, we held semi-structured 
interviews with key actors, including physicians, medical residents, policy makers, 
hospital administrators and educationalists. As part of this broader study we 
conducted an ethnographic study of gynecology residency training. For six months 
we shadowed gynecology residents during their daily activities. Although the 
focus was on residents and not the attending gynecologists, there were many 
opportunities to observe and interview them as well.
Second, between 2009 and 2010 we participated in a group of policy advisors and 
scholars working for the Council for Public Health and Health Care (Raad voor de 
Volksgezondheid en Zorg, RVZ) writing an advisory report about medical education. 
The report was commissioned by the Ministry of Health. The RVZ is based at 
the Ministry of Health. During the writing process we were in close contact with 
ministry policy makers as well as experts in the field of medical training (RVZ 2010, 
Wallenburg 2010). In addition, we observed meetings with field parties (medical 
associations, health insurers, hospital associations) and policy makers. 
9 More detailed descriptions of the research are provided in the various 
chapters.
10 In VIVO stands for “Vaart in Innovatie VervolgOpleidingen” [‘Rapidity in 
innovating residency training programs’]
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The third study (2010-2012) concerned surgical training and took place in a city in 
the western part of The Netherlands. In this study, we focused on the consequences 
of the redesigned residency training programs in the practice of surgery as well as 
the daily organization of medical training. We observed monthly meetings of clinical 
teachers and interviewed attending surgeons and residents about current training 
reforms in residency training. 
In total, we held 74 formal interviews and made over 150 hours of observations. 
As part of the broader study, we conducted a comparative institutional analysis of 
the reforms of medical training in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands (see 
Chapter Three). Comparative policy analysis provides insight into “how one nation 
can learn from another competently in [for example] health policy” (Marmor et 
al. 2009). It can also be used to explain institutional change—or the opposite, 
detecting barriers to institutional change (Tuohy 2011). Here we use comparative 
institutional analysis to examine mechanisms of institutional reproduction and 
change, and the consequences for the governance of medical training. To that 
end, we conducted semi-structured interviews with key actors in both countries. 
We performed an extensive review of relevant documents including policy reports, 
professional literature, newspapers, internet sources and TV documentaries. 
We started out our research with a Q methodological study of medical training 
reform in The Netherlands. Q methodology is a mixed qualitative-quantitative 
research method for studying subjectivity, such as people’s viewpoints, beliefs, 
attitudes, feelings and opinions (van Exel et al. 2006, Neff 2009). The reason for 
using Q methodology was explorative as well as strategic. First, Q methodology 
allows you to explore and quickly gain insight into the perspectives and beliefs at 
stake in a fuzzy research field. Second, when we began our study we knew we 
had a few years of working closely together with medical doctors ahead of us. 
Although the physicians were looking forward to our explorative approach (they 
believed they were in the vanguard of a completely new way of medical education 
but felt insecure about the consequences), they were also a bit suspicious about 
our ethnographic ambitions. We were therefore eager to use a research method 
that came close to medical doctors’ epistemic convictions about scientific research 
(more specifically, the belief in quantitative research—as they often say, “We 
like numbers”), without compromising our explorative research aims. The mixed 
approach of Q methodology seemed perfectly suited to this aim (see Chapter Two). 
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Multiple-sited research 
Our focus on the different ways of “doing” medical training reform and their 
consequences can be described as a focus on multiple ontologies in the pragmatic 
sense. Ontologies do not refer to pre-conceived assumptions about what is true in 
the world and from which actors operate but they refer to particular practices that 
have consequences for the actors they afford (Zuiderent-Jerak et al. 2009: 1714, 
italics in the original). Such analysis, which Mol (2002) has described as ‘ontology 
in practice’ permits analysis of the ways in which multiple, simultaneously existing 
ontologies produce different consequences and afford different opportunities for 
action (Zuiderent-Jerak et al. 2009). Clarke (2005) has termed such approach 
‘multisited research’,11 stressing the importance of situated analysis which 
allows researchers to draw together studies of discourse and agency, action and 
structure, image, text and context, history and the present moment in order to 
analyze the complex situations of inquiry broadly conceived (Clarke 2005: xxii). 
A situated analysis approach, Clarke points out, can simultaneously address voice 
and discourse, texts and the consequential materialities and symbolisms of the 
nonhuman, the dynamics of historical change and power in both its solid and 
more fluid forms (Clarke 2005: xxiii). Moreover, it cuts across different scientific 
disciplines, “borrowing” new kinds of data and methods across disciplinary 
boundaries (Clarke 2005: 146). 
Such an approach also indicates incompleteness. We followed the reform of 
medical education but could not be present at all of its stages. There were 
many reasons including lack of time and resources, other private and academic 
obligations (e.g., our own teaching duties), and because some meetings we 
wanted to attend were “closed” (though we did gain entrance to meetings we had 
not dreamed of being allowed to attend). Many events happened simultaneously 
at completely different geographic locations and obviously it was impossible for 
us to be everywhere at the same time. Thus, the narratives and analyses in this 
book cannot grasp the full nature and outcome of medical training reform. Yet, 
because of our relatedness or ‘partial connections’ (Strathern 1991), thanks to the 
opportunity we had to move more or less freely between the various sites, and 
because of our numerous interactions with key actors which enabled us to discuss 
our observations and analyses, our ‘stories’ are far more than snapshots. They 
11 Note the difference between ‘multi ’ and ‘multiple’. ‘Multi ’  indicates plurality, 
whereas ‘multiple’ articulates the relatedness between the different sites—
for a more detailed argumentation on this, see Chapter Six.
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provide comprehensive insight into the dilemmas, frictions, governance shifts, 
practices and beliefs enacted in medical training reform.
Outline of the book
Before we outline the book, it is important to note that chapters have been 
published (or submitted) as single articles in various scientific journals. Readers 
may benefit as all the chapters (not just the Introduction and Conclusions) can 
be read without needing to refer to any other chapter. For readers of the whole 
book, however, it means some inevitable overlap between chapters, with regard to 
explanations of the reforms and methodology.
Chapter Two sketches the various perspectives on medical training reform. How 
do the actors involved in medical residency training give meaning to the reform and 
what are their expectations? We distinguish four perspectives that reflect current 
debates in medical training on the importance of, on the one hand, transparency 
about residents’ capabilities and accountability in taking care of patients and, on the 
other hand, protecting ‘old school’ models of professional training. Another slightly 
different perspective is about the importance of the learning climate and possibility 
to combine residency training with a private life. Here we argue that current shifts 
in medical training reflect changes in the wider social, economic environment that 
reframe the medical practitioners’ expectations. 
Chapter Three contains a comparative analysis of medical training reform in The 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. Here we address current transformations in 
the medical training regime and their consequences for the capacity of the medical 
profession to govern medical residency training in both countries. The chapter 
shows how the medical profession in both countries has shifted from professional 
self-governance to co-regulation. Although both countries moved to co-regulation, 
there are notable differences in the governance arrangements that have emerged. 
We argue that these differences cannot be explained by diverging institutional 
contexts only (as is often the case in institutional comparative analysis), but by 
the strategic actions of the actors involved. We demonstrate how strategic actions 
set negotiating authority processes into motion, producing new and sometimes 
surprising institutional arrangements that have profound effects on the distribution 
and allocation of authority in the medical training regime.
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In Chapter Four and Chapter Five we extend the analysis to the clinical work 
floor. In Chapter Four we focus on one particular element of current reform: the 
increasing emphasis on transparency and surveillance (‘visibility’) of medical 
residents in everyday clinical practice. The chapter demonstrates that multiple 
practices of residents’ visibility (visibilities) coexist. Attending physicians and 
medical residents tinker with these visibilities in daily clinical work to provide good 
and safe patient care while enacting learning space. 
Chapter Five considers how contemporary reforms in medical training intervene 
in the social interactional order of clinical practice. How do the reforms influence 
residents’ learning opportunities in everyday clinical care? We show how during 
training medical residents move from the periphery to the center of medical work in 
a process that is embedded in, and mediated by, the social technical environment 
of clinical practice. Personal relationships, based on numerous resident-attending 
interactions underpin this transition. We demonstrate how current reforms in 
medical residency training (a severe limitation of duty hours, standardization of 
resident assessment) tend to underplay this process as they create social distance 
between attending physicians and residents. We also show how these unexpected 
and unwanted consequences of reforms are repaired by (re)linking changes to 
medical work.
In Chapter Six we return to the issue of medical governance. We examine how 
existing institutional arrangements in medical training governance are changing, 
and how new governance arrangements become institutionalized in the complex 
interplay between the medical profession, the government and other stakeholders, 
in close interaction with the incorporation of new cognitive instruments as well as 
broader policy processes. We claim that transitions in medical governance are not 
only the result of power struggles between the medical profession and external 
stakeholders, but are also due to the entanglement of private interests. 
In the final chapter, Conclusions, we return to the research questions established 
in this Introduction. We discuss our use of a multiple-sited approach to the 
understanding of how medical training changes, both in terms of the training 
process and outcomes, and the capacity of the medical profession to govern their 
own professional training system.
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Between Trust and Accountability 
Dif ferent Perspectives on the 
Reform of Medical Residency 
Training in The Netherlands12
“Disciplining subordinates has to do with sound morality; shared knowledge can have the 
effect of alleviating distrust, thereby loosening the straightjacket of impersonal rules”. (Porter, 
1995)
“The audit explosion is the explosion of an idea which has become embodied in a wide range of 
programmes for accountability and control”. (Power 1997: 7)
Introduction
In many western countries, including The Netherlands, medical residency 
training is facing reforms intended to make medical practice more responsive to 
societal needs for, among other things, integrated care and efficient health care 
delivery (Fitzgibbons et al. 2006). Medical training is reformed by expanding the 
competency framework of medical practice (Ludmerer and Johns 2005, Swanwick 
2007). In the United States, for example, new training programs focus upon 
quality, patient safety, and systems-based practice (Fitzgibbons et al. 2006). In the 
United Kingdom the government aims to enhance management skills of doctors 
12 This chapter is based on Wallenburg, I., J. van Exel, E. Stolk, F. Scheele, 
A. de Bont and P. Meurs. 2010. Between trust and accountabil ity: Different 
perspectives on the modernization of postgraduate medical training in The 
Netherlands. Academic Medicine 85(6): 1082-90.
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within health care institutes by offering management courses to medical residents 
(Swanwick 2007). In The Netherlands – the central focus of this article- all scientific 
boards of the various medical specialties have been explicitly instructed to revise 
their residency training programs according to the CanMed2000 model specifying 
the various roles a ‘modern doctor’ should fulfill: medical expert, communicator, 
collaborator, health advocate, scholar, professional, and manager (Frank 2005). 
Details of this process are discussed below. Following this model, medical training 
should not only concentrate on acquiring medical-technical skills, but medical 
residents also must learn to communicate effectively with patients, collaborate 
with other health care professionals and manage health services (Frank and Danoff 
2007). To monitor and assess residents’ competencies within this new framework, 
educational tools and teaching courses have been introduced to both attending 
physicians and medical residents.
The introduction of a competency-based curriculum causes a change in the 
organization of medical training in teaching hospitals13. The reform means a shift 
from the old, implicit model of medical training of learning by doing and role 
modeling to a more explicit approach of encoded knowledge and maintaining 
standards in practice. As Nettleton et al. point out, this policy shift based on an 
explicit set of criteria (i.e. competencies) is thought to bring about changes in 
medical training and medical practices and will therefore have consequences for 
the transmission and nature of medical work (Nettleton et al. 2008). The changing 
nature of medical practice is also described by McDonald et al (2006), who argue 
that the reform of medical training and the emphasis on formal training guidelines 
that comes with it, may erode the values on which medical practice was originally 
based, such as vocation, reciprocity, and selflessness.
In The Netherlands, the reform or ‘modernization’ (as most medical practitioners 
refer to it) of medical training, was initiated by the central government and 
subsequently taken over by the Dutch Medical Association. Following a decree of 
the Central College of Medical Specialists, a regulating body of the Dutch Medical 
Association, all medical specialties have been redesigning their educational 
programs according to the competency model. During these revisions, specialty 
boards have defined objectives and standards for education based on CanMed2000. 
13 In The Netherlands, medical residents are trained in university hospitals and 
non-university hospitals that are l icensed as ‘teaching hospitals’. Residents 
usually conduct internships at both university and non-university hospitals. 
In this book we use the term ‘teaching hospital ’ to indicate both university 
and non-university hospitals.
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When this article was written, the first new curricula were being implemented in the 
specialties of gynecology and pediatrics, and other medical specialties had plans to 
follow. What this reform exactly comprises and what its consequences might be for 
clinical practice and medical work, however, is still unclear. Moreover, little has been 
reported on the views of the physicians and policy makers who carry out this novel 
form of medical training. At the start of the implementation of the new curricula, we 
therefore investigated which different perspectives exist on the reform of medical 
training. We did not investigate education programs themselves, but rather how the 
different groups of actors involved give meaning to this concept of ‘modern medical 
training’. What do they think medical residency training is or should be about? The 
second aim of our study was to relate, in a more limited and tentative way, these 
different understandings of the reform of medical residency training to the broader 
changes that are taking place in medical work.
We conducted a Q methodological study to identify and describe the different 
perspectives on the modernization of medical training among stakeholders involved 
in this process, as well as the principal similarities and differences between 
these perspectives. The method will be explained in the next section. From our 
study, it appears that modernization is a fuzzy concept entailing different, more 
or less conflicting perspectives on medical training reform. We argue that the 
frictions between these perspectives reflect existing tensions between diverging 
expectations of modern medical practice, as well as between the medical profession 
and society and within the medical profession itself. 
A Q methodological study on residency 
training reform
Q methodology 
Q methodology is a mixed qualitative–quantitative method that provides a scientific 
foundation for studying subjectivity, such as people’s viewpoints, beliefs, attitudes, 
feelings, and opinions. It is a fairly novel method in the field of health services 
research, but well established in other fields during the past 70 years (e.g., Brown 
1986, Risdon et al. 2003, van Exel and de Graaf 2005, Stephenson 1935). In recent 
years a number of studies using Q methodology were published in the field of 
health (Risdon et al. 2003, van Exel et al. 2006, van Exel at al. 2007, Kreuger et al. 
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2008, Baker 2006, Bryant 2006, Stenner et al. 2000). The aim of Q methodology 
is to access as many alternative existing views as possible on a certain topic (here, 
the reform of medical residency training). Typically, respondents, called the P set, 
are presented with a sample of statements (called the Q set) and are asked to 
rank-order these statements. By ordering them, respondents give their subjective 
meaning to the sample of statements and reveal their subjective viewpoint (Cross 
2005, Smith 2000). 
Q methodology has been presented as an inversion of conventional factor 
analysis, in the sense that Q correlates persons instead of tests (Stephenson 1935). 
Correlation between individual rankings of statements is seen as indicating similar 
viewpoints; if each respondent had an independent viewpoint, the Q sorts of these 
respondents would not correlate. If, however, significant clusters of correlations 
exist, they could be identified through factor analysis, described as common 
viewpoints, and individual respondents could be mapped to these viewpoints. Q 
methodology is used to describe a population of viewpoints and not - like in regular 
survey analysis- a population of people (Risdon et al. 2003). For this purpose a 
small purposively selected sample of respondents is sufficient (van Exel and de 
Graaf 2005, Brown 1980). 
Developing the Q set
Our first step in conducting this study was developing the Q set. This set of 
opinion statements forms the actual research instrument and is the basis for a 
Q methodological study. Consequently, it is important that the statements are 
representative of the subject area of study and are grounded in real existence 
(Brown 1980). To capture the topic and formulate statements, we first explored 
commonly held opinions about the rerform of medical training nationally and 
internationally. We scanned the literature using PubMed and studied policy 
documents and professional literature about the reform of medical residency 
training. Subsequently, we held in-depth semi-structured interviews with a 
purposively selected sample of medical specialists, medical residents, and a hospital 
manager. From all these sources we extracted a long list of issues related to the 
modernization of medical training, which we brought back to a manageable number 
to create the Q set.
From the literature search we obtained a basic understanding of existing views on 
the reform of medical residency training. Our understanding was deepened by the 
interviews. In line with the aim of Q methodology (i.e. to identify different opinions 
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towards a certain topic) we selected our interviewees using the purposive sampling 
method of ‘maximum variation’ (Patton 1990). On basis of document analysis and 
informal conversations with members of the project team we anticipated different 
views of the new curricula among doctors related to age, gender, seniority, and 
medical background (gynecology or pediatrics, as these were the specialties 
implementing competency-based educational reforms at the time of this study). 
We were also aware that there might be a difference in opinion between university 
and regional teaching hospitals, since in The Netherlands medical training is one 
of the core businesses of university hospitals while regional hospitals are more 
directed toward health service delivery. We therefore chose to select respondents 
from different educational regions and from different types of hospitals (university 
and non-university), with different professional backgrounds and different 
degrees of seniority. We selected men and women.This division of gender reflects 
current clinical practice in which most attending physicians are men, while 
younger clinicians are more likely to be women. Finally, we accounted for possible 
differences between “ex post” and “ex ante” preferences for the new curricula using 
regional sampling based on the observation that speed of implementation of new 
curricula differed between educational regions in the country14.  
In March 2007 the selected respondents were approached for cooperation by 
email or telephone by the gynecologists and pediatricians from the project team. 
These project members knew the potential respondents personally through clinical 
work and from their experiences heading professional organizations. All the persons 
approached agreed with the interview. We interviewed six gynecologists (three 
working in a university hospital, three working in a regional teaching hospital; two 
women, four men) and six pediatricians (two working in a university hospital, four 
working in a non-university hospital; one woman, five men). We also interviewed 
five medical residents (two gynecologist residents and three pediatrician residents, 
all women) working in different educational regions of the country. Subsequently, 
we interviewed one hospital manager working in a non-university teaching 
hospital to get a better notion of the meaning of the curriculum reform for hospital 
management. The interviewees were not compensated for their time. 
The interviews covered three broad areas: 1) the structure and process of medical 
training within the hospital; 2) the position and function of medical training within 
14 In The Netherlands medical training is organized in eight different regions. 
In each region a university hospital collaborates with a few local teaching 
hospitals, so-called “affi l iation hospitals”.
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the hospital organization; and 3) the influence of societal developments on medical 
training. The interviews were conducted by two authors (I.W. and A.B.) between 
March and May 2007. All interviews were tape recorded and transcribed. Additional 
informal interviews were conducted with educational experts involved in the reform 
process and members of the national project team entrusted with the reform of 
medical residency training in The Netherlands. Furthermore, between February 
and December 2007 we attended three national conferences about the reform, and 
observed the three weekly meetings of the project team. We made notes about 
these informal interviews and observations and analyzed them as well. 
The literature review, interviews and observations together resulted in a long 
list of 89 issues related to the reform of medical training. The list was structured 
around those issues that emerged as the most important from the interviews and 
literature: (1) concerns with the goals and contents of medical education and the 
use of specific educational methods and tools; (2) the relationship between medical 
training and health policy; and (3) the relationship between medical training and 
society. We stripped the list of double and comparable statements, which resulted in 
a list of 38 statements (see Table 1). The items were checked by various physicians 
and educational experts to ensure that the Q set was complete and the statements 
were unambiguous and expressed in clear language. Finally, the statements were 
edited, randomly assigned a number and printed on cards.
Collecting Q sorts
After developing the Q set, we conducted the Q sorts interviews. As Q methodology 
aims to study diversity of understanding rather than prevalence of understanding, 
participants were not selected randomly for statistical representativeness but 
purposefully for anticipated viewpoint or a certain type of experience (Bryant et 
al. 2006). Copying the purposive sampling method used in selecting interviewees, 
respondents invited for participation in the Q sort represented a heterogeneous 
group. Expecting differences in opinion between people with different professional 
backgrounds and from different geographical regions, medical specialties, and 
hospital settings, we consecutively invited 65 professionals to participate in the 
study. Q methodological studies typically include between 25 and 40 selected 
respondents, which is considered sufficient to reveal the diversity of opinion 
on a subject matter because these respondents are purposively sampled and 
perform a large amount of tests (by mutually comparing and ranking a large set 
of statements) (Smith 2000, Brown 1980). Because respondents were involved 
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with the subject of study, but conducting a Q sort is a cognitively demanding and 
time-consuming task (approximately 30-45 minutes), a moderate to good response 
rate (50-80%) was anticipated. Therefore, more professionals were approached 
than necessary for the analysis.
The group consisted of gynecologists and gynecology residents, pediatricians 
and pediatrics residents, medical educational experts, hospitals managers, and 
policy makers involved in medical training. The medical doctors were selected 
based on the educational region in which they work and their medical specialty. 
We approached one “type” of medical doctor in each educational region (i.e. one 
gynecology resident in the north-east region of the country, one pediatrician in the 
south-east). In total, 48 medical doctors were approached. As with the interviews, 
all respondents were first personally asked for cooperation by a member of the 
project team, after which the researcher (I.W.) sent them the Q study materials. 
The hospital managers we interviewed worked in both university and non-university 
teaching hospital settings in different regions of the country. Three of them were 
asked for cooperation by a member of the project team prior to being interviewed. 
All of them agreed to participate. The other five hospital managers were 
approached by one author (F.S.) during a national meeting about medical training 
reform in July 2007. The five selected policy makers were first asked to participate 
by two of the authors (I.W. and P.M.), after which the interviews took place. Finally, 
the four selected educational experts were asked to participate by their colleague, 
who was on the project team. We approached more physicians than educational 
experts, hospital managers, or policy makers because the reform is designed and 
executed by the medical profession. All Q respondents were volunteers, meaning 
that they were not rewarded for their participation. 
The Q interviews were conducted anonymously, meaning that the respondents 
were not asked for their names or to mention the name of the hospitals they 
worked for. We only asked for their gender, seniority (whether they were an 
attending or resident), and whether they were working for a university hospital or 
regional teaching hospital. The completed Q sorts we received were numbered in 
order for use in the factor analysis.
We asked two distinct Research Ethics Committees to review our study. According 
to the committees no approval was needed, as the study carried no ethical risks 
and would have no or minimal intrusion on patients.
Between June and August 2007 the interviews were administered via mail. 
A covering letter outlined the aims of the study and assured confidentially. 
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Respondents were asked to read through the 38 statements and divide them into 
three piles: agree, disagree, neutral. Next, they were asked to take the “agree” 
pile, read through the statements again, select the two statements they agreed 
with most, and place these in the two spots at the right side of the score sheet 
(see Figure 1). Then they were asked to read through the remaining statements in 
the “agree” pile, select the next two they agreed with most, and place them in the 
next column. This process was repeated until no statements remained in the pile. 
A similar procedure was followed for the cards in the “disagree” pile (working from 
left to right on the score sheet shown in Figure 1), and finally the statements from 
the “neutral” pile were ranked in the middle. 
After finishing, respondents were asked to explain their ranking and to complete 
a few additional questions regarding their gender, age, position, and whether they 
were working in a university hospital or a regional teaching hospital.
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treatment  
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familiarity with the 
material 
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tissue Frequently used 
unnecessary force on 
tissue or caused 
damage by 
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Careful handling of 
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caused inadvertent 
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movement and 
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Lack of knowledge of 
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Competent use of 
instruments but 
occasionally appeared 
stiff or awkward 
Moves smoothly 
 
 
 
Use of 4 5 6 7 8 9 10  
Figure 1 The Q sorting grid. Gray cells refer to the scoring mechanism and were not 
visible to respondents
Analysis of the Q sorts
The individual Q sorts were analyzed using PQMethod 2.11. By-person factor 
analysis was conducted in order to reveal the number of distinct ways in which the 
statements were Q sorted (extraction method: centroid factor analysis; rotation 
method: varimax followed by a small judgmental rotation to loose a confounder) 
(Brown 1986). For each resulting factor, a composite (or idealized) Q sort was
computed, which represents the way in which a person loading 100% on that 
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factor would have ranked the statements. The composite sort of each factor was 
computed using the Q sorts loading statistically significant (p<.05) on that factor 
and the correlation coefficients of these Q sorts with the factor as weights. The 
factors (i.e., different perspectives on the modernization of postgraduate medical 
training) were interpreted and described using the characterizing and distinguishing 
statements for each factor and the explanations of the respondents.
Table 1 Complete list of statements and composite ranking of the statements for the 
four factors representing different perspectives on the modernization of medical training 
determined from a Q study of stakeholders in the Netherlands, 2007
Numbered Statements Factor 
Accountability 
Perspective
Educational 
Perspective
Work–Life 
Balance 
Perspective
Trust-Based 
Perspective
1 A resident learns by doing. 0 -1 -5† 2†
2 A safe clinical environment is a 
precondition for good medical 
training.
5 5 5 5
3 A portfolio reflects a resident’s 
performance.
1 2 2 0
4 Assessment is more about 
providing feedback than judging 
a resident’s performance.
-1 4‡ 2‡ -1
5 Patient safety must be 
guaranteed within medical 
training.
3 5 5 3
6 Topic cards structure medical 
training.
-3‡ 0 0 0
7 The teaching skills of staff 
members should be evaluated 
periodically.
2 2 3 2
8 The distribution of internships 
among university and non-
university teaching hospitals 
should be reconsidered in favor 
of non-university hospitals.
3† -2 -2 -3
9 Learning goals must be 
formulated before the start of an 
internship.
2 3 1 2
10 The master-mate system should 
be central in medical training.
-5 0† -3 3†
11 A system of statements of 
formally awarded responsibilities 
does not fit into the medical 
profession.
-5‡ -3 -1 -2
12 Simulation-based training cannot 
replace “real-life” experience 
with patients.
1 1 2 0
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Numbered Statements Factor 
Accountability 
Perspective
Educational 
Perspective
Work–Life 
Balance 
Perspective
Trust-Based 
Perspective
13 Residents should be strictly 
supervised by staff members to 
prevent medical errors. 
0‡ 0 1 -4†
14 Competency-based medical 
training is like a fad that will 
fade away.
-4 -5 0 1
15 The modular curriculum gives 
residents the opportunity to 
influence their training program.
0 1 1 0
16 There are proportionally too 
many medical specialists and too 
few medical generalists. 
-2 -1 0 -3
17 Specialization depends on the 
labor market: specialization in 
medical training provides better 
employment opportunities after 
graduation.
0 -1 -1 -5†
18 Physician assistants/nurse 
practitioners can take over 
resident’s tasks.
-1 0‡ -3 -2
19 E-learning is an essential part of 
medical training.
-2 0 -2 0
20 Assessment makes a resident’s 
performance transparent.
1 2† 1 0
21 Postgraduate medical training 
cannot be done part-time.
-3 -2 -5† -4
22 Competency-based medical 
training contributes to patient-
centered care.
-1 1† -1 -5†
23 Competency-based medical 
training does not provide better 
doctors.
-4 -3 -2 2†
24 Cursory education should have a 
central position in postgraduate 
medical training.
1 -1† 3 1
25 Staff members are first 
responsible for creating a safe 
clinical environment.
5 3 4 4
26 The use of portfolios only causes 
a lot of paperwork and is a waste 
of time.
-2 -4† 0 1
27 Explicit assessment of residents 
takes too much time.
-2 -4 -4 -1
28 A good relationship between 
staff and residents contributes to 
patient safety.
4 2 4 5
29 Patient care is too complex to be 
summarized in topic cards.
1 -2 3 -2
30 Residents are responsible for 
their own education.
2 3‡ 1 -1
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Numbered Statements Factor 
Accountability 
Perspective
Educational 
Perspective
Work–Life 
Balance 
Perspective
Trust-Based 
Perspective
31 Residents are pivotal to the 
fulfillment of hospital’s service 
obligations.
-1 0 -1 -1
32 A modular curriculum causes 
inflexibility. 
0 -2 0 -3
33 The assessment and judgment 
of residents should be performed 
implicitly.
-3 -5‡ -3 -2
34 Explicit assessment such as 
the application of mini clinical 
evaluation exercises and multi-
source feedback is difficult to 
organize in clinical practice.
-1‡ -3† 2 1
35 Simulation training improves 
patient safety.
2 1 0 3
36 Hospital management has to set 
the preconditions for medical 
training.
0 1 -1 1
37 Staff members function as role 
models for residents.
4 4 -2† 4
38 During an internship in non-
university teaching hospitals, 
residents learn the essence of 
the medical profession.
3† -1 -4† -1
* A statement with a factor score of 5, 4, -4, or -5 is considered characterizing for that factor ; a statement 
with a statistically significant different score for that factor as compared to all other factors is distinguishing 
for that factor.
† P < .01; ‡ P < .05. 
Four perspectives on residency training 
reform 
Thirty-nine persons performed the Q sort for a 60% response rate. Among them 
were three hospital managers, two policy makers, six pediatricians, four pediatrics 
residents, ten gynecologists, ten gynecology residents and four educational 
experts. It is no surprise that the majority of the respondents are physicians, as we 
approached more doctors than representatives from other professions. 
Q analysis revealed four distinct factors, each representing a different perspective 
on the modernization of medical training. The first perspective we called the 
accountability perspective, reflecting the changing nature of the doctor-society 
contract towards more transparency and accountability. The second we labeled the 
educational perspective, which is about the structure of the education program. 
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The third perspective reflects a somewhat different view. We called this the 
work-life balance perspective, meaning that this perspective stresses the balance 
between working life and private life. This perspective also reveals the changing 
professional relationship between attending physicians and residents. Finally, 
the fourth perspective we called the trust-based perspective, reflecting the more 
traditional way of training in which role modeling and trust are considered most 
important. In the following sections we will describe the four perspectives in greater 
depth, highlighting the elements that separate each perspective from the others. 
We will concentrate on the statements that were, in terms of their placements, 
most important. In the description of the perspectives, we share some remarks 
of the respondents that explain their Q sorts. The remarks were translated into 
English and some small adaptations were made to use them as quotations. We 
note statement numbers in parentheses following each statement used in the 
descriptions of the different perspectives.
The four factors had between 15 and 5 defining variables (i.e., respondents 
statistically significantly associated with the factor). Together, the factors 
accounted for 58% of the variance in the Q sorts (see Table 2). The complete list of 
statements and the composite ranking of the statements for each factor scores are 
shown in Table 1. 
Table 2 Characteristics of Factors Representing Different Perspectives on the 
Modernization of Medical Training Determined from a Q Study of Stakeholders in the 
Netherlands, 2007
Characteristics 
Factor
Accountability 
Perspective
Educational 
Perspective
Work–Life 
Balance 
Perspective
Trust-Based 
Perspective
Number of defining variables 5 15 4 5
% of variance explained by the 
factor 12 24 11 11
The Accountabil ity Perspective 
The accountability perspective reflects strong support for more transparency 
and accountability in medical training. Individuals adhering to this perspective 
stressed the importance of an education system in which residents’ performance 
and skills are monitored and assessed. Educational instruments like mini clinical 
evaluation exercises could be used for such assessments (4). More than others, 
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these individuals believed that a system of formally awarded responsibilities (Brown 
1980) should be implemented in medical training (11) to improve patient safety. 
Hospitals should no longer be a place of ‘free practice’ in which residents practice 
their skills on real patients. Instead, residents should first be required to show 
their competency in an assessment procedure. In this view, a system of formally 
awarded responsibilities provides insight into the skills and techniques a resident 
has mastered and is therefore capable to provide on his or her own: “A statement 
of formally awarded responsibilities is a written agreement between a physician and 
the environment and as such the essence of the profession”.  
Individuals sharing this perspective were least likely to say that the old “master-
mate” system should be central in medical training (10): ”The master-mate system 
contains too much hierarchy, which does not fit this age”. Instead, they believed 
that formal agreements were important, both within the group of physicians 
and outside this group, in contacts with society. In general, the accountability 
perspective seemed to mirror a change in the so-called contract between the 
medical profession and society. While this contract used to be based on authority 
and trust, now formal training guidelines, monitoring of results, and explicitness are 
increasingly important (Porter 1995, Harrison 2002).
Five participants were associated with the accountability perspective: three 
pediatricians, one gynecologist and one hospital manager. They all worked in 
non-university hospitals.
The Educational Perspective
Individuals adhering to the educational perspective stressed the importance of 
a more structured and explicit educational program with emphasis on specific 
educational methods in which residents learn the skills and habits of their medical 
specialty. In comparison to the accountability perspective, which is more focused 
upon residents’ performance and skills, the educational perspective focuses on 
the subject of medical training itself, reflecting a strong positive view of current 
competency-based curriculum reform. Individuals adhering to the educational 
perspective believed that a competency-based curriculum helps to structure and 
therefore improve medical training. Individuals sharing this perspective were least 
likely to say that competency-based education appears to be a fad (14). More than 
others, they believed that a competency-based medical curriculum will produce 
better doctors (23): “Competencies offer an instrument to judge whether residents 
have the right capacities at their disposal to become a good doctor”. Individuals 
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adhering to this perspective demonstrated great faith in the use of specific 
educational instruments and methods (such as the portfolio, clinical evaluation 
exercises and multi-source feedback) to make residents’ performance visible and 
explicit (33, 3, 26). Moreover, they believed that attending physicians should 
provide constructive feedback to residents about their performances and learning 
process (4): “A resident does not learn from implicit assessment; transparency is 
necessary to learn how to do things better”. And: “Explicit assessment increases 
transparency and offers a resident insight into the competencies that have to be 
developed”. It was also stressed that there should be enough time for cursory 
education during medical training (24).
Individuals sharing the educational perspective did not believe the use of 
educational instruments would be too time consuming or too difficult to fit into daily 
clinical practice (26, 27, 34): “Clinical evaluation exercises and so on, are easy to 
realize in practice. Especially if learning goals are used, these instruments provide 
a quick and in-depth assessment”. Moreover, they did not think that a competency-
based curriculum would cause a big change in the contents of medical training 
itself, because “We now make explicit what we always did implicitly”.
Finally, more than the other perspectives, the educational perspective stresses 
residents’ responsibilities for their own learning processes (30): “Professional 
behavior is one of the cornerstones of the modernization process. A resident can 
learn more by stimulating his surroundings to provide feedback by asking for 
assessment”.
The Q sorts of 15 participants aligned with the educational perspective. 
Educational experts played an important role in this perspective; all four 
participating educational experts fell in this group. The involvement of educational 
experts in medical training also reflects another interesting feature of medical 
training reform, which is the involvement of stakeholders usually working outside 
the historically closed domain of medical training. Other participants belonging to 
the educational perspective were three academic pediatricians and one pediatrician 
working in a local teaching hospital, two academic gynecologists and two non-
academic gynecologists, two pediatrician residents, one hospital manager, and one 
attending physician. 
The Work-Life Balance Perspective
More than the other three perspectives, the work-life balance perspective reflects 
a shift in medical identity. While in the past, medical work was more or less the 
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clear priority in a physician’s life, nowadays doctors want to have a private life as 
well. Accordingly, the statement about part-time work was found most important 
in this perspective (21). Individuals adhering to the work-life balance perspective 
did not think that part time work will harm medical training, because “Private 
circumstances are of great importance to the mental and physical well-being of the 
resident. These circumstances need to be taken seriously. In the end this will also 
benefit medical training“. As one participant pointed out, “Every job can be done 
part time, why not medical training?“  
The views of people belonging to the work-life balance perspective on medical 
training were in line with their views on medical identity. They believed that 
medical training should become more formalized and more directed at structured 
education of residents rather than on the socialization process of trainees. These 
individuals also believed that the relationship between residents and attending 
physicians should be more equal. Accordingly, they disagreed more than others 
with the statement that the old master-mate system should be central in medical 
training (10), and they were least likely to see attending physicians as role models 
for residents (37): “In my view, the master-mate system is the opposite of a safe 
clinical environment”. 
In the work-life balance perspective, the learning process of residents is put 
at the forefront. It was stressed that residents do not learn only by providing 
services (1), but that residents should get the opportunity to do those things they 
can really learn from. According to one participant, “Residents do not learn by 
simply ‘being there’. Most important is what they can get out of clinical practice”, 
meaning that work schedules should be adapted to the learning goals of residents.  
Accordingly, it was believed that internships should be divided among university 
and non-university teaching hospitals because in this way, residents can experience 
all different aspects of medical work during their training periods (38, 8): “The 
combination of university and non-university internships shapes residency training”.
Although individuals adhering to the work-life balance perspective supported 
reforms of medical training, they were not convinced that a competency-based 
curriculum is the answer to existing problems. They felt that explicit assessment of 
residents is important (27, 33) but doubted whether this would be feasible in daily 
work (34). They feared that the introduction of a competency-based curriculum 
could intensify the already heavy workload of residents. 
Four participants were associated with the work-life balance perspective. It did 
not come as a surprise that three of them were medical residents (gynecology and 
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pediatrics). The other person adhering to this view worked as a gynecologist in a 
university hospital.
The Trust-based Perspective
The trust-based perspective differs from the other three perspectives in the sense 
that it reflects a more expectant view towards competency-based curriculum 
reform. It is based on the belief that becoming a physician means more than 
following an educational program. In this view, medical training is considered to be 
about ‘hands-on experience’ within a socialization process in which inherent values, 
norms and skills are transferred from experienced doctors to novices. 
Individuals sharing this perspective were least likely to say that the new 
curriculum would provide better doctors (23), and did not believe that the reform 
would improve patient-centered care (22): “I do not see a relationship between 
the new curriculum and patient-centered care. What does this mean, anyway? This 
whole new education system is just a lot of paperwork and talk”. They were also 
most likely to say that the use of portfolios takes a lot of paperwork and is a waste 
of time (26). Instead, they felt that medical training is about gaining experience, 
role modeling and trust. These values can be considered the “old” moral values that 
are transferred and acquired during professional training (see Bosk 1979, Prentice 
2007). Accordingly, people in this perspective considered medical training to be 
more than just an education; it is also a moral learning process.
The trust-based perspective stresses the importance of tacit knowledge in 
medical training (see Hafferty 2000). The socialization process is at the forefront, 
although it should be noted that individuals adhering to the trust-based perspective 
were not declared opponents of a competency-based curriculum. The statements 
considering the competency-based reform were not placed at the extremes of the 
distribution, indicating that the reform was not totally rejected, but those adhering 
to the trust-based perspective put emphasis on other aspects of medical training 
(statements that were at the extremes of the distribution). First, they believed 
that a resident learns by doing (1) and role-modeling (37). The master-mate 
system should therefore be central in medical training (10): “For a big part of the 
not assessable aspects of the medical profession, you depend on your teacher”. 
Second, individuals sharing the trust-based perspective strongly disagreed with the 
statement that residents should be strictly supervised by an attending physician 
to prevent medical errors (13): “Strict supervision means that every step must be 
controlled. This will be very unpleasant for both residents and attending physicians. 
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It will not reduce medical errors”. Another respondent put it simply: “Strict 
supervision is unnecessary in a safe clinical environment”. Not strict supervision, 
but trust in each other was considered most important, as was professional 
autonomy. Accordingly, participants adhering to this perspective disagreed (more so 
than in the other perspectives) that there are too many medical specialists and too 
few general medical doctors in medical practice (17). As one participant articulated, 
“I believe that specialists are necessary, especially in university hospitals”. Another 
emphasized the point, noting that “practice shows that specialists are necessary”. 
Five participants aligned with the trust-based perspective. Two of them were 
gynecology residents, and two were gynecologists working in a regional teaching 
hospital. One participant in this category was a pediatrician also working in a 
non-university hospital.
Discussion 
In this chapter, we were able to reconstruct the main perspectives on the reform 
of medical residency training using Q methodology. The four distinct perspectives 
show that reform encompasses various issues. It is about increasing transparency 
and accountability in health care practice as well as about the structuring of 
medical education and transparency within the training process itself. The reform of 
medical training is also about the changing nature of medical identity. Medical work 
is becoming more and more like a “normal” job instead of a way of life (see also 
Nettleton et al. 2008). We may say that the formalization of working relationships 
is probably enhanced by other, more general, developments touching upon the 
medical professions, such as the introduction of the European Working Time 
Directive, which restricts the number of hours residents are allowed to work. At the 
same time, however, our results stress that medical training is about the transfer 
of implicit information and moral values, which cannot be taught without intensive 
contact between the medical expert and trainee.
We recognize the mixed meanings of modernization in the “consensus statements” 
we observed. The consensus statements are the statements that were more or 
less equally valued in all four perspectives. In all perspectives, a safe learning 
environment (2) was considered the most important aspect of medical training. 
There was also agreement about the mutual relationship between a safe learning 
environment and patient safety (5). Consensus on these two items indicates 
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the importance of safety in medical training. What is meant by safety and how 
this should be accomplished, however, is point of disagreement (this becomes 
clear from the placements of these statements in the composite sorts of the 
four perspectives relative to the placement of other statements in those sorts). 
Individuals belonging to the educational perspective, for example, think that safety 
can be improved by the structuring and overspecification of medical curricula, while 
followers of the trust-based perspective believed that safety should be embedded in 
the socialization process of training. It would therefore be too simple to characterize 
modernization as a shift from the “old” implicit model of medical training of learning 
by doing and role modeling to a more explicit approach of encoded knowledge and 
maintaining standards in practice. Instead, the reform is also about a change in the 
moral ideals of medical training.
These distinct perspectives on the reform of medical training not only differ, but 
may also conflict with each other. When medical training is considered to be first 
and foremost a moral education and is about the transfer of values like vocation, 
selflessness, and reciprocity, this takes time and much contact—formal and 
informal— between experts and trainees. This clashes with a more formal approach 
of training directed at the education process in which residents complete temporary 
rotations and work in shifts. In addition, the restriction of the working hours of 
medical doctors (because of EU regulation or popular part-time work schedules) 
might conflict with another development in health care, which is an increasing 
attention to patient safety. Although these developments are not contradictory 
in principle, they have consequences for the way medical practice is organized. 
In the recent past, continuity of care was ensured through frequent attendance 
from the same doctors and close collaboration between them. Now more formal 
regulations and moments of consultation are needed to organize continuity of care. 
A third possible conflict has to do with trust. More transparency and accountability 
in medical work are demanded, changing the relationship between a physician and 
the individual patient as well as between physicians and the society as a whole. At 
the same time, however, more transparency may even cause distrust because a 
layperson does not have the expertise to interpret and understand the information 
available to the physician (Tsoukas 1997). Moreover, it is argued that trust, an 
important aspect of the doctor-patient relationship, could be damaged if too much 
emphasis is placed on accountability and transparency (Harrison and Smith 2004). 
The changes within medical training are strongly entwined with changes in 
the wider social and economic environment. In the last two decades, the role 
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of professionals in the public sector has changed as a consequence of the 
restructuring of welfare states into more market-oriented areas, redefining citizens 
as consumers, and accentuating client participation (Duyvendak et al. 2006, Knijn 
2006). Performances are measured and work has become more standardized by 
use of clinical guidelines and protocols, which touches upon the old tradition of 
professional self-governance (Timmermans 2008). However, our study also shows 
that the changes of medical work and medical practice are not only a result of 
external demands, but also originate in the profession itself, as young doctors are 
striving for a more balanced life between the private sphere and work, as well as 
formalization of the old master-mate relationship. 
The social status and authority of medical professionals have been further affected 
by the empowerment of patients. The position of patients within health care 
institutes have been strengthened by a legal obligation to install client councils that 
are given a voice in hospital management, as well as a legal right to complain about 
health care professionals to a complaints committee (Trappenburg 2006). These 
changes can be seen as attempts to balance the historically unequal relationship 
between medical doctors and patients. At the same time, however, medical doctors 
are not supposed to completely give up their logic of professionalism (Freidson 
2001), as they are still expected to be devoted to the client’s interest more than 
personal or commercial profit (Wilensky 1964). The interconnectedness of these 
“old” and “new” values of medical work is evident in the four different perspectives 
on the reform of medical residency training in The Netherlands revealed in our 
study. 
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Negotiated Authority  
A Comparative Study of Reform 
in Medical Training Regimes15
“The stability of Social Security’s contributory structure was, in this sense, highly dynamic; it had to be 
repeatedly and actively reinforced and was dependent on processes of institutional change.Only through 
historical analysis can we distinguish among alternative causal routes from origins to outcomes and trace out 
the complex - often mutually reinforcing - relationship between continuity and change”. 
(Jacobs, 2010: 127-8) 
Introduction
As a professional group par excellence, the medical profession is often described 
in terms of its authority and capacity to govern its own members (see, e.g., 
Larson 1977, Freidson 2001). In the governance regime of medical professionals, 
professional training is considered a core institution, regulating entry to the 
profession as well as the transfer of professional skills and habits. Despite 
considerable changes in health care policy regimes in the twentieth century, 
this core attribute of the professional medical community has remained largely 
uncontested. Over the past decade, however, the medical profession has faced 
increasing outside pressure to reform training programs to improve patient 
safety and better equip young doctors for changing health care needs and public 
expectations (Ludmerer and Johns 2005, Drazen and Epstein 2002). To that end, 
medical associations in various Western countries (e.g., the United States, Canada, 
the United Kingdom, and The Netherlands) have launched new residency training 
15 This chapter is based on Wal lenburg,  I . ,  J.K. Helderman, A. de Bont,  F. 
Scheele and P. Meurs.  2012. Negot iated author i ty:  A comparat ive study of 
reform in medical  t ra in ing regimes. Journal  of  Heal th Pol i t ics Pol icy and 
Law  37(3):  339-467.
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programs to meet revised standards in residency training, lifestyle, and preparation 
for supervisory roles (Ringsted et al. 2006: 437, Drolet et al. 2010, Fitzgibbons et 
al. 2006). Traditional apprenticeship-based programs, where residents gradually 
learn the skills and professional values of their specialty are being replaced by more 
structured and transparent training based on modern educational insights (Frenk et 
al. 2010, Wallenburg et al. 2010). 
A growing body of sociological and medical educational literature has discussed 
these reforms in technical and methodological terms, addressing the kind of 
knowledge that should be transferred during medical training (Frank and Danoff 
2007, Jones et al. 2001, Sales and Schlaff 2010) and how this should be done 
to prepare medical doctors for contemporary health care problems and changing 
public expectations (Teunissen et al. 2007, Schuwirth and van der Vleuten 2004). 
In contrast, we wish to move past the technical account of medical educational 
reform and argue that contemporary reform of medical curricula has implications 
that go far beyond teaching method aspects and the educational content of medical 
curricula.
This chapter seeks to explore the impact of successive reforms of medical training 
programs on the capacity and authority of the medical profession to govern its 
own affairs. Our empirical focus is on reforms in postgraduate medical training 
in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Both countries have considerably 
different health care systems and diverging state-profession relationships, yet both 
face similar reforms to their medical training systems. The central questions we 
address are What mechanisms of institutional reproduction and change are at play 
in the evolving transformation of the medical training regimes in Britain and The 
Netherlands, and what are the consequences of these transformations for self-
governance of medical professional training in both countries? 
We conducted a comparative historical-institutional analysis of the origins, 
evolution, and transformation of the British and Dutch postgraduate medical 
educational systems. In accordance with recent literature on institutional change, 
we consider institutional change as a gradual, incremental and continuous process 
in which institutions are subject to frequent negotiations (Thelen 2004, Streeck 
and Thelen 2005, Deeg and Jackson 2007, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). In the 
next section we explore the implications of this theoretical perspective for gradual 
and negotiated institutional change. In the following three sections we show how 
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medical training regimes in the United Kingdom16 and The Netherlands have evolved 
over time due to the dialectic relations between endogenous and exogenous forces 
touching on vested interests and power relations in the domestic health care 
systems. 
In the conclusions we compare the cases and discuss the consequences of regime 
transformation for professional self-governance. We argue that in both countries 
professional self-governance has turned into more hybrid forms of coregulation 
in which the medical profession, the state, and other private actors continuously 
reinstate their positions and related claims to authority. This shift to coregulation 
also becomes visible in everyday clinical training practice where the traditional 
training-and-license models are increasingly supplemented or replaced by more 
formal instruction, performance measurement and standardized practices of 
resident training in order to enhance transparency and accountability of medical 
training. We argue that this enhanced visibility of former closed training practices 
may provide other stakeholders with new means to further reform medical 
residency training and, with that, strengthen their authority in the medical 
training regime. We conclude by elaborating on the implications of this study for 
contemporary debates on institutional change.
Transforming the Medical Training 
Regime
A Social Regime Approach
This chapter focuses on the transformation of one of the core institutions of the 
medical profession: the ownership and accompanying authority and autonomy of 
physicians over the vocational programs of medical residency training. Here we 
term the governance structure of medical training a “training regime” embodying 
the distinct institutional configurations and agencies involved in medical training. 
Specifically, regimes are defined as “a set of rules stipulating expected behavior 
and ‘ruling out’ behavior deemed to be undesirable. A regime is legitimate to the 
16 The United Kingdom encompasses several countries (Wales, Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and England) and medical educational policies (sl ightly) 
differ among the countries. Yet, taking into account the differences and 
similarit ies is beyond the scope of this chapter. We wil l therefore talk about 
‘the United Kingdom’ as a whole.
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extent that the expectations it represents are enforced by the society in which it is 
embedded” (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 12-13). Actors in the regime have explicitly 
undertaken to respect certain interest positions of other parties (including those 
not directly involved), to pursue certain substantive goals and values, and to follow 
certain procedures in their future interactions (Scharpf 1997). As such, regimes 
create order and stability in an otherwise chaotic and anarchic world. 
In order to understand the genesis, reproduction, and change of a social regime, 
three important characteristics of regimes should be noted. First, in terms of their 
composition, regimes are typically structured by a host of different institutions, 
together constituting an institutional configuration that makes up a regime. The 
actors involved can be seen as purposeful, meaning that they have their own 
interests and may undertake their own strategies to pursue their goals. Second, 
regimes can be specified at different levels of breadth — that is, they are embedded 
or nested in other regimes (Hood et al. 2001:10). The medical training regime, for 
example, is embedded in the overarching regime of the health care system. Given 
physicians’ central stake in health care, a medical training regime can in turn be 
regarded as one of the constituting regimes of any health care regime, meaning 
that changes in the medical training system may have profound effects on medical 
governance in general—and the other way around.
Third, any distinct regime consists of a configuration of institutions, some with 
deeper roots (more important) than others. Reforming these institutions is likely 
to be harder and more politicized than reforming institutions located more in 
the periphery of an institutional configuration. We refer to these deeply rooted 
institutions as “core institutions”. Although core institutions are complemented 
by other institutions, they are likely to dominate the governance mode in any 
regime and thus impose their logic on the institutional configuration of a regime 
as a whole. Core institutions are also dominant in terms of their authority claim in 
distinct regimes. 
In short, different subregimes and their accompanying institutional arrangements 
interact in the overarching social regime. To understand regime transformation, 
then, we should study the different subregimes, their mutual relationships, as well 
as any changes in one subregime that might spill over to the others. This analysis 
requires a subtle approach to the analysis of institutional change.
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Regime Transformation: Negotiating Power and 
Authority
Institutions can be defined as the formal and informal rules of the game providing 
political agents with incentives and constraints that induce stable patterns of 
behavior. Institutional analysis generally shares an emphasis on the constraining 
character of institutions. Increasing returns, sunk costs, and positive feedback 
are powerful mechanisms that make institutional change largely path-dependent 
(Pierson 2000, Mahoney 2000). In the path dependency view, institutional change 
is usually explained in two ways: either as minor, usually continuous change (seen 
most often) or as major change caused by some sort of exogenous shock opening 
up existing paths (seen rarely) (Streeck and Thelen 2005: 8). In the absence of 
analytical tools to characterize and explain more gradual institutional change, 
much of the institutional literature has relied—explicitly or implicitly—on a strongly 
punctuated-equilibrium model that draws on overly sharp distinctions between long 
periods of institutional stasis periodically interrupted by “critical junctures” allowing 
for more or less radical reorganization (Tuohy 1999, True et al. 2007). 
A growing body of literature is currently questioning these ideas of institutional 
resistance to change (Brown et al. 2010). Scholars writing in the realm of 
institutional change display what Deeg and Jackson (2007) have called “a greater 
plasticity” of institutional evolution, meaning that institutional change is essentially 
a gradual and evolutionary process (Streeck and Thelen 2005, Hacker 2004, 
Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Beyond the conventional view of institutions as stable 
constructs that owe their stability to powerful policy legacies and path-dependent 
processes, the group of scholars has  pointed out that institutional change is 
essentially a gradual evolutionary process. The determinants of institutional 
change not only come from outside, but can also be produced endogenously 
by the very behavior that the institutions themselves have generated. In this 
view, a far more dynamic component is built in wherein institutions represent 
compromises of relatively durable though still contested settlements based on 
specific coalitional dynamics. These coalitions, however, are always vulnerable 
to shifts as institutional rules are subject to varying interpretations and levels of 
enforcement. They therefore exhibit ambiguities that provide space for interested 
agents to exploit their efforts to alter the coalitions (Thelen 2004, Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010). To understand these more gradual and incremental processes of 
institutional evolvement, one should consider the mechanisms of reproduction that 
help to sustain these institutions over time as well as the changes in institutions 
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that gradually transform them into new directions. Institutional change can best be 
understood in terms of the “co-evolution” of multiple institutions in a social regime 
(Thelen 2004: 32). 
Power and authority are important features in institutional transformation 
analysis, stressing the role of agencies in social regimes (Moe 2005, Mahoney and 
Thelen 2010, White 2009). Such power relations create order as well as rigidities, 
because all actors in a particular regime become more expert at pursuing courses 
of action that favor their own interests. Potential rivals, however, not only lack the 
power to challenge preestablished institutions, but also lack the accepted expertise 
and potential to convince others that alternative actions are practically viable 
(Crouch and Keune 2005: 85–86). This can be illustrated by the medical training 
regime in which specialization, the application of medical knowledge, technical skills 
and tacit knowledge have long been accepted as dominant sources of expertise, 
thereby excluding actors without this kind of knowledge. However, notwithstanding 
these deeply embedded power relations, institutional change often involves 
compromises or contested settlement between coalitions of countervailing powers 
and always carries an element of dynamism or ambiguity, implying that regime 
stability is not automatically generated but depends on the ongoing mobilization 
and reproduction of power (Light 2000). Light proposes a model of “countervailing 
powers” in which one set of interests (such as medical professional dominance 
over medical residency training) overextends its attempts to dominate the field, 
prompting the regrouping of other actors and interests (like the state). As a 
consequence, the medical training regime swings back and forth between different 
kinds of authority (see also Mendel and Scott 2010). 
Contemporary theories on institutional change put more emphasis on the 
ambiguity and dynamics of institutional evolvement. They stress the crucial 
importance of the interaction among political context, strategic actors, and the 
properties of institutions themselves in explaining institutional change (Mahoney 
and Thelen 2010: 31). Changes in existing procedures, ideologies and structures 
that may be due to changes in the overarching social regime or in adjacent 
regimes can lead to conflicting logic and authority claims, as various actors have 
their own identities, interests, and commitments to different goals and objectives. 
Specifically, if new expectations and related kinds of knowledge emerge and 
become legitimate— such as in health care, where is increasing acceptance of the 
necessity of other kinds of expertise besides medical technical expertise to provide 
good care (e.g. good doctor-patient communication and organizational knowledge; 
Iris BW 3.indd   60 03-09-12   15:32
61
Negotiated Authority
see Zuiderent-Jerak and Berg 2010, Waring 2007)—vested authority becomes 
contested. Eventually such conflicts may become more manifest and thereby 
weaken the legitimacy of settled interests, providing openings for new actors and 
other interests to renegotiate established institutions and claim a share in the 
authority over these regimes. 
To conclude, in contrast to earlier accounts on institutional change, the regime 
perspective adopted in this chapter allows for a more subtle analysis of gradual 
institutional change to understand the transformative processes of the medical 
training regime. The analysis entails a thorough understanding of the origins, 
evolution, and transformation of the medical training regimes in the United 
Kingdom and The Netherlands. The next sections turn to empirical cases of medical 
training reform. First we provide insight into the institutional contexts of medical 
governance. We then move on to the comparative and historical-institutional 
analysis of medical residency training reform in both countries.
Medical governance in the United 
Kingdom and The Netherlands
Since its inception in 1948, the British National Health Service NHS) has been based 
on the principle of universal free access to state-provided health care funded by 
taxation. Hospital specialists are salaried employees of state-owned hospitals, and 
general practitioners work as independent contractors with the NHS. 
The Dutch health care system can be portrayed as a neocorporatist associational 
system with predominantly public funding and privately owned and operated health 
care providers. Contrary to their British colleagues, most Dutch physicians work in 
entrepreneurial medical specialty partnerships (maatschappen) in association with 
a hospital. Notwithstanding these differences, the medical profession has always 
possessed considerable self-regulatory authority in both countries. 
In The Netherlands, medical self-regulation fits in nicely with the corporatist 
system in which the state has major constitutional responsibilities but depends 
highly on privately working professional practitioners and private not-for profit 
institutions to accomplish this (Helderman, 2007). On the national level, Dutch 
physicians are represented by the Royal Dutch Medical Association (Koninklijke 
Nederlandse Maatschappij tot bevordering van de Geneeskunst, KNMG) to which 
most physicians belong. The KNMG acts as an advocate of medical professional 
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interests and is formally involved in the regulation of medical practice. The interests 
of the various medical specialties are also defended by the specialty associations 
that are more or less commensurable with the British Royal Medical Colleges. 
Specialty associations play an important role in the formulation of residency training 
programs and clinical guidelines for their medical specialty.
The early days of the British NHS have been described as ‘the politics of the 
double bed’ (Klein 1990), because initially the NHS offered a state-based health 
care system while physicians kept a large degree of autonomy. The British medical 
profession has a deeply rooted tradition of self-governance, with the British Medical 
Association (BMA), the Royal Medical Colleges, and the General Medical Council 
(GMC) as the most prominent regulatory bodies. The BMA serves as a trade 
union as well as a professional organization. The Royal Medical Colleges are the 
professional bodies of the various medical specialties that play important roles 
in the regulation of professional training programs and entry to the professional 
community (Klein 2006). The GMC, an independent regulatory body, is involved in 
quality regulation of the medical profession as a whole (Irvine 2006). 
A comparative analysis of the transformation of medical training regimes in 
the United Kingdom and The Netherlands thus seem to fit a most different case 
design (George and Bennett 2005). While the two differ in important institutional 
characteristics of their health care systems, when it comes to the self-regulatory 
authority of medical doctors they share important similarities. In the last two 
decades, however, the self-regulatory capacity of the medical profession has 
increasingly been challenged by a number of exogenous developments. In the 
United Kingdom, the introduction of the internal market and performance indicators 
had an important effect. The Thatcher government introduced the internal market 
in 1991 in an attempt to reduce health care budgets and create more efficiency in 
public sector spending. Central elements included the introduction of a purchaser-
provider split and a system of provider competition in which money would follow 
the patient (Bevan and Robinson 2005). After the Labour party returned to power 
in 1997, successive governments more or less continued the policies of the internal 
market, with more emphasis on performance control and state-based regulation 
(Helderman et al. 2012). As a result, medical practitioners have been confronted 
with many managerial instruments such as standards of good practice and 
procedures for monitoring, evaluating, and sanctioning medical performance (Bevan 
and Robinson 2005, Helderman et al. 2012). 
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The Netherlands went even further in the reform attempt by enacting a new 
health insurance system and incorporating a structure of regulated competition in 
its corporatist health care system. The reforms began with the Dekker Commission 
advisory report of 1987, but it took almost 20 years before the suggested reforms 
were fully implemented. Meanwhile incremental changes were made to enhance 
the institutional and technical feasibility of regulated competition while keeping 
control over health care supply and prices (Helderman et al. 2005). The new Health 
Insurance Act was finally enacted on January 1, 2006, also considered the date on 
which the Dutch turned to the system of regulated competition. Citizens can now 
choose between health insurers, while health care insurers aim to contract efficient 
care of good quality with competing health care providers. Despite the current 
emphasis on competition, Dutch health care is still heavily regulated to contain 
macro healthcare expenditures and guarantee equity (Helderman 2007). 
Against the background of these overarching system-level reforms, the reform of 
medical training regimes became increasingly politicized in both countries in the 
2000s. In the next two sections, we focus specifically on the origins, evolution, 
and transformation of medical training regimes in the United Kingdom and The 
Netherlands.
Medical Training Reform in the United 
Kingdom
Enhancing Unity in Brit ish Medical Education
In the early nineteenth century, Britain had no structured system of medical 
education. There was extreme variation in the quality of medical education and 
thus also in the quality of medical practitioners (Nutton and Porter 1995). This 
slowly started to change with the introduction of the Medical Act in 1858 when the 
medical profession was confronted by a fast-developing body of medical knowledge, 
which increasingly made clear the distinction between real medical treatment and 
quackery. The profession felt an increasing need to set up a registration system 
to distinguish good doctors from bad. Such as system would also enhance the 
social status and income of physicians because it would establish a monopoly on 
medical care (Loudon 1995). The establishment of the registration system meant 
a significant push toward skill standardization, which was further enhanced by 
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the 1858 act’s requirement to allow someone with a four-year bachelor’s degree 
to practice medicine. The General Council of Medical Education and Registration 
was also established through the Medical Act. It was abbreviated to General 
Medical Council (GMC) in 1951. The GMC was licensed to provide a register of 
qualified doctors and had to ensure adequate standards for medical education. 
The GMC was originally an independent authority funded by physicians’ mandatory 
payments. All council members were medical practitioners representing various 
medical corporations. In daily practice, however, the Royal Medical Colleges set and 
controlled the standards and practices for their specialties, yet, training practices—
and outcomes—varied considerably due to local circumstances.
With the introduction of the NHS, the professionally dominated system remained 
largely intact. However, because of the importance of medical education to the 
quality of health service provision and the fact that medical education was mainly 
paid from NHS resources, medical education increasingly became a political 
concern. Initially, political involvement was mainly restricted to undergraduate 
medical education as the Royal Medical Colleges successfully defended their medical 
curricula against outside interference. Nonetheless, several political attempts were 
made to reform medical residency training. A significant example was the Royal 
Commission on Medical Education in 1965. In its final report, published in 1968, 
the Royal Commission recommended a smooth transition between different training 
phases by strengthening ties –and thus alignment– among undergraduate schools, 
universities, regional hospitals and Royal Medical Colleges. It recommended 
changing teaching methods, curricula contents (by also including non-medical 
technical courses) as well as the examination system (Townsend 1968). The 
commission argued for a specialist register to recognize qualified doctors. However, 
many of its recommendations were not implemented, or simply failed, because of 
resistance from the Royal Medical Colleges.
Some issues, however, were readdressed a few years later by the Merrison 
Commission, installed in the mid 1970s to advise the government on a deepening 
conflict between the GMC, Royal Medical Colleges, and medical practitioners 
that threatened the continuity of NHS service provision. Although the Merrison 
Commission addressed broader issues related to medical governance, about a 
quarter of its final report was dedicated to the topic of medical education. As 
with the Royal Commission, it recommended introducing a specialist register and 
expressed the need to unify the medical educational system. Although very critical 
of the part the GMC had played in the conflict with the medical practitioners (Parry 
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1976), the commission argued that the GMC should play a pivotal role in the 
coordination of the various training phases. The Merrison report paved the way for 
the 1978 Medical Practitioners Act, which launched a new GMC that included lay 
membership in order to influence the GMC’s thinking from outside the profession 
(Stacey 1992). The act also established a special education committee inside the 
GMC to coordinate all stages of medical education. However, in everyday practice it 
appeared difficult for the GMC to fulfill this role because of the increasing authority 
of the Royal Medical Colleges over medical affairs due to rapid medical technological 
development and associated specialization.
Although neither inquiry led directly to fundamental changes in the British medical 
training regime, they did however redirect attention to expectations and interests 
outside medical education and sowed the seed for more outside interference in 
medical vocational training in subsequent decades. In other words, medical training 
was no longer the exclusive domain of the medical profession.
Building and Losing Trust in the Brit ish Medical 
Training Regime 
In the mid 1990s newly introduced European legislation required significant 
changes in medical training governance to guarantee mutual recognition of 
specialist medical qualifications between the United Kingdom and European 
partners. The Calman Commission, named after its initiator, the then Chief Medical 
Officer Sir Kenneth Calman, was installed to fit British medical vocational training 
to the new requirements. Noticeably, the Calman Commission executed its task 
in close collaboration with the medical profession as well as other stakeholders 
in professional training, such as the NHS, universities, medical schools, and 
postgraduate deans. The reforms not only addressed institutional arrangements 
but also aimed to improve medical curricula. Key elements were competitive entry 
to training posts, structured training programs across all specialties with regular 
assessment of medical residents, the introduction of “specialist registrar” as a new 
training grade, and the introduction of the Certificate of Completion of Specialist 
Training (CCST) as evidence of competence to mark the end of training. The 
Specialist Training Authority (STA) of the Royal Medical Colleges was introduced 
for overall supervision in postgraduate medical education. Remarkably, given all 
the years of professional resistance, a specialist register was established (Calman 
et al. 1999). The reforms were generally regarded as a successful collaboration 
to improve postgraduate medical education. The Calman Commission was highly 
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appreciated for the time that it took to deliberate on reforms and the trust it 
created between the different agencies in the British medical training regime. 
But the emerging trust relationships between medical doctors and other 
stakeholders in the medical training regime were still very fragile. The success 
of the Calman reforms was soon overshadowed by the disclosure of scandals in 
pediatric cardiac surgery in Bristol and the Shipman case. (Harold Shipman was 
thought to have murdered approximately 236 patients. In 2000 he was found guilty 
of murdering at least 15 and was sentenced to life in prison, where he committed 
suicide in 2004). These notorious failings set in motion successive policy measures 
to enhance medical performance management (e.g, Dixon-Woods et al. 2011). 
The Bristol inquiry, published in 2001, suggested replacing the STA with the GMC. 
In response, the Department of Health said it preferred an independent agency 
to supervise medical vocational training and announced the establishment of the 
Postgraduate Medical Education and Training Board (PMETB). The PMETB came into 
being in 2005 as part of the reforms of Modernizing Medical Careers (MMC), the 
topic we turn to next.  
Modernizing Medical Careers
MMC can be traced back to two policy documents: the NHS Plan (Department of 
Health 2000) and Unfinished Business (Donaldson 2002). The NHS Plan stressed 
the need for a larger workforce to improve access and quality of care. The report 
set out a commitment to a health service increasingly delivered by fully trained 
doctors rather than those in training and announced a shorter training period 
as one of the policies that would accomplish this (Klein 2006). Interestingly, the 
government now started to wield medical training as a strategic tool to achieve 
other NHS goals.
The Department of Health asked Chief Medical Officer Sir Liam Donaldson to work 
on a future prospect of medical vocational training, particularly addressing the 
Senior House Officer (SHO) grade, which in the 2000 report was identified as one 
of the causes of the delay in training consultants. In his final report, Unfinished 
Business, Donaldson went beyond the SHO problem. Unfinished Business presented 
a critical image of the British medical educational system and recommended far-
reaching reforms. First, it outlined a time-capped structured training program with 
seamless transitions between training phases. Second, it proposed a new admission 
procedure to provide equal opportunities to applicants. Third, in line with the earlier 
government’s announcement, it recommended handing over the supervision of the 
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training program to the PMETB (Corrigan and Pinchen 2009). Feeling a sense of 
urgency to reform medical curricula because of growing political and public distrust, 
the medical profession was moderately positive about the proposed reforms. With 
the experience of the Calman reforms in mind, the professionals felt committed to 
another round of reforming medical curricula.
Yet, whereas the Calman reforms deliberately proceeded gradually in order not 
to undermine fragile trust relationships, MMC happened almost overnight. Many of 
the recommendations set out in Unfinished Business were implemented at once by 
the Department of Health. The first measure was to establish PMETB in 2005. The 
second was to implement a special foundation program in the first two years of 
medical residency training to improve the transition between the various training 
phases. A third major change was the introduction of a new appointment system, 
the Medical Training and Application System (MTAS). The MTAS aimed to enhance 
the validity and reliability of the admission procedure to vocational training (Madden 
and Madden 2007). A special review group with representatives from the BMA, 
Royal Medical Colleges, and governmental bodies was set up to coordinate the 
reforms. Although the medical profession was formally included in the review group, 
their actual influence was rather limited (House of Commons Health Committee 
2008).
The Battle of Modernizing Medical Careers
The selection of new trainees became the central focus of MMC. The MTAS was 
based on explicit selection criteria for entering medical residency training in that all 
candidates could apply for the training position of their choice through a nationally 
administered electronic portal. Short-listed candidates would then be interviewed 
by local attendants and offers would be made to the most successful candidates. 
The overall idea was that the recruitment system would become much more open 
and equal this way. By the end of 2006, the Department of Health set out plans to 
introduce MTAS as soon as January 2007. The medical associations warned that 
this would be too soon as the system was not yet ready. Moreover, they feared a 
shortage of training posts. A week before the system went live, the BMA asked 
for suspension of the new procedure, but the Department of Health refused and 
pressed ahead with its plans.
Right from the start, the system was heavily criticized by candidates and local 
assessors. There were serious concerns that the best applicants were not being 
short-listed for interviews. Moreover, the number of applicants was far higher than 
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expected due to overseas applicants as well as applications from doctors already in 
the system who so far had not had good career opportunities. This created fierce 
competition for posts in many areas and made thousands of young doctors deeply 
anxious about their future prospects (House of Commons Health Committee 2008, 
Madden and Madden 2007). In the spring of 2007, the widely shared discontent led 
to a revolt against MMC, and in particular against the MTAS. The onset was a letter 
from a group of senior physicians published in BMJ that shared their concerns about 
the MTAS as well as the role of PMETB in professional training (Brown 2007). In 
addition, a local group of surgeons refused to proceed with the selection procedure, 
effectively sabotaging the new system, because they felt it was unable to select 
the best candidates (Hawkes 2007). The revolt was followed closely by the British 
media. Matters came to head when a special group, the Douglas Review, led by the 
Vice Chair of the Academy of Royal Medical Colleges, was installed to investigate 
the problems. The Douglas Review decided to proceed with the MTAS in spite of the 
problems (Eaton 2007a). This decision was heavily criticized by practicing clinicians, 
who felt unrepresented by their governing bodies. 
Feeling that their career options were negatively influenced by the MTAS, junior 
doctors organized demonstrations against the system in London and Glasgow 
(Eaton 2007b). They increased the pressure by going to court to ask for the MTAS 
to be quashed. Although it refused their application, the Higher Court was very 
critical of the MTAS, calling the system disastrous (House of Commons Health 
Committee 2008). In April 2007, during an interview on BBC Radio, Health 
Secretary of State Patricia Hewitt apologized to junior doctors for the crisis, 
saying that the application scheme had caused ‘needless anxiety and distress’ 
and repeating the apology to Parliament later that month. The BMA welcomed 
the government’s acknowledgement of the problem but stated that an apology 
was not enough. Shortly after, two critical incidents with the MTAS made personal 
information publicly accessible. These breaches of privacy proved the last straw; 
the secretary of state decided to abolish the MTAS and handed the selection 
procedure over to local deaneries. 
So, in sharp contrast to the Calman reforms ten years earlier, MMC became 
highly politicized, with the MTAS at the center of the heated debate. Medical 
practitioners not only protested the government but also turned against their own 
representatives in the reforms. The MTAS was regarded as nothing less than a 
direct attack on one of the core institutions of the medical training regime. Although 
the medical profession had learned to deliberate, discuss and even compromise 
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with external stakeholders on many other aspects of medical governance, the MTAS 
was simply not acceptable.
Not only was disapproval directed at the MTAS, but MMC as a whole became 
highly contested. This illustrates the spillover effect of the system of recruiting 
new trainees as a core institution in the medical training regime. This does not 
mean, however, that the reform of medical residency training was put on hold. In 
practice, there was a significant shift to more outcomes based medical training. A 
competency framework has been implemented in all residency training programs, 
listing the competencies a resident should master. Furthermore, residents have 
become obliged to have their competencies assessed and signed off by consultants 
regularly in order to obtain license to practice medicine (Noordegraaf 2011). 
After the abolishment of the MTAS, medical associations successfully asked for an 
inquiry, which was led by the physician Sir John Tooke. In its final report, published 
in 2008, the Tooke Commission claimed that the problems had been caused partly 
because the medical profession had been bypassed in the reform process. The 
Tooke Commission stated, “strong professional involvement … is essential to ensure 
plans are co-owned and supported to ensure that those with insight into the likely 
evolution of specialty practice are able to influence policy” (Tooke 2008:97). They 
proposed establishing an independent, professional-led advisory body for medical 
training and education, further recommending a merger of the PMETB and the 
GMC. Despite some reluctance, the government agreed with the merger, which 
became effective in 2010. A few months later, Lord Darzi’s report NHS Next Stage 
Review was published, announcing the creation of Medical Education England (MEE) 
as an independent nondepartmental advisory board to be headed by a physician. 
This body has to ensure that “policy, professional, and service perspectives are 
integrated in the curricula” (Darzi 2008:73). Note that the authority over medical 
vocational training is not handed back to the Royal Medical Colleges. Instead, 
the medical training regime has become increasingly coregulated by independent 
bodies comprising both professional, lay and government members.
At first sight, MMC may be considered a classical critical juncture, opening up a 
window of opportunity for the involvement of external stakeholders in the medical 
training regime. In this classical portray of institutional change, institutional 
development is envisioned as long periods of institutional stability alternating with 
brief periods of revolutionary upheaval in which there is room for more substantial 
changes (Thelen and Steinmo 1992, Thelen 1999). The historical-institutional 
analysis presented above, however, reveals a far more gradual and evolutionary 
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reform process. Indeed, the medical training regime as a professional-controlled 
system had already started to transform into a more coregulated regime in the 
1960s and 1970s. Both endogenous and exogenous factors were at stake in this 
process. Whereas in the second half of the twentieth century endogenous changes 
led to incremental changes in the medical training regime to adapt medical 
vocational training to new circumstances (e.g., the GMC obtaining an albeit small 
role in governing medical vocational training), exogenous forces such as new 
European legislation paved the way for further state involvement and a more 
structured and formalized postgraduate medical education. 
This gradual transformation process was interrupted in the late 1990s, when 
growing distrust in the medical profession provided the government with legitimate 
means to claim partial authority over the professional training system. However, 
by rushing past the objections of the medical profession and implementing a new 
recruitment system to wield other NHS goals, the government touched on a core 
institution of professional self-regulating authority, provoking a revolt of practicing 
clinicians against the government as well as against their own professional bodies. 
The government had to back down, painfully realizing that such reforms could not 
be succeeded without the necessary medical practitioners’ support and expertise. 
The MMC debacle led to a renegotiation of authority in the medical training regime, 
putting in place new governance arrangements of co-regulation. Moreover, the 
involvement of other stakeholders introduced new kinds of knowledge in medical 
training that increasingly gained legitimacy. As a consequence, in everyday medical 
training practice there was a shift from the traditional, implicit training-and-
licensure model to a competency-performance model which put more emphasis on 
the formal assessment of residents’ skills and knowledge. 
Compared to the British case, the Dutch reforms underwent a far more deliberate 
process, though not less contested. In the next section, we turn to The Netherlands 
and explore the transformation of the Dutch medical training regime. 
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Medical Training Reform in The 
Netherlands
Establishing a Self-regulatory Structure for 
Medical Education
Similar to United Kingdom, The Netherlands of the nineteenth century lacked any 
formal certification and examination system to assess the quality of training that 
apprentices received in a given workplace. This slowly started to change with the 
establishment of the Dutch Medical Association (NMG) in 1849. The NMG had to 
overcome practical differences by enhancing the unity and status of the medical 
profession (Goudsmit 1978). One measure it introduced was a university-based 
medical curriculum to train doctors with uniform authority. Overall, the role of the 
government in medical education was restricted to subsidizing medical faculties. 
Increasing specialization between 1900 and 1930 enhanced the competition 
between generalist and specialist practitioners, threatening the hard-won unity 
of the medical profession. Most doctors realized that further formalization of 
specialization was necessary to, as one of the medical leaders pointed out, “prevent 
chaos and ensure quality” (Klazinga 1996). In 1931, the Specialist Registration 
Commission was established to register medical specialists and also to set formal 
requirements for medical curricula and select the hospitals that would become 
training sites. 
After World War II successive Dutch governments tried to gain more control 
of medical education, mainly driven by concerns about rising health care costs. 
Initially measures were directed only at undergraduate medical education 
as the medical associations successfully resisted external interference in 
their postgraduate training programs. In the early 1950s, however, after 
rising complaints about the quality of hospitals selected as training sites, the 
government installed a state commission to investigate medical residency training 
(Klazinga 1996). This inquiry led to the introduction of the Central Board for the 
Recognition and Registration of Medical Specialists (CC; later Central Board of 
Medical Specialists, or CCMS) in 1961. The CCMS, which fell under the aegis of 
the Royal Dutch Medical Association (KNMG), had to regulate and control the 
quality of medical training. The ten years needed to create this board prior to its 
establishment reflect the severe negotiations between the medical associations and 
the government about the composition and authority assigned to the board. In its 
Iris BW 3.indd   71 03-09-12   15:32
72
Chapter 3
final appearance, it comprised members of the medical associations and medical 
faculties as well as representatives from the government and teaching hospitals. 
Although government and hospitals thus became formally involved in medical 
vocational training—adding a new layer to the existing system dominated by 
professionals—medical practitioners still held a majority of seats and dominated the 
board’s policies and decisions (Klazinga 1996).
By this time, the quality requirements of medical curricula were discussed mainly 
in terms of years of training at a selected training site and the skills of the clinical 
teacher. This changed in the 1980s when requirements were sharpened because 
a rising number of medical residents had put the capacity of the old master-
apprentice system under pressure. The CCMS, in consultation with the specialty 
associations, formulated new requirements to improve training quality, such as 
a minimal number of hospital beds and the number of patient contacts. External 
peer-reviewed site visit programs for teaching hospitals were introduced to monitor 
and assess the quality of local training programs (van Herk et al. 2001). Although 
these measures enhanced the formalization of the medical training system, it was 
also widely recognized that many of the requirements were not met in daily clinical 
practice (Klazinga 1996). 
At the same time, government interference in postgraduate medical education 
increased. This was mainly due to an increasing felt need to adapt the number 
of doctors-in-training to future health care expectations. To this end, the 
Capacity Board was established in 1999. Typically for the Dutch corporatist 
system, this board was an independent body set up by the Ministry of Health in 
close collaboration with the medical associations, health insurers and hospital 
associations. The board annually determines the number of training posts for each 
medical specialty. These numbers are only maximums, however, meaning that a 
specific specialty association can also decide not to fill all posts —for example when 
it fears overcapacity (Frissen et al. 2008).
Hence, as in the United Kingdom, external interference in Dutch postgraduate 
medical education increased in the second half of the twentieth century but it 
evolved differently than in the United Kingdom. The reforms of Dutch medical 
residency training were very similar to the mechanism of institutional layering, in 
which new institutional elements are grafted onto the existing system, thereby 
touching upon powerful vested interests (Schlicker 2001). In recent literature on 
gradual institutional change, layering is recognized as one of the key mechanisms 
of institutional transformation. It may alter the overall trajectory of institutional 
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development by allowing alternative courses of action to involve actors alongside 
the established trajectories without abolishing established institutions (Thelen 
2004:, Streeck and Thelen 2005). Over time, however, alternative trajectories may 
grow into new structures of governance, enabling non-dominant actors to gain 
power, and thereby enforce changes, in the existing governance regime. This is 
exactly what happened during the medical training reforms of the 2000s, which we 
turn to next.
Adapting to New Requirements
By the late 1990s, medical professional leaders and politicians were increasingly 
arguing that medical curricula were not keeping up with major changes in the 
health care arena. An important turning point was marked by a speech by the then 
Minister of Health, Els Borst-Eilers, addressed to the KNMG in 1999. Minister Borst, 
a physician before entering politics, drew attention to upcoming changes in health 
care such as an increasing need for technically skilled healthcare workers who are 
also good communicators and organizers of care. The minister stressed the need 
for more efficient training and a shorter training trajectory. Reforms of the medical 
curricula were necessary to accomplish this, she argued. Typically for the public-
private dependency in Dutch medical governance, the minister’s appeal for reform 
was followed by two policy documents, one by the medical association, the other by 
a government appointed commission. The first was De Arts van Straks (Tomorrow’s 
Doctors) (Commissie Meyboom 2002), commissioned by the medical association. 
In short, the report painted a prospect for the medical education system of 
shorter follow-up periods between the training phases and a curriculum based 
on modern educational insights into improving the quality of workplace-based 
learning. Tomorrow’s Doctors was followed by De Zorg van Morgen (Tomorrow’s 
Care) (Commissie Legrand 2003) which supported the recommendations made 
in Tomorrow’s Doctors but placed more emphasis on improving the efficiency of 
medical training. 
At the same time, and similar to the British case, the medical profession was 
confronted with new European requirements for medical curricula that established 
a maximum length of medical training trajectories and restricted the number of 
working hours for residents. The medical profession, feeling an increasing sense of 
urgency to adapt their training programs to changing outside demands, announced 
a sweeping reform of medical curricula in 2004. Following the decree, all medical 
residency training programs had to be redesigned following a competency-based 
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model that specified clear end goals. In addition, residents’ skills had to be tested 
regularly using special clinical assessment tools. Overall, the reforms can best be 
understood as an attempt to render medical residency training in a more formal 
and transparent structure without losing professional values and the traditional 
method of apprenticeship-based learning. In daily practice, the training reforms 
focused strongly on restructuring individual training schemes and the use of 
modern educational tools (in particular the instruments to measure residents’ 
capabilities). Educationalists, who previously had no access to postgraduate medical 
education, were hired to implement the reforms. Special courses were developed 
to teach the doctors how to work with the new teaching and evaluation methods. 
So, the reforms that started as an attempt to keep up with changing health care 
demands were gradually reframed as educational improvements to existing training 
programs, but without making any substantial changes to the governance structure 
(de Bont et al. 2008).
By this time, however, the medical profession had to face significant policy 
developments that also impinged on their self-regulating capacity. These policies 
were closely related to the introduction of regulated competition in Dutch health 
care. With regard to medical education, the most significant policy change turned 
out to be the introduction of the Education Fund to subsidize training posts. Until 
then medical residency training was paid for through health insurance premiums. 
Teaching hospitals received more money (were more expensive) than hospitals 
without residency training programs. When the system of regulated competition 
was announced in 2005 the difference in costs became a problem, because teaching 
hospitals could not compete with nonteaching hospitals. Since medical training 
was considered a general good, it was decided to introduce a tax-based Education 
Fund to subsidize residency training. This fund was administered by the Ministry 
of Health. Initially the medical professional association agreed, considering the 
Education Fund as a purely administrative tool to protect vocational training from 
the possibly harmful consequences of competition. A year later, however, their 
opinion changed entirely when the government introduced a new distribution model 
for the allocation of training posts among teaching hospitals. The government 
announced that such allocation would partly depend on measured teaching quality. 
Better training quality, it argued, would be rewarded with more training posts. 
It should be emphasized at this point that the distribution of training posts had 
always been a professional matter regulated by the medical specialty associations. 
Although the government had become involved in the late 1990s with the 
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establishment of the Capacity Board, the allocation of training posts among the 
training sites (the hospital departments) was still fully controlled by the specific 
specialty associations working in close collaboration with local clinical teachers. The 
distribution procedure was viewed as a highly delicate process as it involved money 
(because of disbursement from the Education Fund and also because a medical 
resident provides medical services and is thus cheap labor, especially in the last 
training phase when a resident acts almost on the level of a fully trained physician) 
as well as reputation (having more residents means more prestige).The Education 
Fund impinged on the professional distribution system in three ways. First, because 
all training posts were subsidized separately and each clinical teacher had to 
account for the money received, the fund rendered the mechanisms and related 
powers of the distribution system visible. Second, because the fund was paid out 
of public resources it legitimized the Minister of Health to set requirements for 
claiming resources, thus intervening in the traditional closed practices of allocating 
training placements. Third, because the resources were paid to the hospital 
administration and not to the clinical teachers directly, the fund provided new 
interests for hospital boards to become involved in local residency training. Indeed, 
as medical training generated income it created incentives to establish more 
training posts. This extra income was even more warranted in the light of increasing 
competition on price between hospital institutes. Whereas the medical profession 
often preferred fewer training posts to guarantee some kind of scarcity favoring 
the economic position of the particular specialty group, hospital administrators 
preferred more training posts.
Here we see another example of the insertion of a new institutional layer into the 
medical training regime. In the next section we will demonstrate how the Education 
Fund, introduced as an administrative tool, gradually turned into a strategic 
instrument to control the allocation of training placements, thus enhancing the 
politicization of medical vocational training. Put dramatically, the innocent Education 
Fund turned into a treacherous Trojan horse that seriously challenged the authority 
monopoly of medical doctors.
Defending and Redefining Professional 
Jurisdictions
The medical profession soon realized that it had “sold” their autonomy to the 
government”. After announcing the assignment of training posts on the basis 
of measured quality, in 2009 the government initiated a project that offered 
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limited additional training placements to two medical specialties (surgery and 
internal medicine) according to measured performance. However, both medical 
specialties refused to cooperate, arguing that the quality indicators were invalid. 
The Department of Health thereupon postponed its project and commissioned 
educationalists and policy makers to develop a series of performance indicators that 
could be used to measure training quality. 
The medical associations were dismayed by the new situation and gathered 
together to develop a strategy to forestall further government control. Opting to 
maintain control by initiating change themselves (rather than being victims), the 
associations designed a counterproject that would enhance competition on training 
quality but would be placed at the other extreme of the training trajectory: medical 
residents could follow a time-capped apprenticeship at the end of their residency 
in a teaching hospital of their choice. The performance indicators would allow 
choices to be based on learning opportunities for specialization as well as measured 
teaching quality. Although former Minister Ab Klink doubted whether this plan would 
indeed stimulate competition on quality, he decided to embrace the profession’s 
initiative. He did warn that it could only be a first step toward more competition in 
residency training. 
A special pilot project subsequently developed “displays” where local clinical 
teachers advertised their end-term apprenticeships, providing insight into both 
learning opportunities and training quality scores. Ironically, but also typical for the 
interdependencies between the medical profession and the government in Dutch 
medical governance, the project was funded by the Ministry of Health. In the next 
phase, implemented in 2011, senior medical residents gained the opportunity to 
apply to the advertised training positions. Though the outcomes are still unclear, 
medical residents have responded enthusiastically to these new opportunities for 
getting a grip on their training and their professional career. Although it is too early 
to draw conclusions, this empowerment of medical residents vis-à-vis their clinical 
teachers (the physicians) may eventually have consequences for the traditional 
master-apprentice structure, because it enables residents to leave a teaching 
setting in the training phase in which they possess the highest clinical productivity.
In sum, the Dutch reforms of medical residency training can be characterized by 
processes of institutional layering through which new governance arrangements 
in the Dutch medical training regime have been introduced alongside existing 
ones. It is along these alternative trajectories that, from the 1960s onwards, 
endogenous changes in regulatory bodies (e.g. introducing the CCMS and later 
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establishing the Capacity Board) gradually enforced state authority in the medical 
training regime. This induced new forms of state-profession coalitions in which 
hospital organizations increasingly took part. In daily practice, however, the medical 
profession still dominated the coalitions. Surprisingly, the introduction of regulated 
competition in the Dutch health care arena—a significant shift in the overarching 
system of health care governance—encroached considerably upon the vested 
power of the medical profession in residency training. Whereas the Education Fund 
was introduced to protect medical education from the dynamics of competition, it 
eventually introduced new ambiguities into the medical training regime (see Jacobs 
2010 for a similar observation). The fund opened up the traditional closed practices 
of training post allocation, providing other stakeholders (e.g., the government and 
hospital boards) with new legitimate means to intervene in the process. As such, 
the Education Fund indirectly empowered the government and hospital boards, 
challenging vested medical professional authority in the allocation of training 
placements. Typically for the Dutch neocorporatist system, this resulted in a new 
negotiation process in which the medical profession attempted to regain authority 
over its professional recruitment system.
Conclusions 
A comparative analysis of the transformation of medical training regimes in the 
United Kingdom and The Netherlands comes close to a classical most different case 
design (George and Bennett 2005) in the sense that both countries differ on many 
institutional characteristics except for one crucial independent variable— namely, 
the self-regulatory authority of the medical profession with regard to its vocational 
training programs. The chapter has demonstrated that in the United Kingdom 
and The Netherlands medical training regimes have been transformed from 
predominantly professionally controlled systems into regimes of coregulation. There 
are important differences between the two countries in terms of the strategies 
that were enacted as well as in the nature of the interactions among the medical 
profession, the state, and other stakeholders that can be explained from the nested 
institutional structure of both countries. Nonetheless, the outcomes of the reform 
of the two medical training regimes were quite similar. In the United Kingdom and 
The Netherlands medical professional bodies had to give up their monopoly in 
professional training and increasingly had to share power with other stakeholders. 
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Yet, in the end, in both countries reforms got politicized, and contested, when they 
touched upon the core institution of medical training regimes: the recruitment of 
new trainees. 
In the United Kingdom, the increasing emphasis on medical performance 
management and the government’s subsequent attempt to wield medical education 
to improve the NHS led to MMC and the highly contested new recruitment system. 
In The Netherlands, regulated competition in the overarching regime of health care 
seemingly unintentionally touched on vested professional power over the selection 
and placement of new recruits. The new authority claims over medical vocational 
training ended up in a clash between the medical profession and other stakeholders, 
particularly the state. In both countries authority conflicts were more or less 
settled by agreeing on a regime of coregulation that reconfirmed and perpetuated 
the importance of medical professional expertise and the accompanying authority 
claim of the medical profession. This coregulation forced the medical professional 
to adapt its training practices to new kinds of knowledge that have increasingly 
become legitimate in the health care arena, such as enhanced transparency and 
accountability of medical training practice. 
At first glance this may be read as a proof of professional authority over their 
vocational system in which the profession “only” has to adapt its practices to the 
overarching agenda of health policy reform in order to maintain its legitimate 
authority. However, a closer look reveals that adaptations such as structuring 
training programs and enhancing visibility of former closed training practices may 
give other stakeholders new means to impose their logics on medical training. 
These changes may set in motion more profound reforms of the distribution 
and allocation of authority in the medical training regime, of which the Dutch 
government’s attempt to introduce competition on training posts is a striking 
example. Moreover, contemporary changes in medical education may also make 
physicians (especially the ones that are now trained in the new performance-
based system) more likely to accept more profound forms of performance-based 
management in their (future) work (see also White 2009). Seen this way, the 
transition to forms of co-regulation has not reconfirmed professional authority over 
the medical training regime but has instead opened up the former closed practices 
of medical residency training by installing new kinds of ambiguities that provide 
space for further reforms in the (near) future.
Analytically, the paper shows that the self-governance of medical professional 
training cannot be fully explained by a model of countervailing powers but requires 
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a more dynamic explanatory approach directed at the coevolution of changes in 
multiple institutions that make up an institutional configuration. In the United 
Kingdom and The Netherlands, medical training regimes coevolved with systemic 
health care reforms. Initially, these reforms were located on the periphery of the 
medical training regime. However, as soon as the reforms touched upon the core 
institutions of those regimes, coevolution became far more politicized, ending up 
in a clash of contradicting authority claims. Indeed, MMC entailed a much wider 
reform than the introduction of the MTAS, but its failure had a large impact on other 
forms of external involvement in medical residency training as well. 
Overall, this chapter adds to the current debate on institutional transformation by 
demonstrating the necessity of detailed empirical analysis for our understanding 
of on- and off-path change. Subtle analysis allows us to gain insight into the 
ongoing processes of negotiation on authority in distinct social regimes and the 
mediating role that institutions play in this. Importantly, as we have tried to 
show, such analysis also helps unpack the more unexpected and unpredictable 
transformations in a social policy regime. In general our analysis of institutional 
change in complex policy systems such as health care stresses the need to study 
the interaction among aspects of the political context, the properties of institutions, 
and the process of negotiation and renegotiation between the actors involved. All 
are crucially important to understanding institutional transformation, especially in a 
critical case such as the self-governance of medical doctors and their accompanying 
authority claims over their medical training regimes.
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Learning to Doctor Tinkering with 
Visibility in Residency Training17
“[Medicine]... must be enthused with a sense of openess, driven by the conviction that...decisions must 
be routinely open to inspection and evaluation, like the openess that prevades science and scholarship”. 
(Freidson 1994: 196)
“The ‘balance’ sought, then, is something that needs to be established, by attuning viscous variables to each 
other. Rather than the balance sheets of the accountant, the balancing body of a high-wire artist or a dancer 
come to mind. And even if finally everything fits, if everything is nicely attuned to everything else, it may fall 
apart again”. (Mol 2008: 62)
Introduction
Medical education has been of distinct concern in medical sociology since the late 
1950s with the publication of The Student Physician (Merton et al. 1957) and Boys 
in White (Becker et al. 1961). Both studies set the scene for later sociological 
accounts on medical education by addressing topics as student socialization and 
dealing with clinical uncertainty see (Hafferty 2000, Light 1980, Sinclair 1997). 
After a pause of about a decade in which sociological attention was devoted to 
the issue of professional dominance through the influential work of Eliot Freidson, 
medical education received renewed sociological attention in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Fox 1979). Drawing on the highly deliberate topic of professionalism of that 
time, these studies focused on the socialization of (junior) doctors in the medical 
community (Miller 1970), and, more in particular, the construction of the medical 
identity (Light 1980, Hafferty 1991). Although the latter studies differed in their 
analysis of how the construction of the medical identity is done, they shared an 
17 This chapter is based on Wallenburg, I., A. de Bont, M.J. Heineman, F. 
Scheele, and P. Meurs. Learning to doctor: tinkering with visibi l ity in 
residency training. Accepted for publication in Sociology of Health & Il lness.
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interest in the tacit practices that medical residents need to learn to embody when 
becoming a member of the medical professional community (see also Prentice 
2007). Within this body of literature the socialization of novices is seen as part of 
the surveillance of junior doctors who practice the medical conduct in everyday 
clinical settings (Bosk 1979).
In the last decade, however, there has been a shift to more formalized and 
structured models of supervising and assessing of residents. Due to increasing 
outside pressure to open up medical training to outside scrutiny, medical 
authoritative bodies across the West (such as Canada, the United Kingdom, 
United States, and The Netherlands) have redesigned residency training programs 
in outcome and competency-based curricula to enhance the standardization of 
training programs and to increase transparency of training practices (Fitzgibbons 
et al. 2006, Lurie et al. 2009). Following the new requirements, residents have 
to act under close supervision of clinical supervisors (“attending physicians” or 
“attendings”) and are only allowed to perform clinical procedures on “real patients” 
when they have proven their capabilities (ten Cate and Scheele 2007, Johnson 
2007). The shift to an externally validated training model potentially has significant 
implications for the training of medical residents (doctors-in-training) and their 
(future) conduct. 
Yet the reforms of medical residency training have remained largely unaddressed 
within the medical sociological literature on medical education (for some exceptions 
see Johnson 2007, Chamberlain 2009, Wallenburg et al. 2010). In this chapter, 
we aim to contribute to the understanding of how contemporary reforms in 
postgraduate medical education are incorporated in residency training by focusing 
on a core element of the reforms: the surveillance of residents in everyday clinical 
training practice. Drawing on ethnographic study of gynaecology residency in The 
Netherlands, we explore how attending physicians and medical residents make 
residents’ performance visible and hence evaluable in everyday clinical practice. 
We will argue that visibility is not a single or one-dimensional aim (Struhkamp et 
al. 2009) in residency training but that, instead, multiple visibility practices (or, as 
we term it, visibilties) coexist in everyday clinical training practice, serving different 
goals (Mol 2002). The central questions we address in this chapter are: How is the 
visibility of medical residents enacted in everyday clinical work and what aims do 
these visibilities serve? And how are the visibilities coordinated in everyday clinical 
work?
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The study
The chapter builds on a large-scale evaluation project of medical residency training 
reform in The Netherlands (2006-2012). The project focused on the implementation 
of the redesigned programs of paediatrics and gynaecology/obstetrics residency 
training, incorporating the new standards of outcome-based and competency-based 
education. 
Three authors of this chapter (I.W., A.B. and P.M.) were appointed external 
evaluators of the project. The research project entailed a multiple-sited study of 
reform enactments. As researchers and practicing gynaecologists, the third and 
fourth authors (M.H. and F.S.) were directly involved in the reforms. Our close 
collaboration helped to generate insider’s and outside perspectives on the reforms, 
enabling an in-depth insight into the evolvement and possible consequences of the 
reforms for (traditional) residency training practices (see also Dixon-Woods et al. 
2011). 
In this chapter, we narrow the focus to the clinical workplace, drawing on an 
ethnographic study conducted in two gynaecologist/obstetric wards in hospitals 
located in the western part of The Netherlands. Fieldwork was conducted between 
November 2007 and September 2010.The first clinic, referred to as ‘Hospital 
K’, is a university hospital. For four months the first author (I.W.) shadowed 
gynaecology residents during their daily activities. The second hospital (‘Hospital 
L’) is a nonuniversity teaching hospital. Here the same author followed gynaecology 
residents in their daily routines for two months. During the first observation period, 
more general observations were made of residents’ work and supervision. Based on 
this, more specific observations were conducted in the second period. Although we 
shadowed residents and not attending gynaecologists, we had many opportunities 
to observe and interview attendings as well. 
All participants were informed about the research in a presentation given by the 
first author prior to the study, as well as in personal interactions during fieldwork. 
Patients were notified of the role of the researcher and could refuse her presence, 
which happened twice. Pseudonyms have been used for all participants. No ethical 
approval for this study was needed as the institutional review board of Hospital K 
determined the research to be exempt. 
Notes taken during periods of observation were worked up into detailed 
descriptions shortly after. During the first observation period audiotape recordings 
(five) made of clinical teaching activities were transcribed verbatim. Additionally, 
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we conducted in-depth interviews with 17 attending physicians (12 gynaecologists 
and five paediatricians) and 12 medical residents (five gynaecology residents and 
seven paediatrician residents). The interviews were semi-structured following a 
topic list focused on clinical supervision and resident evaluation. Interviews were 
electronically recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data analyses proceeded in a 
sequence that started with close reading of all transcripts and field notes, followed 
by open coding to label and categorise data elements. This was followed by axial 
coding to link emerging concepts and then selective coding to define key concepts 
(Strauss 1987). Before we describe the study’s findings, let us first turn to the 
theoretical background of resident surveillance and the multiplicity in care practices.
Multiple visibi l it ies in residency training
Surveil lance through social ization
In the sociological literature on medical education the surveillance of medical 
residents is intrinsically connected with the socialization of junior doctors (Arluke 
1978, Apker and Eggly 2004). Socialization involves the moral and symbolic 
transformation of a layperson into an individual who can take on the special role 
and status claimed by the profession (Haas and Shaffin 1982). Out of the body of 
literature two main elements emerge: case presentation and (learning to deal with) 
clinical uncertainty. 
First, case presentation points at the practice of junior doctors presenting a 
patient case in front of an audience of superiors (attending physicians, senior 
residents). Case presentation has been described as a vehicle for professional 
socialization as juniors learn to embody the medical conduct by presenting cases 
effectively and persuasively (Erickson 1999, Lingard et al. 2003). Because case 
presentations are self-presentations, Anspach argues, residents employ a set of 
strategies to protect their own credibility, like using the language and imitating 
the focus of their superiors. Consequently, juniors increasingly concentrate on the 
profession culture instead of patients (Anspach 1988). Second, Fox has pointed 
out that medical knowledge is inherently uncertain as it is riddled with gaps and 
unknowns and the amount of medical facts is impossible to completely master (Fox 
1957). Fox describes how medical students gradually become socialized in medical 
confidence; instead of blaming oneself for clinical mistakes, the aspiring doctor 
learns to successfully manage the limitations of medicine. Drawing on Fox, Light 
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has stated that training for uncertainty actually means ‘training for control’, arguing 
that medical doctors run the danger of becoming insensitive to complexities in 
diagnosis, treatment and client relations (Light 1979). Similar to the literature on 
case presentation, the studies on clinical uncertainty argue that juniors increasingly 
identify with and commit oneself to the profession and a professional career, 
developing greater loyalty to colleagues than to patients (Apker and Eggly 2004, 
Fox 1957, Light 1979).
Multiplying visibi l ity 
Although these sociological accounts on medical socialization have been very 
contributively to the understanding of how novices become ‘real physicians’ 
embodying and disseminating medical professional skills and values, the main focus 
on the medical doctors as a social group and the wider social implications of its 
training practices (in particular the doctor-patient relationship), have been firmly 
criticized within the realm of science and technology studies (STS). STS-scholars 
have criticized medical sociologists for neglecting what is being done in medicine 
while focusing on the social environment of medicine or the social implications of 
medical work (that is, the focus of doctors on own profession instead of clients, or 
the distribution of power in the relationship between an attending and a resident). 
In response, STS-scholars have proposed to turn to clinical practices itself to 
examine how medicine is performed (Timmermans and Haas 2008). Timmermans 
defines practice as “the actual contingent, situated process of performing tasks, 
doing work together, and transforming something into something different” 
(Timmermans 2006: 28). An analysis of practice, he argues, concerns questions of 
who does what, when, where, and with what consequences. 
A second point of critic that STS-scholars have raised is the “normative 
universalism” (Timmermans 2006: 28) that is expressed in sociological accounts on 
medical work. Instead of worrying about the implications of medical socialization 
for, for instance, the doctor-patient relationship STS scholars take normativity as a 
starting point and address the different purposes and values that are embedded in 
daily clinical practices. So, instead of knowing what good care or good training are 
beforehand (as a solid or settled practice) each situation involves different “goods” 
which relate in different ways (Pols and Willems 2011, Mol et al. 2010). This can 
be illustrated with the work of Jeannette Pols on “good washing” in long-term 
psychiatry (Pols 2006). Each situation, Pols argues, involves different valued 
purposes which relate in flexible ways and thus different ways of washing patients 
Iris BW 3.indd   89 03-09-12   15:32
90
Chapter 4
to provide good care. As Pols points out, good care may also mean not washing 
dirty patients if individual autonomy is found to be more important than personal 
hygiene. Yet this value is not stable either, as someone’s ‘dirtiness‘ may not only 
bother the patients themselves, but also bother the other patients around them. 
So, situations of care (here washing patients) are highly situated and can only be 
analyzed as a consequence of specific patterns or traditions, values, knowledge and 
routines used.
Relating the principle of multiplicity to our interest of surveillance in medical 
residency training, we argue that what resident surveillance is and what it does 
multiplies across the many practices of residency training, its enactment of 
technologies as well as across spaces. The surveillance of residents is thus situated, 
contingent and variable, incorporating different (and sometimes conflicting) goods 
and reflect the different values and realities that are enacted in daily practices. In 
short, there is not a single aim or way of making residents’ work visible, but there 
are multiple visibilties. 
In daily work these visibilities are entangled and need to be dealt with together. 
This connectedness implies a number of questions about similarity and difference 
between practices (and goods) as well as how these practices are brought together 
. This bringing together has been described as ‘tinkering’ (see Struhkamp et al. 
2009, Mol et al. 2010, Pols 2012). Tinkering thus points at the situated practices 
in which different goods are juxtaposed despite their mutual conflicts and tensions 
(Law 2010).
In this chapter, we relate the approach of studying the multiplicity of practices 
to the surveillance of medical residents. That is, by addressing the multiplicity of 
residents’ visibility, we seek to unravel the various ‘goods’ embedded in medical 
residency training and examine how these are brought together in everyday clinical 
work. 
Gynaecology residency training in 
everyday cl inical work
Residency training is apprenticeship-based learning, meaning that residents get 
their training primarily by working on patients alongside other physicians rather 
than through lectures and skills lab work, although simulators and skills labs are 
increasingly part of regular residency training (see Johnson 2007). During their 
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training residents rotate through various services and departmental clinics and 
gradually take on increasing levels of responsibility. Where they work and what 
they do depends on the learning stage but also, more practically, on the workload 
of the particular clinical department. In The Netherlands residents do not only 
rotate among different services but usually also among university and nonuniversity 
teaching hospital sites. 
During a working day residents are assigned to a particular service (that is, the 
outpatient clinic, nursing ward, delivery rooms, and operating theatre) where they 
work under the supervision of an attending gynaecologist handling the particular 
ward. At other times residents may be ‘on call’ which means that they have to take 
care of all the patients assigned to the gynaecology department during an evening, 
night or weekend shift. During a shift a resident is usually assisted by a supervising 
gynaecologist who may be in the hospital or is at home. Although a resident 
usually is the first to encounter a patient the attending physician bears the (legal) 
responsibility for treatment.
In the next sections we analyse four practices of visibility in everyday clinical 
practice. With “visibility” we mean the ways residents’ work and performances 
are rendered visible and hence evaluable to attending physicians. We focus on the 
three clinical situations where medical training is enacted: the morning report, the 
outpatient clinic and the operating theatre.
First visibi l ity: Staging residents
The morning report
A first crucial dimension of visibility in medical training is ‘staging residents’, 
meaning that attending physicians put residents ‘on stage’ by watching and 
challenging them when performing clinical activities in order to gain insight in their 
capabilities. Earlier studies, such as the work by Stelling and Bucher (1976) and, 
more recently, Prentice (2007) describe how the amount of supervision and control 
that residents are subjected to is decided upon the process of staging. An explicit 
practice of staging is the morning report. In Hospital K and Hospital L attending 
physicians, residents, midwifes, house staff and medical students gathered each 
morning at 8 AM to discuss events of the evening and night before (for example, 
night deliveries and surgery, patients seen at the emergency room or who are 
admitted to hospital). During the presentations patients’ data (personal details, 
results of clinical tests, digital pictures of X-rays, etc.) were projected with a 
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beamer (video projector) on a big screen. Usually the resident of the night shift 
took the lead in presenting patient cases, following a strict (and almost ritualized) 
routine of giving a patient’s name, year of birth, obstetric history, medical history, 
current medical problems, possible diagnosis and proposed medical treatment. In 
both hospitals there was a clear divide between faculty and residents. Attending 
physicians and senior residents usually sat at the front of the room, while medical 
students and house staff gathered at the back.  
During the presentations residents were often interrupted by questions from 
attendings requesting further information, suggesting alternative diagnoses or 
treatments, or criticizing a resident’s presentation:
“How do you feel about your presentation? Haven’t you missed some important 
information here?” The resident does not answer immediately, keeps her gaze on 
the screen. The attending continues, speaking sharply. “I want to know the position 
of the baby. Just telling me the number of tractions18 doesn’t give me a clue.” The 
resident answers that it all happened without her present. The attending doesn’t 
take this explanation for an answer and becomes even more annoyed. “You were 
there when they reported on this, weren’t you?’ You should know’.” 
(Field notes, Hospital L).
The morning report is more than a handover from the night to the day shift. It is 
the place where residents are tested, clinical knowledge is discussed and shared 
and lessons are taught. In the excerpt above the resident is publicly staged for 
not having full knowledge of the patient the resident is reporting on. Erickson 
has pointed out that the formality of case presentations displays the lack of equal 
footing between residents and their superiors and teaches juniors about status 
differences (Erickson 1999). Although this hierarchy is also clearly present in the 
excerpt above, there is more to say. The shortcomings of the resident (that is, not 
knowing the position of the baby) enables the gynecologist to teach the residents 
and house staff a lesson about medical work. The lesson is twofold: first, it is about 
performing a clinical activity. The attending explains what is technically important to 
check upon (and report on) when performing a ventouse delivery. Second, and this 
lesson parallels Bosk’s concept of moral mistakes in medical training (Bosk 1979), it 
is about clinical responsibility. Resident need to know exactly what is going on when 
18 Number of pulls during a ventouse delivery.
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they are on duty, whether or not they take part in the action. Being informed about 
patients for whom one is responsible is a moral clinical obligation. The morning 
report thus has a disciplining effect on residents by generating a shared view of 
good clinical habits and, more broadly, good care. Yet it is also practical: residents 
learn how ‘things go around here’ and what is expected from them.
The role of technology
The screen, beamer, and the computer play an important role in the morning 
report. The technologies enable to search through patient records collectively, and 
to display and discuss a X-ray or a CTG scan19. However, showing these materials 
not only provides insight into the clinical case but also renders resident’s work 
visible and hence evaluable to the audience:
An attending gynaecologist asks the resident on duty to show the CTG of a delivery. 
The resident nods, clicks through the menu to open the patient record. Within 
seconds the CTG is visible on the screen. 
“So, when did you do the foetal blood sampling (FBS)?” 
The resident scrolls to the point when the test was performed. Pointing to the CTG, 
the attending then asks whether it was essential to do the test. He says it was not, 
going on to explain, “We do them [FBSs] too often. If you get a result of 7.30 or 
higher, it’s not necessary. I think it is okay if it happens once, but if you get this 
result three times out of ten, then it is not.” 
(Field notes, Hospital L)
The FBS is a common clinical procedure to objectify a baby’s health during a 
delivery. It involves making a tiny scratch on the top of the (unborn) baby’s head to 
determine the acidity of the baby’s blood. The test result shows whether the baby 
is in need, meaning that a caesarean operation is indicated, or whether they can 
go on with the ‘natural’ delivery. The FBS is popular with residents as it provides 
objective insight in an uncertain clinical situation. This is especially true for less 
experienced residents. Junior doctors usually start their rotation on the delivery 
ward. When introducing them to the ward, senior residents often advise juniors 
to do an FBS if they cannot get good insight into the baby’s condition: “You can 
always do an FBS, then you know whether you’ve still got time or need to call the 
19 CTG: cardiotocography, a technical means of recording foetal heartbeat and 
uterine contractions during pregnancy and delivery.
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supervisor” (Field notes, Hospital L). Yet, since the test causes discomfort to mother 
and child it should not be done unnecessarily, as the attending gynaecologist 
quoted above also points out.
Moreover, the FBS example underscores the role of technologies. It shows 
how digital patient records render residents’ work visible and assessable to an 
audience of attendings, residents, house staff and medical students. By comparing 
the clinical decision (‘performing an FBS’) to the digital excerpt of the CTG, for 
example, those present can determine whether the particular resident was right 
to do the test. Also, it renders visible if a particular resident is doing the test often 
without any urgency to do so, revealing his or her clinical uncertainty. Visualizing 
technologies thus render it difficult for a resident to cover up mistakes to make a 
good impression to superiors and to protect or enlarge clinical autonomy, as has 
been described in earlier studies on case presentation (Anspach 1988, Apker and 
Eggly 2004).  
In short, the use of digital devices such as the computer and beamer not only 
provides detailed insight into the patient’s case but also makes residents’ work and 
performance visible and, in principle, contestable. We will further elaborate on the 
role of technologies in the surveillance of medical residents when discussing the 
topic of filming surgical procedures. 
Second visibi l ity: Negotiated supervision
Surveillance through the records
From the morning report let us turn to the gynaecology outpatient clinic, where 
patients come to consult a gynaecologist without being admitted to hospital. The 
main question we will deal with in this section is how attending physicians keep 
track on residents’ performance when they are not directly visible to them and how 
residents seek to create this autonomous space while they at the same time trying 
to present themselves as reliable doctors.
In both Hospital K and Hospital L the outpatient clinics are situated in a separate 
part of the building. The outpatient clinic contains a small central desk where 
patients can check in and physicians meet their patients before taking them to 
one of the small consulting rooms. Behind the central desk a white board displays 
who are on service, as well as the name and beeper number of the supervising 
attending physician. In both hospitals patients are assigned to a resident’s service 
on base of prior clinical diagnoses or articulated health problems. Although an 
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attending physician usually is nearby (seeing own patients or doing administrative 
work), residents work mainly autonomously. They see their own patients and only 
consult a supervising attending when they encounter unfamiliar clinical situations or 
problems. 
This does not mean, however, that residents are not checked upon. Their work 
at the outpatient clinic becomes visible – and thus controllable – to attending 
physicians through activities that can be described as “surveillance through the 
records”. Attending physicians regularly read patient records to evaluate what 
has been done and whether anything important has been missed. This may be 
done intentionally to evaluate a resident’s work, or (most commonly) when seeing 
the same patient concerned at another time. Residents are aware of this control 
mechanism, as one of the residents pointed out: “If I do something unusual I 
always explain why in the patient record, for example, that the patient wanted to 
do it this way” (Resident, Hospital L). 
Surveillance through the records is another example of disciplining residents. 
Similar to the morning report reprimand discussed above, the knowledge that 
patient records may be controlled disciplines residents into working in accordance 
with agreed local practices or clinical guidelines (Foucault 1977). Moreover, this 
disciplining effect enables the supervising attending to stay at some distance from 
the serving resident.
Tinkering with supervision 
In the interviews (and during observations) residents pointed out that they 
usually ask for supervision based on what they need and when they think they 
are expected to do so. When starting work in a new department, residents usually 
consult their supervisors more often than later on. They say they do this because 
they lack clinical knowledge (especially when it comes to unwritten local habits) 
but also because they think consulting the supervising attending, and thus making 
yourself visible, is appropriate when you are a novice. Later, when they have gained 
experience and know “how things go here”, they act more autonomously. 
Moreover, residents stress that the degree of supervision mainly depends on the 
personal preferences of a supervisor: “Some attendings want to be more in control 
than others, you just know that. So you call them more often” (Resident, Hospital 
K). Yet other attending physicians seem to leave the work largely to the resident. 
During our fieldwork we often encountered residents who believed that they had 
to look after patients by themselves as the attendings were busy elsewhere. Yet, 
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attending physicians emphasise that they are fully aware of what is going on and 
describe their supervising activities as planned: 
“You work so closely together, you know how they [residents] work and whether 
you can rely on them to contact you when needed […]. The most dangerous 
residents are the ones who just go ahead and don’t realise when they need to call 
you for a decision. If someone like that serves on my shift and I’m at home, I’m 
inclined to call in more often to check if everything is okay” 
(Attending gynaecologist, Hospital K).
The amount of autonomy residents receive depend on their assessed competence. 
As skills and knowledge increase during residency they are allowed to carry out 
more clinical procedures independently. Yet, as the attending above points out, it 
is not only a question of clinical competence but also one of reliability.  Attending 
physicians bear the legal responsibility for a patient’s health and thus need to 
know whether they can rely upon a resident, meaning that the particular resident 
will call for assistance when needed and obeys the orders of superiors. ‘Docility’ is 
often mentioned as an important criterion for trust–providing opportunities to the 
resident to act autonomously. However, trusting a resident is also based upon their 
not calling too often: 
Paula, an attending gynaecologist, attends the morning round on the maternity 
ward when her beeper goes off again. She exclaims. ”Will it go on like this the 
whole day!” She grabs the phone and listens to who is calling her this time. “Well, 
this is your fourth call this morning, but no matter, all your questions have been 
relevant.” 
(Fieldnotes Hospital L).
Residents face an ambiguous task. On the one hand they are expected to make 
themselves visible and consult their supervisor, thus showing their docility. On the 
other hand they are expected to work independently and ‘not call too often’ to show 
their clinical autonomy and present themselves as confident physicians. Residents 
tinker with supervision and patient care. They constantly try to figure out what 
is expected of them, and try to live up to the (assumed) expectations, while also 
seeking to provide good medical care to patients in their charge. 
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In an interview, an attending gynaecologist described supervision as a continuous 
play between residents and the attending in which residents try to show off clinical 
knowledge and skills to earn more space to practice. Moreover, as residents grow in 
seniority an element of choice is added to the play: 
“One gynaecologist is better than another,” Suzy [a resident] says. “Some 
questions you just don’t want to ask the appointed supervisor but you would 
want to put them to another gynaecologist.” She explains that it is about having 
confidence in someone’s knowledge and skills. I (I.W.) ask Suzy what she does 
when she is appointed to a supervisor she does not trust. Suzy answers that she 
sometimes tries to slip into another gynaecologist’s office. “Or, if there is no rush, 
I ask the patient to make a follow-up appointment. But if it’s an emergency, you 
can’t escape your supervisor”. 
(Resident, Hospital K)
Residents also make assessments of those who supervise them. During a residency 
they increasingly develop their own clinical preferences and routines and try to act 
accordingly. They may feel that the scheduled supervisor is not the most suitable 
physician to turn to because they think the particular clinician is less experienced 
in a specific problem, or simply because the resident prefers the more aggressive 
approach of one attending or the more careful approach of another. Although 
bypassing your supervisor is not allowed as a physician stressed when we discussed 
this topic, everyone knows that it is done and more or less seems to accept it. 
Here our analysis resonates with earlier accounts on medical education, showing 
how junior doctors seek to create their own learning opportunities (Miller 1970, 
Bosk 1992) and aim to enlarge the space to act autonomously while their superiors 
elaborate a set of countermoves to keep control (Bosk 1979). Yet, we want to add 
that this interaction is a negotiated order. During residency residents gradually seek 
to obtain more freedom and, by doing so, demonstrate their readiness to taking 
on a more senior role with accompanying tasks and responsibilities. Attending 
physicians respond to this by providing more space to act. Although this may be 
done very implicitly (for instance, by not punishing the bypassing of supervisors) it 
points to an important transformation of the resident into a more mature clinician.
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Third visibi l ity: Playing with invisibi l ity
The importance of independent practice
Residents need space to practice medicine to be trained as independent physicians 
(Smith et al. 2003). Whereas sufficient space is negotiable at some locations, at 
other locations the room to practice is far more limited due to clinical risk and 
patient vulnerability, as in operating theatres. In these cases, other practices need 
to be put in place to create learning space. In this section we turn to the operating 
room (OR) and highlight the practice of enacting invisibility to provide the space for 
residents to assume the clinical responsibilities of an attending physician.
It depends on the situation, and luck as well, that they come across a complication 
when I’m not there (…). During my training, I was really proud when I handled 
things well on my own. You know, in obstetrics things can get acute, and if 
you solve a problem, then everyone says you’ve done a good job. That gives 
you confidence. I try to give them [residents] the opportunity to have such 
experiences”. 
(Attending gynaecologist, Hospital K)
The gynaecologist quoted here underscores the importance of encountering clinical 
problems to experience clinical responsibility. If things go well, confidence increases 
for both resident (self-confidence) and the attending physician (confidence in the 
resident’s capabilities). 
Susan (senior resident) and Matt (junior resident) are on duty in the OR. Nick, the 
attending gynaecologist, asks if he should supervise the next caesarean operation 
or does Susan want to do it. Susan agrees to do it. Matt smiles at me. “See how it 
goes around here, we just send our supervisors away!” 
Half an hour later, while Matt and Susan are in the middle of the operation, Nick 
walks in to check the printed operation schedule in the corner of the OR. In passing 
he looks over Matt’s shoulder to see how things are going and leaves without a 
word. When the operation is finished, Matt and Susan join Nick in another room to 
prepare for the next surgery. Nick is sitting at a desk and announces that another 
caesarean section is coming up. Susan and Matt return to the OR. 
Nick arrives a few minutes later wheeling in the patient and her husband. He warns 
Susan and Matt to be careful. The woman has had contractions for the past 9 hours 
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and her uterine wall might be weakened. Susan nods; she has just explained this to 
Matt. Again Nick leaves, returning only when Susan and Matt are closing the wound 
(following the birth of a healthy baby). “How far along are you?” Nick asks. “Just 
finishing,” Susan answers. Nick disagrees. “You are only starting to close the belly. 
And don’t forget the operation schedule.” Now he stays in the OR, watching as 
Susan and Nick finish the operation. 
(Field notes, Hospital L)
In this case the attending is not really invisible but regularly pops in. With his 
leaving the OR, both residents experience something akin to clinical autonomy. Nick 
provides space for Susan to practice the role of supervising attending, although 
he still bears the final responsibility for the patients on the operation table, and 
for the operation schedule. To accomplish this responsibility Nick employs several 
kinds of dispersed surveillance, such as regularly entering the room to check on 
the residents and patients and speeding up the operation program by bringing in 
patients or by just being around. 
Pretending invisibility
Another practice we encountered is “playing the invisibility game”:
We walk from the delivery room to the nursing post. Ruben, a gynaecology 
resident, tells me about an important lesson he learnt in a surgery rotation. He had 
to do a caesarean, together with his supervisor. The attending asked who Ruben 
wanted him to be: the collaborating chief, the assisting chief, the collaborating 
medical student or the hindering medical student? The attending often played this 
‘invisibility game’. 
Ruben chose the hindering medical student. During the operation the patient had 
a fluxus (non-stop bleeding after delivery) which Ruben did not manage to stop. 
Ruben tells me [I.W.] how the patient was losing more and more blood and all the 
while the supervisor did nothing. This made Ruben nervous. Finally he asked the 
attending to take over, which the attending immediately did. Ruben says he thinks 
the attending went too far [at pretending to be invisible], but, at the same time, he 
was also annoyed with himself that he had not managed to fix the problem. 
(Field notes, Hospital K)
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In the story of Ruben the attending gynaecologist plays a game to teach the lesson 
of clinical responsibility. This lesson is twofold. First, by pretending invisibility 
(placed in a lower position relative to the resident) a supervisor creates space for 
the resident to experience clinical responsibility for the patient on the operation 
table. This allows residents to demonstrate their ability to manage clinical issues on 
their own, also when complications show up. Second, it is about being accountable 
to a vulnerable patient, both from the perspective of the residents and the 
attending. The attending does not really leave the room but is present all the time, 
ready to intervene (in sake of the patient) when this is urgently needed. However, 
intervening will probably hamper the self-confidence of the resident. Therefore, the 
attending will only intervene when there is no other way. By waiting the attending 
also challenges the resident: what is the appropriate moment to give up? 
And here comes the ambiguity again; a resident should not give up too early 
(as this shows uncertainty and dependency), but not too late either (revealing 
disrespect for the patient’s wellbeing). In other words, the test is to choose the 
right moment. Although these different accountabilities do not fit readily together, 
and may sometimes even be in opposition, playing with invisibility seems to be a 
creative tinkering practice that holds together flexibly both the goals of good patient 
care and good resident learning.
Fourth visibi l ity: Fi lming surgical procedures
The mediating role of technologies
Technological innovations have changed clinical practice considerably in the last few 
decades (Timmermans 2000, Clarke et al. 2003). What role do medical technologies 
play in the surveillance of residents?
The gynaecology operating room has recently been rebuilt to make it suitable for 
endoscopic surgery. Three big flat screens hang above the operating table, displaying 
the inside the patient’s body and the instruments the surgeon is manipulating during 
an endoscopic procedure. A small camera built into the operating lamp records 
the entire operation. Now medical students (and researchers!) should no longer 
need to stand on footstools, peering over clinicians’ shoulders, hoping to see what 
is happening on the operation table, moving cautiously (or not daring to move) to 
prevent contamination of the sterile operation field.  
(Field notes, Hospital L)
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In Hospital L the new filming capacity is closely linked to the introduction and rise 
of endoscopic surgery. This type of surgery typically involves laparoscopic devices 
that are inserted through the skin into a body cavity or anatomical opening, 
with operating clinicians looking at a screen instead of the patient’s body while 
performing the procedure.  
An anesthetised patient suffering from a myoma that needs to be removed lies 
on the operating table, with her legs supported by padded leg rests. Liz (senior 
resident) sits on a stool in front of the patient with Mark (attending gynaecologist) 
standing right behind her. Liz inserts an endoscope, keeping her gaze on the screen 
behind the patient. She moves the scope around and flushes liquid into the womb 
(to generate internal pressure). She starts to remove the myoma, slicing off small 
sections while moving the endoscope backwards and forwards. The procedure is 
complex and physically burdening as Liz constantly needs to alter the quantity of 
liquid while taking care to cut into the myoma and avoid perforating the womb. 
Focusing on the screen, Marks says Liz should cut off small pieces from left to right. 
After 20 minutes Liz proposes stopping even though the removal is incomplete 
since the patient has already been advised to have the procedure done in two 
operations. Yet Mark disagrees and says they can still do some more cutting now. 
They change positions. Mark inserts the endoscope and works on for another 20 
minutes. Liz says she probably could have done more, but she needs to become 
more skilled in using the instrument. Mark does not answer immediately but asks 
whether the procedure is taped: “This is an instructive case”. 
(Field notes, Hospital L)
By checking the screen as well as the resident’s movements the supervising 
physician can see and respond to what is being done inside and outside the 
patient’s body. Moreover, the use of the scope enlarges the skills of the residents 
as each movement is blown up on the screen (which is part of the endoscopic 
technique). Furthermore, the videotaping of the procedure enables the resident and 
supervising attending to watch the surgical procedure again, giving them more time 
to spend on evaluating the resident’s skills. 
Making performance transportable
Videotaping also enables others to watch the procedure as well:
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Susan, one of the junior residents explains that the recordings are used for group 
teaching in a particular surgical procedure or disease. “Some residents also save 
their recordings in electronic portfolios so they can demonstrate their surgical skills 
when applying for a gynaecologist post in another clinic”.
(Resident, Hospital L)
Medical technologies reconstitute the training of junior doctors in various ways. 
First, the filming technique allows to make individual performance transportable 
and hence visible to and assessable by other physicians, residents and medical 
students, and even to potential colleagues. Learning is thus no longer restricted 
to a closed and situated activity from which others can learn only when the people 
involved are willing to share their experiences. Second, competencies can be 
evaluated more precisely by focusing on specific aspects since the filming technique 
enables ‘to slow things down’ (Mesman 2011) and discuss specific elements. 
Although we did not specifically study this, it could be the case that visualizing 
technologies shift attention from the construction of the medical identity (judging 
a resident as a future physician) to technical skills as these are enlarged and 
increasingly focused upon through the new technologies. 
Third, and this is a relatively new phenomenon, the recording technique renders 
the surgical and teaching qualities of the attending physician visible and hence 
evaluable to a broader public. Interestingly, this may mean that in the (near) future 
attending physicians have to account more for their skills and training methods 
—and may become more careful and remote in enacting educational strategies like 
the enactment of invisibility.  
Discussion
Current reforms in postgraduate medical training point at an increasing emphasis 
on measurable visibility of medical residents. The reform incorporates structured 
models for the supervision and assessment of medical residents. Following new 
requirements, residents are allowed to perform clinical procedures on “real” 
patients only when they have proved they are capable of doing so. Yet this chapter 
has shown that in everyday clinical work multiple practices of residents’ visibility 
coexist. We have listed four of these: staging residents, negotiating supervision, 
playing the invisibility game and filming surgical procedures. These visibilities are 
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flexibly brought together in daily clinical work to serve the two central goals of good 
patient care and good education.
The chapter has shown how both attending physicians and residents persistently 
tinker with visibility to serve both of these aims. The staging of residents during the 
morning report, for example, helps to discipline residents in their work, allowing 
them with more space to practice independently at other moments or locations 
(for example, in the outpatient clinic). Moreover, the enactment of invisibility 
games in the operating theatre provides residents with the experience of clinical 
autonomy but also enables attending physicians to test residents’ technical skills as 
well as their reliability- which is crucial information for an attending when on call 
(do residents ask for attending’s assistance when this is appropriate, or will they 
muddle through at the risk of a patient’s health?).
However, the chapter has demonstrated that the balance between these visibilities 
is currently shifting towards greater visibility. The incorporation of technological 
devices in clinical work plays a crucial role in this. The use of the beamer and 
the laptop displaying clinical information of patients (such as laboratory results 
and CTG scans) to the audience during the morning report, for example, render 
residents’ work and performance increasingly visible and contestable. Moreover, 
the teaching capabilities and habits of attending physicians are increasingly made 
visible through the use of new technologies. The introduction and rise of endoscopic 
surgery, for instance, allows operations to be videotaped and to be transported. The 
videotaping technique thus transports the attening-resident interaction away from 
the intimate zone of the OR allowing others to watch and evaluate their activities as 
well. We suggest that this shift to visible work may make attending physicians (and 
residents) more reluctant when enacting strategic activities like the game of playing 
invisibility. 
Moreover, this chapter has contributed to the traditional medical sociological 
debate on medical education by shifting the focus from medical education as a 
social institution of junior socialization to the practices of medical training itself. A 
practice-oriented study not only focuses on the social implications of medicine but 
highlights the practices and contingencies of everyday clinical work, the (sometimes 
conflicting) values and purposes that emerge as well as the way in which medical 
practitioners deal with these to serve different aims. Moreover, such approach 
helps to get a better understanding of how current reforms in medical education 
challenge clinicians’ educational activities.
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You Need to Bond with the 
Ones You Train”: The Changing 
Social Interactional Order in 
Medical Residency Training20
“(...) residency training is designed as a moral education, the purpose of which is to teach 
young doctors the standards of practice.” Bosk 2003[1979]: xvi
Introduction
On 30 June, the day before the horrific Tuesday, when all start their medical 
training, a new group of interns gathers to hear the Fish (chief resident), the Leggo 
(chief of medicine), Dr. Frank (the house psychiatrist who warns the group about 
the hard life of an intern, suggesting that some may commit suicide before the 
end of the year) talking about the rules and values of the House of God. In the 
following weeks the interns quickly learn the Laws of the House of God (e.g., “Law 
#1: Gomers21 don’t die”) produced by the Fat Man (senior resident). These laws 
20 This chapter is based on Wallenburg, I., J. Pols, and A. de Bont. “You need 
to bond with the ones you train”: The changing social interactional order in 
medical residency training. Submitted to Science Technology & Human Values 
(under review).
21 Gomers, an acronym for ‘get out of my emergency room’, are old demented 
patients who, according to Shem’s Fat Man, “want to die but we don’t 
let them” (Shem 1995 p.38). These patients, Shem’s characters argue, 
can only be helped by turfing them out to the nursing home as soon as 
possible. Turfing refers to a fictional practice of transferring patients to 
another service to get rid of cl inical responsibil ity for them. However. The 
term has been adopted by American physicians to point at the real practice 
of transferring patients to other cl inical services  to delegate cl inical 
responsibil ity for them (Bosk 1992, p. 63).
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help interns survive both their patients and chiefs, and care for the sick who do die 
(Shem 1995).
First published in 1978, Shem’s novel ‘The House of God’ describes the life, loves 
and horrors of a group of junior doctors undergoing training. Many medical students 
and residents (physicians-in-training) from all around the world have read the 
book, a satire of “real” residency training practice. The closed world of juniors 
learning to doctor that Shem portrays has also been described in many sociological 
studies of medical education (for example, Fox 1957, Bosk 1979, Sinclair 1997). 
These studies usually focus on the socialization of junior doctors in the medical 
community, and, more in particular, the construction of the medical identity 
(Hafferty 2000). 
Others writing in the realm of science and technology studies (STS) have 
pointed at the use of technology in the process of becoming a physician. 
Prentice, for instance, has described how the surgical identity becomes embodied 
through practice in the operating room. She shows how guided physical training 
simultaneously embodies the technical and social lessons of surgery (Prentice 
2007). Likewise, Johnson has examined how medical simulations, which in the 
past decade have increasingly become part of residency training, are woven into 
the context of medical education and, as such, have become part of the situated 
learning that occurs in medical apprenticeship (Johnson 2008). Both Johnson 
and Prentice draw on the concept of legitimate peripheral participation (Lave 
and Wenger 1991) to describe how junior doctors are gradually integrated in the 
local medical community of practice, changing position from the figurant zone 
(“periphery”) to the protected arena (“the center”). In this process attending 
physicians continuously judge the junior’s abilities to take on more responsibility, 
become increasingly part of the medical team, and ultimately, perform more 
complex clinical procedures.
In this chapter, we elaborate on the socio-technical perspective on medical 
training. Drawing on ethnographic research in gynecology and surgery training, 
we study how current shifts in postgraduate medical training—including the 
severely reduced resident duty hours and increasing standardization of resident 
assessment—reconfigure traditional training practices and change the positions of 
actors herein. We use Goffman’s concept of the social interactional order (Goffman 
1959,1961) and Pinch’s recent socio-technical explanation of Goffman’s social 
interactional order (Pinch 2010) to explore how professional relationships, clinical 
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responsibilities and residents’ learning opportunities in everyday training practice 
are arranged and change due to the reforms.
The central questions we address are: How do contemporary medical training 
reforms intervene in the social interactional order of clinical practice and in 
the position of medical residents? How do these reforms influence the learning 
opportunities in everyday clinical practice?
A socio-technical understanding of the 
social interactional order
Erving Goffman, an observer-theorist of everyday social interaction, has described 
how actors maintain roles and play out social relations according to precise rules 
of staging (Goffman 1959). In The presentation of self in everyday life Goffman 
shows how individuals present themselves and their activities to others during face 
to face interactions by playing roles (“performances”) and attempting to control 
the impressions the audience form of them in order to make the audience believe 
that the characters they see actually possess the attributes they appear to possess 
(Goffman 1959). Goffman aimed to understand how people are constituted, 
define themselves and are understood by others in terms of interaction. He was 
particularly interested in the situated activity system of social exchange between 
individuals comprising not only spoken words but also the tone, accent, bodily 
language, gestures, withdrawals and the silences that are enacted (Smith 2006).
Goffman perceived the social interactional order as a reality in its own right in that 
issues concerning the self are approached from the point of view of the workings 
of interactions, relationships and organizations (Smith 2006, 42). He distinguished 
a front region (where the act is performed) and a back region (where performers 
prepare themselves). Goffman noted that while the front region is by and large a 
public space, control must be exercised over who can go backstage, so as not to 
disturb the image (and impact) of the performance (Goffman 1959: 119)—and the 
enacted social order. 
In a recently published article, social scientist and technologist Trevor Pinch draws 
attention to the barely articulated yet crucial role of technology and materiality in 
Goffman’s work (Pinch 2010). Technologies and materialities, and how they are 
arranged and change, are important to the ways social interaction is performed, 
mediated and staged. Moreover, changes in materialities and technologies are 
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highly consequential for the organization of the social interactional order. Which 
technologies and materialities are chosen (instead of others) may configure 
interactions in quite different ways (Pinch 2010: 419). To demonstrate this, Pinch 
focuses on Goffman’s concept of ‘role distancing’ which comprises the idea that 
actors not only embrace their roles but, at times, also need to ‘step out’ of their 
role to distance themselves from the role and, by doing this, reveal to others that 
they are actually playing a role (Goffman 1961, Pinch 2010: 412). To indicate this, 
Pinch draws on Goffman’s example of performing surgery. Goffman argues that 
during surgery a chief surgeon often steps out of his role by making jokes when an 
operation turns into a less critical phase. This role distancing, Goffman explains, 
aims to signal to the rest of the team that they can relax somewhat (Goffman 
1961: 415). Pinch explains that this moment of relaxation is not only marked 
by the verbal or physical clues of the surgeon, but also crucially depends on the 
material circumstances and technical practices of the surgery, such as the results 
of X-rays and the patient’s blood pressure, which confirm that a critical phase has 
passed (Pinch 2010: 416). 
Pinch thus argues that role distancing not only applies to the verbal and physical 
acts that take place, but also depends strongly on the technical and material 
characteristics of a particular situation. In general, he demonstrates that the 
interactional order studied by Goffman is embedded in, mediated and staged by 
material circumstances and mundane technologies. Pinch stresses the importance 
of studying how participants negotiate the technological and material choices and 
the factors that constrain or enable those choices as part of the social order (Pinch 
2010). 
This chapter takes up the socio-technical perspective of the social interactional 
order and applies this to the issue of medical residency training reform. Elaborating 
on Lave and Wenger’s concept of legitimate peripheral participation mentioned in 
the introduction (Lave and Wenger 1991), we view the social interactional order of 
medical residency training as the relations and interactions between participants 
in a local medical professional community of practice, in which newcomers 
gradually become integrated into the group of vested practitioners through moving 
from the periphery to the center of medical care delivery. Drawing on Pinch, we 
argue that this social interactional order of learning to doctor is mediated by 
and embedded in material circumstance and mundane technologies (e.g., time, 
buildings, ultrasounds, assessment tools). We examine how the social interactional 
Iris BW 3.indd   110 03-09-12   15:32
111
“You Need to Bond with the Ones You Train”
order is reconfigured through contemporary reforms in medical training and how 
participants seek to (re)negotiate these changes.
Fieldwork
The study builds on a larger, on-going evaluation study of postgraduate medical 
educational reform in The Netherlands (Wallenburg et al. 2010). We draw on two 
distinct yet closely related ethnographic studies in gynecology training and surgery 
training. The first study examined how reforms are enacted in daily gynecology 
training practice and was executed in two phases between November 2007 and 
September 2009. One of us (IW) conducted participant observations and semi-
structured interviews with gynecology residents and gynecologists in two hospital 
clinics. The first, referred to as “Hospital K”, is a university hospital. The second, 
“Hospital L”, is a nonuniversity teaching hospital. In both settings, IW shadowed 
gynecology residents during their daily activities. She saw patients, attended 
educational conferences, observed operations and deliveries, and sat with residents 
while they entered notes and orders into computers. Although the focus was on 
residents and not the attending gynecologists, there were many opportunities to 
observe and interview attending physicians as well. IW interviewed 17 attending 
physicians and 12 residents. 
The second study (October 2010–January 2012) concerns surgery training. 
This study concentrated on the daily organization of residency training and the 
consequences of current reforms for residency training programs. IW observed local 
clinical teachers at six meetings (monthly, each lasting about two hours) discussing 
topical issues, the residents’ performance and more general matters relating to 
surgery training. In addition, we conducted interviews with 13 attending surgeons 
and 14 surgery residents22.
22 The interviews were conducted together with Niels Hopmans (surgery intern/
researcher, Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam) and Ted den Hoed (surgeon/
clinical teacher, Ikazia Hospital Rotterdam).
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The shift to standardization in medical 
training 
In 2004 the Central College of Medical Specialists of the Dutch Royal Medical 
Association (CCMS), responsible for accrediting residency training programs, 
launched a far-reaching reform. The CCMS announced that from 2011 onwards 
all resident-training programs had to be competency-based, with structured 
time-capped internships, and predefined and measurable end terms. This shift to 
structured training programs and measurement of residents’ competencies fits in 
with a far broader trend of standardization and measurable performance in medical 
work (Timmermans and Berg 2003, Taylor 2011).
A key reform element is the introduction of standardized clinical assessment tools 
to assess and measure residents’ competencies. During our field work, attending 
physicians often recalled how rarely their clinical teachers commented on the things 
residents did. Often they had to guess or try to “read” their teachers opinion of 
their performance. Thus, the evaluation of residents used to be done fairly implicitly 
but now competencies must be assessed regularly, using standard forms. 
One example is the Objective Structured Assessment of Technical Skills (OSATS), 
a validated evaluation instrument designed for surgical procedures. It allows 
a supervising attending to evaluate a resident’s level of competence in eight 
performance categories. These are: treatment selection, feeling for tissue, time 
and motion, knowledge and handling of instruments, use of assistants, flow of 
operation, knowledge of specific procedure and peri-operative care. Skills are 
scored on a scale from 4 (poor performance) to 10 (excellent performance); see 
Figure 1. 
Using standard evaluation instruments is meant to serve several goals. First, it 
improves the learning climate for residents as assessment tools facilitate structured 
feedback. Second, it enhances the objectivity of assessment. Third, it facilitates 
comparability between residents (indicating the “learning curve”), as well as 
between moments in a resident’s training trajectory. Finally, such instruments 
make residents’ performance transportable. Residents no longer need to follow one 
“master” (as in the old master-apprentice model) who knows all their residents’ 
capabilities well after training them over the years. Standard assessments enable 
residents to travel between hospital sites to learn and obtain qualifications for 
specific clinical procedures from various clinical teachers (“what you qualified for at 
one teaching hospital can also be done in another clinical setting”). Although there 
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is considerable skepticism in the field whether assessment tools such as the OSATS 
can really objectify competence, they are increasingly being used in daily clinical 
practice. 
Standard assessment reform occurred in concert with another major shift in 
residency training, namely, a severe reduction in resident duty hours. Working 
long hours has long been recognized as an essential element of the residency 
experience. Since the 1990s, however, extended duty hours, and especially the 
resulting sleep deprivation, have increasingly been seen as a danger to patient 
safety, and a risk to the resident’s own health and education (Longnecker 2006). 
In response to growing public and professional concerns, American and European 
regulatory bodies announced a steep reduction of resident duty hours in the early 
2000s. In the United States residents’ working hours were limited to 80 hours 
averaged across four weeks (Drolet et al. 2010). In Europe, following the Working 
Time Directive from the European Commission, resident duty hours were brought 
back to 48 hours on average (Richards 2009). Despite the considerable difference 
in the number of hours, the limitations provoked similar criticism in both continents. 
Clinicians argue that the reduction will deprive residents of clinical exposure, and 
put patient safety in danger as more frequent handoffs will result in loss of essential 
(tacit) knowledge about patients. Moreover, the new duty-hour rules may lead to 
a shift-work mentality in the new generation of physicians (Szymczak et al. 2011). 
We will discuss these shifts and how they reframe traditional training practices in 
more detail below. 
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Figure 1 Objective Structured Assessment of Technical Skills (OSATS)23 
Selected 
treatment 
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 *
Demonstrates lack of knowledge 
about the pathology
Knows broad outlines Demonstrates close 
familiarity with the 
material
Respect for 
tissue
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Frequently used unnecessary force 
on tissue or caused damage by 
inappropriate use of instruments 
Careful handling of tissue but 
occasionally caused inadvertent 
damage
Consistently handled 
tissues appropriately with 
minimal damage
Time and 
motion
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Many unnecessary moves Efficient time/motion but some 
unnecessary moves
Clear economy of 
movement and maximum 
efficiency
Knowledge 
and handling 
of instruments
 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Lack of knowledge of instruments Competent use of instruments 
but occasionally appeared stiff 
or awkward
Moves smoothly
Use of 
assistants
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Insufficient use and instruction of 
assistants
Appropriate use and instruction 
of assistant most of the time
Optimal use and instruction 
of assistants
Flow of 
operation
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Frequently stopped procedure, 
needs lots of instruction
Demonstrates forward 
planning, yet needs lots of 
instruction
Obviously planned course 
of procedure, independent 
and confident
Knowledge 
of specific 
procedure
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deficient knowledge, needs 
instruction at most stages
Knows most important steps of 
procedure
Demonstrates full 
knowledge
Peri-operative 
care
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Untidy and incomplete Good execution of tasks, needs 
instruction
Independent, precise and 
complete
Cumulative 
average 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
* Unassessable
Final Score
Less than expected As expected Better than expected
Total score 
Supervisor
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unsatisfactory* Average Satisfactory**
Total score 
Resident
4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Unsatisfactory Average Satisfactory
* Poor to fair
** Good to excellent
23 The OSATS form presented here is the one used by Dutch surgeons 
(translated in English). Although the OSATS is often presented as a universal 
assessment tool in surgery practice, different versions are used by different 
medical specialt ies within and among countries. This nicely i l lustrates the 
felt need among cl inical groups to adapt “universal” instruments to local 
habits, beliefs ad needs (see also Timmermans and Berg 1997, Zuiderent-
Jerak 2007)
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Negotiating learning space
Residents learn medical conduct in real hospital settings or the general 
practitioner’s surgery by practicing medicine (i.e., performing physical examinations 
of patients, prescribing drugs, scheduling lab tests, managing clinics, attending 
clinical conferences and—in case of a surgical specialty—operating on patients) 
under the supervision of attending physicians (e.g., Bosk 1979, Sinclair 1997). 
Room to practice is not a given, but must be negotiated by residents presenting 
themselves as competent and reliable clinicians:
Lisa, a senior resident, is serving on the obstetrics ward. A young woman is 
admitted to the ward suffering from serious pain in her belly. She is 20 weeks into a 
quadruplet pregnancy. A nurse enters the nursing post and announces that her pain 
has worsened. Lisa decides to perform an ultrasound right away and asks Dave, the 
attending gynecologist, to accompany her. She asks Nick, a junior resident who has 
just started his internship, to join them. 
Lisa wheels in the ultrasound equipment and explains to the woman that they 
want to check the babies. She offers Nick the ultrasound scanner: “Do you wanna 
do it?” Nick nods, grabs a chair and smears gel over the woman’s belly, and then 
he starts moving the scanner over the huge belly rather clumsily. Lisa takes his 
hand: “Smoother, like this.” Covering Nick’s hand, she gently slides the ultrasound 
scanner over the belly. The babies become visible on the screen. Dave asks Nick to 
move downwards to render the cervix visible. Keeping his gaze on the screen, Dave 
notices that one of the babies has already moved into the cervix cavity. He tells the 
mother that this baby will be born soon, and that they can only hope that the other 
three babies will stay inside.24
Back at the nursing post Dave tells Lisa to remove the cervical cerclage.25 Lisa 
nods, explaining to Nick (and me) that contractions may cause a rupture of the 
womb if the cerclage is not removed in time. Lisa walks Nick back to the corridor, 
where she shows him the equipment needed to perform the procedure. She asks 
24 In The Netherlands, as in other countries, babies born after 20 weeks 
pregnancy are not treated and may die during or shortly after delivery. 
There are discussions going on whether to extend the l imit to 23 weeks.
25 Cervical cerclage, also known as a cervical stitch, is used when the cervix 
opens sl ightly and there is a risk of miscarriage because it may not remain 
closed throughout the pregnancy. It is often applied in multiple-birth 
pregnancies.
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Nick if he has ever removed a cervical cerclage before. Nick says no never, but he 
wants to learn how. 
We go back inside. Lisa explains to the mother what they are going to do, and asks 
the nurse to give her some more pain medication. They put the woman’s legs over 
the padded rests. Nick shifts a stool in front of the woman and sits. Lisa hands 
him a speculum. While explaining to the woman what he is doing Nick inserts the 
instrument. Standing close to Nick, Lisa bends to glance inside as well. She tells 
Nick where to cut the stitching, and watches closely as he removes the device. She 
then turns to the woman, saying that now they can only hope for the best and need 
to wait to see what will happen.26 
(Field notes, Hospital K). 
In the above excerpt, the junior resident is new to the obstetrics ward and needs 
to learn the local procedures and techniques because within a few weeks he must 
be able to run the ward. The senior resident seeks to provide him with as much 
hands-on experience as possible. 
Providing patient care and preparing residents for autonomous clinical work are 
entangled and aligned in the clinical procedures residents perform. Experiencing 
clinical autonomy is believed to be an important element in the transition of a junior 
doctor into an attending physician, as residents gain self-confidence and begin 
perceiving themselves as competent clinicians (Smith et al. 2003)27. In the above 
excerpt, the attending physician’s choice to step aside and allow both residents 
into the center of clinical care delivery is mediated by the technology enacted to 
examine the babies, as well as the good performance of the senior resident. The 
ultrasound scan, for example, reveals that one of the babies is about to be born 
and cannot be stopped. As no further treatment is possible until the baby is born, 
besides pain control and removing the cervical cerclage, there is no immediate need 
for the attending to stay with the patient. 
The attending’s decision to give the residents the space to take care of the patient 
and her babies is also the result of a subtle negotiation process. The senior resident 
26 Sad to say, al l four babies were born that same day and died a few minutes 
after their birth.
27 This does not mean that the attending really disappears from the scene. 
In this particular case, the attending stayed around doing administrative 
work and regularly asked about the condition of the patient. In other work 
we have explored how attending physicians and residents tinker with the 
(sometimes confl icting) central goals of providing good care and good 
medical training (Wallenburg et al. forthcoming).
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demonstrates her clinical knowledge and technical skills by instructing the junior 
(e.g., informing him of the need to remove the cervical cerclage) and by guiding his 
smooth movements during the ultrasound scan. In doing this, the senior negotiates 
her central position in the interactional order of medical care delivery. Moreover, 
her performance enables the junior resident to move into the center of medical 
care provision as well: he is the one allowed to conduct the ultrasound scan, and 
to remove the cervical cerclage. Medical devices and the materiality of the clinical 
setting play important roles in this negotiation process: the positioning of the 
patient and the speculum used to reveal the cerclage, for instance, render the 
junior’s activities (inside as well as outside the body) visible to the senior resident, 
enabling her to guide the junior’s actions while he is performing the procedure for 
the very first time. Doing the ultrasound scan and removing the cervical cerclage 
also stage the junior’s competence, and his self-confidence: can his hand move 
smoothly, does his hand shake when inserting the speculum? 
Knowing the places and spaces
Being embedded—in daily clinical activities and medical procedures, in the building, 
and in the local community of practitioners—is an all-important requirement to 
becoming integrated in the social interactional order of medical care delivery. 
If you’re new in a hospital, and you don’t know where the Emergency Room is, or 
you don’t know if the nurse phoning you is someone who panics easily or not, or 
you can’t find the nursing ward when they need you, then you’re lost. And what 
about the surgeon? Will he let you operate on a patient if he doesn’t know you, or 
will it take weeks before he lets you do anything? 
(surgery resident, SR1)
In this excerpt, which comes from an interview with a surgery resident in which we 
talked about the current trend of training residents in different hospital settings, the 
resident emphasizes the importance of being familiar with the local environment. To 
be able to practice medicine, the resident explains, you must be able to find your 
way around the hospital, and be familiar with the local procedures and peculiarities 
of the health care workers that make up the learning environment. 
The importance of knowing your way around becomes particularly apparent during 
a night or weekend shift when most doctors are not present, and the resident on 
call is the first to be approached for assistance or consultation. On being called, 
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and this happens quite often, the resident has to decide whether or not to respond 
or come immediately. To decide upon a phone call, residents ask questions about 
the case at hand but also rely on (their judgment of) the nurse who phones them: 
is this someone who phones very easily, or someone with lots of experience and 
know-how who only calls in case of an emergency? As one gynecologist resident 
put it, referring to a male nurse: “Alex used to work here. He was a great guy, you 
could fully rely on him. If he called, you knew you had to run”. (Field notes, Hospital 
L)
Residents must become acquainted with their surroundings to be able to anticipate 
(acute) clinical situations. Moreover, they need to build a personal relationship with 
the attending physicians who must entrust them with the care for their patients:28 
(…) being around, sticking to the ward if you want to perform an operation… you 
need to be the first. It’s always the same group of people who do most surgical 
procedures. This is an underestimated part of residency. You can’t test or measure 
it, but the people at the front, who are willing to do a bit more are the ones who 
get rewarded; they are called more often to do something than the ones who don’t 
do this. (surgery resident, SR10) 
You need to bond with the ones you train. They [residents] must show a kind of 
eagerness. You’re prepared to do a bit more for the ones that show this ambition. 
(surgeon, S12)
Showing ambition, for example by staying when others go home, is rewarded with 
participation in a late-night surgery, or being phoned “when something interesting 
is going on at the operation room” (attending surgeon, CA4). Residents have to 
present themselves as eager learners to gain entrance to the inner circle of clinical 
care delivery. This takes time, and lots of effort.
In short, patient care, learning and evaluating performance are entangled—and 
tinkered with—in the performed clinical activities. Rather than a neatly structured 
learning program in which juniors take predefined steps, switching from one 
28 Hirschauer (1991) and Prentice (2007) make a similar argument, that 
residents must earn the right to operate on a patient. The operating theatre 
is controlled by various ‘suites of steri l ity’. Each suite closer to the patient is 
better controlled than other more peripheral suites. Surrounding the patient 
are the ‘privi leged zones’ (Prentice 2007: 538) where only those actors 
who have shown their competence and reliabil ity have entrance. For older 
l iterature on this see Stell ing and Bucher (1976).
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learning phase to the next, residency is a way of doctoring (Mol 2008, Struhkamp 
et al. 2007), of enacting learning opportunities within given clinical situations and 
exercising hands-on judgment. Learning space, meaning the space that residents 
get to practice medicine autonomously, is not predetermined but is enacted in a 
subtle negotiation process in which residents present themselves as competent and 
reliable clinicians. Although hierarchy is clear and fixed (attending physicians are 
in charge, residents have to follow their orders), the social order is variable and 
negotiable. By giving good performances residents move into the center of medical 
care delivery.
Dealing with time constraints
Current reforms in postgraduate medical education are directed at creating a 
time-limited, structured, and more transparent residency training program. In 
this section we focus on the limitation of resident duty hours. Following the new 
European duty-hour rules, residents’ working hours are limited to 48 hours per 
week on average. Shifts are limited to eight hours’ duration, separated by a rest 
period of 11 hours. Further restrictions specify a minimum rest period of 24 hours 
in each seven day period or 48 hours in 14 days. 
Initially, the duty-hour rules were not taken very seriously by clinical teachers 
and residents. However, high fines imposed by the Dutch Labour Inspectorate have 
made them far more careful not to exceed the limitations. Clinical teachers try to 
incorporate the requirements in local training programs. Some clinical teachers, 
for example, no longer sign up senior residents to night shifts that forestall their 
learning opportunities; during the night there are fewer chances to practice skills, 
and the obliged rest period afterwards would make them lose out on other learning 
opportunities as well.
What is the effect of the new resident duty hours for the position of medical 
residents in the social interactional order, and thus their learning opportunities in 
everyday clinical practice? 
I came into the hospital on a Friday night and didn’t leave until the Monday 
morning. Then I wouldn’t see my youngest child for 48 hours. Things are more 
normal these days, but when I qualified as a surgeon I’d done at least 3600 
operations. Now I have colleagues who’ve only done 900. But when I’m on call, 
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I’m at ease. Sometimes things can get really complicated, but I know what to do. 
Others don’t have this experience. It can make you feel insecure when you’re on 
call. It’s a problem. They need others in the back, like me, who you can call any 
time. 
(surgeon, S2) 
This surgeon is worried about the loss of clinical exposure. Due to the new duty-
hour rules, residents spend less time in the hospital. They see and perform fewer 
clinical procedures, experience fewer complications and encounter fewer exceptional 
cases to learn from (Longnecker 2006). Although things are more normal (at least, 
now you can watch your child grow up!), there are fewer opportunities to acquire 
personal clinical routines, and develop clinical confidence. 
However, the number of working hours goes beyond the issue of clinical 
experience in a quantitative sense. It also concerns the position of medical 
residents in the process of health care delivery: 
In the past [as a resident] you saw everything. Now the day is divided into shifts. 
Residents lack continuity. Attending physicians, work more hours than residents. 
Especially when you’re low in the hierarchy this means you lack information. When 
you’ve a more prominent position you’ll be informed. But if you’re low, you have to 
sort things out for yourself. 
(surgeon, S3)
Residents must be embedded in clinical practice to have full knowledge of—and 
be able to learn from—daily clinical matters. In contrast to staff members, who 
are caught up in patients admitted to their wards or past deliveries after a day off 
or a holiday, residents put themselves ‘at the front’ to stay informed. During our 
fieldwork we regularly observed attendings chatting about clinical issues in their 
offices, after staff meetings, or in the corridor between patient visits or operations.29 
Residents do not participate in these backstage spaces which constitute the center 
of clinical work. In hospitals K and M, for example, attendings dressed for work in 
their offices, while residents had their own changing room in another part of the 
29 See Waring and Bishop (2010) for a discussion of the importance of corridors 
and water coolers as informal spaces to deliberate on work-related issues 
that “keep things going”. 
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building. Also, residents were not allowed to attend staff meetings, an important 
location for discussing clinical matters. 
In the spaces that were shared we noticed a clear separation between attending 
physicians and residents. During the morning report in Hospital K, for instance, 
residents always sat on the left side of the room while attendings sat on the right. 
Although there were plenty of conversational exchanges between members of 
both groups, the chats before and afterwards were shared only with peers. As 
the surgeon quoted above points out, residents need to overcome the split with 
the attendings by participating in daily clinical work; taking part in medical care 
delivery, and attending morning reports, handovers and clinical conferences on a 
daily basis. The new duty-hour rules, however, seem to reinforce the split between 
attending physicians and residents. As residents are around less, it becomes harder 
for them to be involved in clinical matters. In consequence, residents tend to 
remain at a more peripheral stage of clinical practice.
Yet, time constraints are also negotiated:
We don’t always register ourselves [for the operating list]... I want to be a good 
surgeon. That means I must be able to remove a spleen. Spleen patients don’t 
show up between nine and five, but at night. 
(surgeon resident, SR5)
Residents occasionally stay in the hospital even when, according to the clock, they 
should leave. In contrast to the old days, residents stay for specific purposes, such 
as attending an operation (see also Szymczak et al. 2011). Currently, violating 
duty-hour rules by working long hours is less about showing professional conduct or 
dedication to patients, which used to be a central element of residency training (see 
Bosk 1979), but more about taking part in interesting clinical situations or being 
able to exercise specific clinical skills. 
However, residents who primarily focus on their personal learning trajectory also 
cause resentment among attending physicians who feel that the residents are 
neglecting the wider professional environment to which they belong:
Why do they need a week off after nights on call? (...) In my opinion they don’t do 
enough. In the past, continuity of care was provided by residents, and now it’s me. 
I have to conduct patient rounds as they no longer know who is lying in the beds. 
(surgeon, S8)
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Recently, I was phoned by a colleague. He was furious. He’d called a resident to 
serve on the outpatient clinic. But the resident refused, saying that his training 
schedule said he should be on the ward. This is not what our job is about. It’s not 
what we expect from junior doctors. The consequence may be that we don’t call 
them anymore. 
(surgeon, S3)
During our fieldwork, we regularly observed attending physicians complaining 
that the new duty-hour rules ‘put things on their heads’ (attending surgeon) as 
attendings now have to bear the drudgery30 (more on-call duties, patient rounds) 
while the residents do the operating theatre cases and go home at night. The more 
pragmatic focus on practicing skills and signing off learning goals stands against a 
backdrop of group thinking about what it means to behave like a professional. 
Clinical teachers are struggling with the tensions in rules and professional conduct. 
On the one hand, the new duty-hour rules force them to enact more tailored 
opportunities for residents to practice skills (e.g., not scheduling a night shift but 
a day in the operating theatre), while on the other hand they feel that residents 
should earn their more central position the hard-work way and, thereby show 
ownership of their work and professional responsibility. Residents primarily focusing 
on their own training program tend to miss out on the interesting clinical cases as 
they are not integrated into the center of the local professional community.
Performing with cl inical assessment 
tools
Introducing clinical assessment tools in residency training is aimed at standardizing 
the evaluation of residents. Assessment tools would provide objective insight into 
a resident’s competence, enhancing transparency and transferability of residents’ 
capabilities. They would render a flexible and personalized training program 
possible because the license a resident obtains to conduct a clinical procedure at 
one hospital would also hold at another teaching hospital. Assessment tools would 
thus help to disentangle the traditional attending-apprentice model in which the 
30 This is what Becker et al. (1961) have referred to as ‘scut work’, meaning the 
work that residents and medical students have to do in order to keep things on 
track without any tincture of responsibility (see also Star and Strauss 1999). 
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resident is totally dependent on the judgment of one attending (or a small group 
of them). They would thus help residents to get a grip on their medical career. But 
how are the clinical assessment tools “fleshed out” in practice? And what do they 
mean to the goal of enacting a more personalized form of residency training?
During our fieldwork, both attending physicians and residents usually underscored 
the benefits of the use of assessment tools: 
It [using clinical assessment tools] forces an attending to interact and provide 
feedback. It’s very useful talking with someone about your ways of doing things—
and how to improve them. 
(surgeon resident, SR8)
You could become a bit careless with residents you think are doing quite well, 
whereas formal assessment might reveal that on the whole they aren’t doing that 
well. Now you have an instrument to observe this. It gives you better insight into 
bad performers. Not that everything is that bad, but you can pay more attention to 
this or that. That’s a real improvement. 
(gynecologist, G1)
Both the attending and the resident quoted above point out that the assessment 
tools focus attention on the competence of the tested resident. In the traditional 
master-apprentice relationship the attending, as the role model, was the primary 
focus (is the resident becoming like me? Do I view him or her as a good doctor?). 
Now the focus is on the resident’s personal skills. The gynecologist explains: 
assessment tools help attendings gain in-depth insight into how residents perform, 
and enable them to respond to this.
Clinicians also stress that evaluation instruments cannot entirely replace the old 
model of providing feedback, as the instruments do not cover the whole picture of 
learning to doctor:
You have to make clear to a resident what can be improved, and that’s not 
something you trust to paper but tell in person. Such feedback is far more 
important than circling a level of competence. I don’t care about this level (…) In 
the end you judge a resident by comparing him or her to yourself. Setting norms is 
pointless, it’s all about trust. 
(surgeon, S4)
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This attending surgeon distinguishes the act of giving feedback in the periphery 
from giving it in the center of the social interactional order. In the periphery, 
residents’ competencies are evaluated and reduced to numbers that indicate a 
resident’s level of competence (e.g., respect for tissue, use of assistance- see figure 
1). The numbers allow comparisons between moments in the learning trajectory as 
well as between residents. In the center, the surgeon in the excerpt above explains, 
scores are not important. Here, you learn the ‘real’ lessons about being a doctor. 
The lessons are role modeling; these are not trusted to paper but shared in private 
between a master and an apprentice. 
However, it is not as if assessment tools do not really matter in practice, or 
that it is a deliberate choice to use them, or not, in specific situations. How the 
assessment tools are used, and what they do, is the result of the practices that 
enact the instruments (Pols and Willems 2011)—in the periphery or in the center:
They give you a tool for gathering information about badly performing residents. In 
the past it was very hard to make someone quit a residency, as we could seldom 
prove incompetence. But now we can show them the evaluation forms. 
(gynecologist, G4)
Formally assessing residents enables clinical teachers to render bad performance 
visible. In the recent past, poor performers could usually only be “disarmed” 
through relegation to specialized, non-technical or non-emergency aspect of clinical 
work. Or, after finishing residency, such residents could only find a job at second-
class hospitals (see Bosk 1979).31 The enhanced visibility of poor evaluations forces 
residents to work hard to improve their performance, or, ultimately, quit residency.
However, bad marks are also given to the residents operating at the other end of 
the performance continuum, the “high potentials”:
When assessing residents I always make sure to point out something that has room 
for improvement. Scoring everything at the top level makes no sense.
(surgeon, S12) 
31 We do not want to suggest here that the practice of relegating residents no 
longer exists. What we do want to point out is that it is now easier to force 
a poorly performing resident to quit training as poor performance can be 
rendered visible and (judicial ly) proven.
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During an interview the (male) surgeon quoted above pointed out that he often 
gave residents a bad mark to stimulate them to improve their performance. 
Interestingly, medical students do not usually get bad marks. During our fieldwork 
we regularly encountered medical students who were very frustrated by the marks 
they had received. These students often got a “B minus”, independently of whether 
they had done their very best, or had just coasted along. Attending physicians 
explained to us that a bad mark is accompanied by investing in more work, while 
a good mark gives the wrong impression, that someone is already good enough. 
Giving a B minus is thus more convenient.  
Good residents do get bad marks. A bad mark given to a good performer 
demonstrates the commitment and willingness of the attending to put effort into 
the resident’s professional development. While a B minus for medical students—or, 
as we argued above, bad marks given to poorly performing residents—points at 
participants acting in the periphery of clinical practice, the same B minus is used to 
create learning space for good residents and demonstrates their central position in 
the medical social order. 
The multiplicity of measuring performance questions the idea of an objectified 
and transferrable residency training program. To know whether a “4” (see Figure 
1; equivalent to a “D”) refers to a poor or an excellent resident it is important 
to be familiar with an attending’s habitual training and judging methods. 
Contextualisation of assessment shows the importance of personal interactions 
between the attendings and the residents they train:
Interviewer: Would you let a resident operate on a patient if the resident has 
qualified for that procedure in another teaching hospital?
Surgeon (S12): No! That’ll never happen! These are our patients, our reputation. 
Training residents is nice, but in the end they’re only passers-by. 
Attending physicians bear the clinical responsibility for their patients. As this 
surgeon makes clear, inadequate care delivered under an attending’s aegis not only 
harms the patient but also impedes the attending’s reputation. Therefore, attending 
physicians let residents operate on their patients only if they have full confidence in 
the resident’s skills, intelligibility and reliability. This confidence is not transferred 
on an assessment form, but is built up over time during numerous personal 
interactions between an attending and a resident. 
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The center of medical care delivery is thus a protected arena where patients are 
protected against incompetent (or not yet trusted) practitioners, and the attending 
physicians’ reputation is guarded against possibly poor practitioners. The reputation 
argument is probably even more important in the current health care arena with its 
stronger emphasis on transparency and measurable performance (see Power et al. 
2009).
Conclusions and discussion
As Shem pointed out a few decades ago, medical training is an important social 
institution of the medical profession. During their training, junior doctors come to 
embody medical conduct by working with physicians and practicing on patients in 
real clinical settings. This chapter has demonstrated that the space residents get to 
perform medical procedures is not predetermined, but must be negotiated in the 
social interactional order of a local medical community of practice. The center of 
medical care, we have argued, is a protected arena. The hard work that residents 
must do to gain entrance to this center is aimed at protecting the patient’s health 
as well as the reputation and status of the attending physicians. Only those 
residents who consistently show clinical competence, reliability and intelligibility are 
able to participate fully in medical care delivery. The question in this chapter was 
how performance was trained and evaluated.
The chapter has shown that the movement from the periphery to the center of 
medical care delivery is a process which is embedded within and mediated by the 
socio-technical environment of everyday clinical work. Residents must become 
familiar with and act along with (tacit) local rules and habits. They must get to 
know the nurses and the geography of the building, as well as the (personal) 
wishes and expectations of the attending physicians to be able to present 
themselves as reliable and skilled (future) physicians and obtain a central place in 
the social interactional order.
Current reforms in medical training, such as the limitation of residents’ duty hours 
and standardized resident assessment, are reconfiguring the social interactional 
order in crucial ways. The reforms, tending to shift towards formal and structured 
residency training, create social distance between attending physicians and 
residents. The new duty-hour regulations, for example, stimulate residents to focus 
increasingly upon their own learning goals instead of group work, which causes 
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resentment in the attending physicians. Also, the introduction of standardized 
assessment of residents’ competence has shifted attention from role modeling and 
group thinking towards resident’s individual capabilities, challenging the personal 
relationships that have always underpinned residency training. Such changes tend 
to position residents at a more peripheral stage of the social interactional order 
because attending physicians feel that they can permit residents to undertake 
delicate clinical work only if they have earned their full trust. Hence, procedures 
and arrangements change to objectify them, but in the end, it is still the personal 
assessment that is the obligatory point every resident has to pass.
This chapter has also shown how these unexpected and unwanted consequences 
of current reforms are repaired in everyday clinical practice. This is not to say 
that the reforms are “decoupled”, meaning that professionals fulfill the reporting 
demands only superficially as rituals while actual professional work and practices 
are sealed off. Nor is this to say that the reforms are ‘colonized’, meaning that 
organizations become infused with reforming processes at the expense of 
professional autonomy, as has often been described in the medical sociological 
literature (e.g., Power 1997). Instead, this chapter has shown how the reforms are 
negotiated by re-linking them with clinical work: residents still need to sign up for 
on-call duties, or have to do the invisible work on wards to keep things on track 
(see Star and Strauss 1999), although at a far lower intensity than in the past. 
Similarly, clinical assessment tools are used to improve feedback on performance, 
and they are enacted as intervention tools to force poorly performing residents to 
quit their residency. But they are also used to stimulate good performers to excel. 
Our study has important policy implications for current reforms in medical 
training. It demonstrates that the idea of introducing a universal program that 
allows residents to move freely between training sites will put residents in a more 
peripheral stage of clinical practice if physicians do not have the opportunity to do 
the repair work needed to re-embed medical residents. It shows that if the ideal 
of a measurable and personalized training program is pushed through, new kinds 
of backstage spaces will be created to enable clinical teachers to inform colleagues 
about their creative practices in training residents—such as giving low marks to 
stimulate high potentials. Because the training of doctors cannot be disconnected 
from hands-on care for patients, responsibility of the supervisor “on the spot” 
and embeddedness of the resident in concrete practices, trust and individual 
assessment by supervisors will always be part of medical training. These “old 
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school” individual assessments cannot be replaced by objectifying and generalizing 
assessments -and this is not something to strive for.
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Reconf iguring Medical Governance 
A Multiple-Sited Analysis of 
Medical Training Reform32
Multisited research projects (...) are intended as supplements approaches to traditional grounded theory 
analyses that center on elucidating the key elements, materialities, discourses, structures, and conditions that 
characterize the situation of inquiry. Through mapping the data, the analyst constructs the situation of the 
inquiry empirically. (Clarke 2005: XXII)
Introduction
Many observers of health care systems across the West have noted the profound 
changes in medical governance that have occurred over the last few decades. 
Once highly stable and dominated by the medical profession, the sector is now 
experiencing an influx of new organizations and new approaches to regulation 
inspired by corporate and managerial ideologies previously marginalized in the 
doctor-dominated system (Mendel and Scott 2010, Gray and Harrison 2004, 
Chamberlain 2009). This has led to the emergence of more complex coalitions of 
interests and diffused sources of power (Kuhlmann and Saks 2008, Ackroyd et al. 
2007). Accounts of change point at a shift from notions of professional partnership, 
collegiality, discretion, and trust to increasing levels of managerialism, bureaucracy, 
standardization, assessment and performance review (Evetts 2011, Noordengraaf 
2011a, McDonald et al. 2009). 
Many of these accounts explicitly or implicitly rely on the classic sociological 
conflict model that sets the medical profession on one side and ‘external’ actors 
32 This chapter is based on Wallenburg, I., A. de Bont, F. Scheele, J. 
Helderman, and P. Meurs.  Reconfiguring medical governance: a multiple-
sited analysis of medical training reform. Submitted to Organizational 
Studies. 
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(managers, the state) on the other. Or, to frame it in a more sociological way, 
such accounts reflect a dualism of (a return to) professionalism versus ‘beyond 
professionalism’ (see Noordegraaf 2011b). To overcome this dualism we need to 
explore the changes that affect professional work as well as the mechanisms that 
underly these changes (Noordegraaf 2011b: 1357). In this paper we explore a 
dynamic and relational approach of medical governance change by studying the 
reform of postgraduate medical education in The Netherlands.
Medical training is critical in any study of medical governance change. It is a core 
institution of medical professional (self-)regulation. New members to the profession 
are recruited and socialized in training, and it is where the profession’s core 
knowledge and practices are defined and transferred (see Light 1988, Timmermans 
and Chawla 2009).
Here we draw on our ethnographic research into medical training reform, studying 
the changes of medical residency training ‘in action’. During our study we traveled 
around multiple sites enacting reform: the Ministry of Health, medical associations, 
national conferences pertaining to the reform, and the hospital. We examined how 
policies and policy ideas are developed and negotiated, how they ‘travel’ between 
sites and how they are “fleshed out” in everyday training practice. The questions 
that guide our research are: How is the reform of medical training enacted at 
different sites? How is the interplay between reform activities leading to new 
governance arrangements? 
Drawing on sociological studies of professional governance and institutional 
change theories we argue that transitions in medical governance are not only 
the result of power struggles between the medical profession and external 
stakeholders, but are also due to the increasing entanglement of the interests 
of the actors involved. Processes of change are mediated by the enactment of 
(governing) instruments and the introduction of new knowledge structures as well 
as by practices of power in hospital organizations and the state apparatus. The 
dynamic processes and constellations of authority that emerge from this have led to 
the institutionalization of new governance arrangements of co-regulation in medical 
training governance.
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The increasing diffuseness of medical 
governance
From professional dominance to soft autonomy
Medical governance can be defined as “the authoritative attempts by public or 
private bodies to control the actions and behaviours of physicians” (Burau et al. 
2009). Medical governance has often been explained in terms of the non-medical 
actors’ considerable lack of power to control physicians adequately. Professional 
groups typically claim some notion of autonomy because their work is grounded on 
expert and exclusive knowledge. This includes not only codified, abstract knowledge 
associated with formal training, but also esoteric, indeterminate and experiential 
knowledge that is tacit in nature, situated and embodied in practice (Freidson 
1994, Abbott 1988). Eliot Freidson, a main proponent of the theory of professional 
dominance, claims that the medical profession has always been very effective in 
protecting the medical domain against outside interference. Once it has obtained 
protections from the state and safeguards from economic competition through 
formal institutional mechanisms such as educational and licensing requirements, 
the profession regulates itself through peer review and ethical codes (Freidson 
1986, 1994). Although in his later work Freidson recognized the rise of other 
stakeholders (particularly the state and the market) and argued that shift in power 
could even crush the professional domain (Freidson 2001), he still conceived 
the medical profession as separate from other actors. This vision of the medical 
profession as a distinct and competing actor is also shared by other theorists 
of the medical profession. Donald Light, for instance, introduced the model of 
countervailing powers to indicate how several parties (the state, profession, clients 
and third-party payers that together constitute the health care environment) have 
different interests, cultures and goals that are in conflict with each other, and how 
the balance between these actors changes over time. According to Light, when one 
player in the health care field dominates, other players will react to redress the 
“excessive” power base of the dominator (Light 1995, 2009). 
Since the 1990s, the debate has shifted toward the issue of “deprofessionalization” 
or “commodification” of the medical profession (Duyvendak et al. 2006, Evetts 
2006). An important and growing body of literature points at the transformation 
of the medical domain from a profession-controlled system to a more hybrid 
managerial system (Noordegraaf 2007). This literature argues that organizational 
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objectives increasingly come to regulate and replace occupational control in 
practitioner-client interactions, thereby limiting the exercise of discretion and 
preventing the service ethic that has been central in professional work (Evetts 
2011, Kuhlmann and Saks 2008). Accountability measures, it is argued, have 
increasingly rationalized and bureaucratized professional work through procedural 
guidelines in the form of rule-based practices (Courpasson 2000, Ackroyd and 
Muzio 2007). Other scholars have pointed out how the managerial discourse has 
become more internalized in medical practice and culture, leading to new forms 
of self-surveillance (Waring 2007, Currie and Waring 2009). Levay and Waks, for 
example, introduced the notion of “soft autonomy” to describe how professionals 
internalize ideas of quality control that originate from outside the health care 
professions and embark on a process that has become irreversible (Levay and Waks 
2009). Yet, these authors also point out that transformations of soft autonomy or 
“governmentality” (Waring 2007) can be conceived as strategic actions to maintain 
a significant degree of control over important evaluation criteria and procedures 
and retain basic professional autonomy (Levay and Waks 2009; 523, for similar 
argument see Currie and Waring 2009). 
Latter scholars suggest replacing the common view with a subtler analysis of 
how professionals are transformed from “inside out”. However, they still rely on 
the classic power divide between the medical profession and outside regulators. 
Such an approach, we argue, largely leaves unaddressed the more contingent and 
gradual reform processes that not only result from outside managerial activities 
but also emerge from (and interact with) changes in the profession. To arrive at a 
preciser understanding of medical governance change, we turn to cultural-cognitive 
theories on institutional change.
An institutionalist understanding of medical 
governance change
Typically, institutional analysis emphasizes the legacies of institutional 
arrangements and the constraining or structuring character of these arrangements 
to institutional reform. Many different definitions emphasize different aspects of 
institutions. Here we adopt Richard Scott’s definition: institutions are “regulative, 
normative and cultural-cognitive elements that, together with associated 
activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to social life” (2008: 48). 
Following Scott’s definition, institutions set rules, monitor and sanction activities, 
both formally and informally. Institutions introduce prescriptive, evaluative and 
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obligatory dimensions to social life and, as such, foreground ‘appropriate’ behavior 
(Scott 2008). Institutions establish an order that defines and justifies the roles of 
certain actors, helps actors in the field to interpret events, and provides routines 
and rationales defining appropriate ways of carrying on the work (Mendel and Scott 
2010). 
Traditionally, institutional theories emphasize the patterning and constraining 
effects of institutions thereby stressing the importance of ‘structure’. More recent 
institutional theorists, however, emphasize the crucial dimension of agency. 
Discussion has thus moved away from the deterministic focus on the influence of 
top-down forces alone to the dialectic relationship between structure and agency 
(Powell and DiMaggio 1991, Finn et al. 2010, Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Streeck 
and Thelen (2005), for example, point at the interplay between exogenous forces 
and endogenous institutional changes, which may lead to gradual institutional 
transformation. New institutional arrangements, they argue, bring in new 
ambiguities as these are often subject to varying interpretations. Such ambiguities 
leave a great deal of play in the interpreted meaning of particular rules and in the 
ways the rules are instantiated in practice, providing critical openings for other 
stakeholders to exploit the opportunity to bring in new procedures, ideologies or 
knowledge structures (Mahoney and Thelen 2010). 
Drawing on knowledge studies, Knorr Certina (1999) points at the importance 
of epistemic cultures for institutional change. Epistemic cultures are groups 
that create and warrant knowledge. Knorr Certina points out that the expansion 
of expert systems in modern society has resulted in a massive increase in the 
technological and informational products, and amplifies the processes themselves 
as well as knowledge-related contexts and structures. “A knowledge society is 
not simply a society of more experts, more technical gadgets, more specialist 
interpretations. It is a society permeated with knowledge cultures, the whole 
set of structures and mechanisms that serve knowledge and unfolds with its 
articulation” (Knorr Certina 1999: 8-9). According to Knorr Certina, knowledge 
structures implode in social structures and existing institutional arrangements and 
thereby transform these institutional arrangements. How institutional arrangements 
are rearranged, however, is contingent and depends on many other influencing 
circumstances. Knorr Certina stresses the crucial importance of epistemic objects 
to the analysis of change. Epistemic objects are objects of knowledge; the objects 
practitioners employ in their daily practices, be they problems to solve, models 
they create, or information systems they utilize. Change, Knorr Certina points 
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out, can occur through processes of ‘object-centered management’ as epistemic 
objects create some sort of distributed cognition, which then starts to function as ‘a 
management system’. Through its discourse, existing practices become coordinated 
and rearranged (Knorr Certina 1999). Knorr Certina claims that detailed empirical 
research is needed to grasp the influence of epistemic cultures and accompanied 
epistemic objects.
What does all this imply for our analysis? First, if we want to understand changes 
in medical governance, we must be sensitive to seemingly small or gradual 
adaptations in governance arrangements that may set into motion more profound 
changes over time. Second, we should look not only at personal (“human”) 
interactions but also take into account the role of epistemic objects in the process 
of medical governance change. Third, we must study multiple sites (both their 
connections and interactions) to gain in-depth insight into the process of change. 
A multiple-sited ethnographic study
Before describing our research, we need to consider the term ‘multiple-sited’. 
Choosing a term to describe a research design has theoretical connotations as 
well as practical considerations. A multi-level approach, for instance, encompasses 
hierarchy. The term fits in with the macro-meso-micro distinction so often used in 
policy literature or sociological accounts of professional governance (for example, 
Harrison and McDonald 2008). According to this approach, policy measures are 
developed at the broad political level and ‘travel down’ to play out with varying 
impact on lower-intermediate field-level structures (for example, professional 
associations) or local communities. And, the other way around, ‘policy feedback’ 
travels up from local levels to the political level. Other terms fitting in with this 
approach are “top down” and “bottom up” policies. Yet, we want to point out in 
this study that the distinctions between these levels blur when one studies “real 
practices” (also argued elsewhere, see e.g., Bijker et al. 2009: 24, Strathern 
2000).  
A multiple-sited approach indicates equality (one site is no more important or 
powerful than any other) as well as multiplicity. The term ‘site’ stems from the 
ontological approach, which is often used in science studies (Mol 2002, Clarke 
2005). An ontological study suggests that ‘reality’ is not a single or unique object 
that can be discovered, but is something constructed in the situated interplay 
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between actors and objects. To comprehend “real” practices, then, one needs to 
study practices (Timmermans 2006). Moreover, by traveling between practices (or 
“sites”), the researcher gains insight into the connections between multiple sites. 
Multiple, then, refers to the relatedness of the different sites. We do not use the 
term “multi”, as this would indicate plurality (which would mean something like 
“medical training reform is everywhere”, making it rather impossible to study) (see 
Mol 2002, Law and Mol 2002). 
Instead, by following, traveling and “acting” with the actors involved in the reform, 
we attempted to gain in-depth understanding of the reform of medical training—and 
with that an understanding of the process of medical governance change. This 
does not mean that we went everywhere, or only to the important places (from an 
ontological approach it is awkward to define what is important and what is not). 
We observed and interviewed the key actors, conducted a document study and 
talked to many people (doctors, residents, civil servants, hospital administrators, 
policy advisers, researchers, educationalists, and nurses), to acquire a deep 
understanding of the discussions, instruments, measures, objects, strategies and 
ongoing events in medical training governance.
The study
Our study is based on three related research projects conducted in The 
Netherlands. First (2006–2010), we were the appointed evaluators of a national 
project working on the implementation of revised training programs in pediatrics 
and gynecology training (the ‘InVIVO project’—more on this below). We conducted 
a process evaluation and observed meetings of the InVIVO project team (35), 
national seminars and workshops on the reform (16) and meetings in local hospitals 
(8). We conducted participatory observations at the medical specialist association 
pertaining to the reform (10). In addition, we conducted in-depth interviews with 
physicians, medical residents, policy makers, educationalists, nurses and hospital 
administrators (55 in total) (see de Bont et al 2010, Wallenburg et al. 2012). 
Second (2009-2010), the first and fifth authors of this chapter were part of 
a group of policy advisers and scholars writing an advisory report on medical 
education, commissioned by the Ministry of Health. During the writing process we 
were in close contact with policy makers at the ministry and experts in the field 
of medical training (RVZ 2010). We observed meetings with field parties (medical 
associations, health insurers, associations of hospitals) and policy makers (10 in 
total). 
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Third (2010–2012), we conducted a study in surgical training, concentrating 
on the consequences of implementing new training programs in surgery for 
the practice and daily organization of residency training (‘the actual work’). We 
observed local clinical teachers at meetings (7) discussing topical issues related to 
changes in surgery training. We interviewed attending surgeons (13) and surgical 
residents (14) about current training reforms in everyday residency training. 
We also interviewed hospital administrators (10) about the reforms in medical 
residency training.33 We made 135+ hours of observation.
Background: The reform of medical 
training
In The Netherlands, medical training reform in the 2000s was the result of 
political pressure and ongoing debates in several medical societies (the scientific 
associations of the various specialty areas) on the need to bring medical training in 
line with broader changes in health care. It was felt that existing residency training 
programs no longer fitted in with the heavier patient load (nowadays fewer patients 
are admitted to hospital and they stay for shorter periods), medical technology 
developments and a severe reduction of resident duty hours. Whereas medical 
residents used to work up to 100 hours a week, nowadays working weeks are 
limited to 48 hours on average, due to government legislation (see Richards 2009). 
The reduction of duty hours affected the traditional master-apprentice system in 
which residents learned medical conduct by working closely together and imitating 
attending physicians over long periods (Bosk 1979, Szymczak et al. 2011).
At the time, the Ministry of Health considered medical education a useful policy 
instrument to deal with upcoming changes in health care, such as rising costs 
and the need for more interdisciplinary care in the light of an increasing elderly 
population. In 1999 the then Minister of Health, Els Borst-Eilers, gave a speech 
addressed to the Royal Dutch Medical Association. The minister, a physician before 
entering politics, stressed the need for more efficient training and a shorter training 
trajectory. Reforms of the medical curricula were needed to accomplish this, she 
argued. 
33 The interviews were conducted together with Niels Hopmans (surgery intern/
researcher, Erasmus Medical Center Rotterdam) and Ted den Hoed (surgeon/
clinical teacher, Ikazia Hospital Rotterdam). 
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The discussions were followed by two policy documents, one by the medical 
association, the other by a government-appointed commission. The first was De 
Arts van Straks (Tomorrow’s Doctors) (commissie Meyboom 2002). In short, the 
report depicted a prospect for the medical education system of shorter follow-up 
periods between training phases and a curriculum based on modern educational 
insights into improving the quality of workplace-based learning. Tomorrow’s Doctors 
was followed in 2003 by De Zorg van Morgen (Tomorrow’s Care) (Commissie 
Legrand 2003), which supported the recommendations made in Tomorrow’s Doctors 
but placed more emphasis on improving the efficiency of medical training. It argued 
that the occupational and educational structure of the health care system should be 
redefined to be better equipped for upcoming health care needs. 
The Centraal College Medisch Specialismen (Central College of Medical 
Specialisms, CCMS), an independent regulatory body mandated by law to monitor 
and control residency training, feeling an increasing sense of urgency to adapt its 
training programs to changing demands, launched a sweeping reform project for 
medical residency training programs in 2004. Drawing on much broader trends of 
evidence-based learning and competency-based practice, the CCMS announced 
that all training programs must be redesigned following a competency-based model 
that specified clear goals (Jones et al. 2001, Frenk et al. 2010). To that end, they 
adopted the Canadian CanMEDS model, listing the seven competencies (or “roles”) 
a modern doctor should master (see Frank 2005). Besides technical competence, 
the model contained general competencies (for example, communication, 
collaboration, organization) indicating the more general role doctors should play in 
health care delivery. In addition, the competence of residents had to be evaluated 
regularly using special clinical assessment tools. Standardized assessment, they 
argued, would help to objectify capabilities and make them transferable. Moreover, 
this system would better serve the broader aim of enhanced transparency and 
accountability in medical work (Taylor 2011).
Designing a modern medical training 
program
How was the reform of medical training enacted in practice? As noted above, the 
need to reform residency training was also felt by physicians involved in everyday 
medical training: 
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I realized that quality of care is strongly related to training quality. Medical 
residents are the first to encounter patients. They serve in the emergency room, 
and support deliveries. To improve the quality of hospital care we need to train 
them differently. (...) You need to know when they’re ready to deliver certain types 
of care. 
(Pediatrician, P1)
This pediatrician, who was one of the initiators of the reforms in pediatric training, 
argues that medical residents are insufficiently prepared to deliver patient care for 
two main reasons. First, residents do not have enough skills and experience to care 
for patients in relatively unstable clinical situations. And second, it is unclear when 
they are ready to deal with critical patients as their capabilities are not tested. 
A better training system, the pediatrician indicates, would improve the quality 
of health care delivery. Supported by other prominent figures in the field, the 
pediatrician took the lead in redesigning the pediatric training program. They were 
joined by a group of gynecologists from neighboring hospitals who also felt that 
medical training lagged behind major shifts in health care and that it was necessary 
to meet residents’ expectations of medical training: 
They have been educated in a school system of competency-based learning and 
feedback. And they expect something similar from us. Besides, more residents want 
to be trained part time, especially now with the feminization of medical work. We 
need another training system. 
(Gynecologist, G1)
As this gynecologist points out, residency training needs to be “modernized”; the 
classic master-apprentice model lags behind contemporary ideas on good education 
(structured, competency-based programs, structured feedback on performance) 
and adult learning. A new system is even more warranted, the gynecologist argues, 
now that residents spend far less time in the hospital.
The group of pediatricians and gynecologists collaborated in designing a reform 
project. From the very start, attention was focused on using modern educational 
insights and instruments to reform residency training programs. It was strongly 
believed that educational principles would improve residency training as they shape 
the former relatively unstructured program and allow clinical teachers to provide 
structured feedback to enhance the residents’ learning process. Educationalists, 
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who until then had been hardly involved in residency training, were hired to study 
and develop clinical tools and bring medical curricula in line with modern education 
insights.
One such educational instrument was the mini-Clinical Evaluation Exercise 
(Mini-CEX). The Mini-CEX is a method of assessing competencies in real-life clinical 
practice. It consists of a short observation of a resident demonstrating clinical 
skills, and is carried out by a clinical supervisor using a pre-defined scoring format 
listing the competencies and performance levels a residents should master when 
performing a certain clinical procedure (e.g., a physical examination of a patient) 
(Norcini et al. 2003). Educational instruments, such as the Mini-CEX, would 
encourage physicians to direct attention to the educational principles of residency 
training: 
The assessment tools help physicians to provide feedback to their residents. We 
focus on the instruments as these are the simple things, and then we move up. 
(Pediatrician and former leader of a clinical medical association, P5) 
This physician refers to the change of culture deemed necessary for a new training 
system directed at learning instead of “doing”. Educational instruments, especially 
assessment tools, were believed to be excellent devices to support this transition 
as they would draw attention to a resident’s learning process. Moreover, the 
instruments fitted in with the way doctors practice medicine:
The instruments perfectly suit the way we doctors work. We first diagnose a clinical 
problem and then come up with solutions to solve the particular problem. This is 
exactly what the instruments do. 
(Gynecologist, G3)
The use of instruments to measure and steer performance fitted in with the broader 
trend of evidence-based medicine (Timmermans and Berg 2003, Taylor 2011). 
Many physicians felt that if instruments were used to test residents’ competence, 
meaning that assessment would have consequences for individual learning 
trajectories and—eventually—medical careers, then the instruments would have 
to be based on sound research. At the same time, and this is important to note, it 
was strongly believed that educational instruments would improve medical training 
without encroaching on traditional training practices. It was often said, “We’re only 
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making explicit what we used to do implicitly” and “The reform will only change ten 
percent of our work, the other ninety percent will stay the same.” 
Negotiating a reform project
In 2005 the gynecology medical society, approved the redesigned gynecology 
training program and a year later this was followed by a redesigned pediatric 
training program (NVOG 2005, NVK 2006). Both programs spelled out the themes 
and clinical procedures residents should learn, as well as the level of competence 
they should obtain at each per learning stage. For example, the gynecology training 
program said that ‘a resident should be able to consult on a complicated pregnancy 
without supervision in year two’ (NVOG 2005: 42). Training programs followed 
the structure of the CanMEDS framework mentioned above, including clinical tools 
to assess residents’ competencies. The programs introduced new educational 
methods, such as personal training plans and creating a portfolio to collect evidence 
of (and to account for) personal capabilities.
With the introduction of their new training programs, gynecology and pediatrics 
shot ahead of other medical specialties that were only getting started with 
redesigning their training programs. They were also ahead of the CCMS, still 
drafting their regulations. Nevertheless the boards of both medical societies 
decided to submit their new training programs for CCMS approval and pursue 
implementation anyway. The societies installed the “InVIVO”‘ project group to 
implement the reforms and applied to the Ministry of Health to obtain funding for 
the implementation process. 
The CCMS accepted the two redesigned training programs: “They couldn’t reject 
our work as we went further in structuring the programs than their concept 
regulations” (Gynecologist, G3). However, the CCMS opposed the funding proposal, 
arguing that funding should benefit all medical specialties and not just a select 
group. The CCMS wrote a letter the ministry to forestall its policy makers from 
funding the project. However, and much to the surprise of the appliers themselves, 
the Ministry of Health decided to subsidize implementation to the tune of five 
million euros. During an interview a Ministry of Health policy maker explained the 
ministry’s strategic reasons for funding InVIVO:
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[Former Minister of Health] Klink’s idea was to support entrepreneurs in the medical 
community, just to get something done there. The medical association seeks only 
to protect private interests.
(Ministry of Health policy maker).
Although the government considered medical education an important policy 
objective, to reshape the broader educational structure of the health care system 
and, with that, improve health care delivery, funding InVIVO was also part of 
a broader strategy to open up the closed system of medical professional self-
regulation. 
This does not mean, however, that the medical association was entirely put aside. 
The medical association also received government funding for more general reforms 
to the medical training system, although the amount of money was substantially 
lower. Yet, on other issues of that time (for example, a severe, lingering conflict 
about doctors’ salaries) the medical association remained the ministry’s main 
discussion partner. In other words, the ministry did not abandon existing 
governance arrangements but used its resources to stir up vested governing 
coalitions by commissioning gynecology and pediatrics to act as vanguard 
specialties and provide valuable practical experience (i.e. ‘best practices’) to guide 
the reform process of the other medical specialties.
In short, the InVIVO project introduced new alliances between the Ministry of 
Health, physicians (specifically gynecologists and pediatricians) and educationalists. 
The ministry was willing to become involved as it believed that the project would 
help open up what was perceived as a closed domain (that still had high public 
stakes). The physicians, in turn, were aware that they had engaged with an 
often distrusted actor (the government) but also thought they could limit the 
government’s influence. Moreover, the physicians believed that government 
involvement (and associated funding) would allow them to overcome resistance in 
medical practitioners against reforms in residency training.
The collaboration between the diverse parties thus introduced a complex coalition 
of interests in medical training with new cognitive structures and ideological 
purposes. Although the influence of policy makers and educationalists was initially 
marginal, the new policy objectives and knowledge structures introduced new 
ambiguities and notions of “good residency training” to the medical training system. 
As we will show below, both the government and educationalists (particularly the 
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didactic methods and tools) gradually began playing a more substantial role in 
medical residency training.
The coordinating role of educational 
tools
The members of the InVIVO team (“project team”), particularly its physicians, 
struggled in their task to guide the implementation process of the new residency 
training programs. They felt hampered by both the obligation to account for the 
implementation of the redesigned curricula to the ministry and the need to respect 
the professional values of collegiality and trust, which implied that they were unable 
to force colleague physicians to change their training habits (see also Bosk 1979, 
Witman et al. 2011). The project team feared that if they pushed their efforts to 
reform residency training too far, they would lose the physicians’ support and the 
whole reform project would collapse. Indeed, the reform was heavily criticized by 
many rank-and-file physicians who accused InVIVO members of rendering medical 
training too rigid and even “unworkable”.
The balancing act became even more difficult when InVIVO was put under 
the protection of the newly established College Beroepen en Opleidingen in de 
Gezondheidszorg (College of Health Care Professions and Education, CBOG) in 
2007. The CBOG was commissioned by the Ministry of Health in order to pursue 
the ministry’s goal of establishing an integrated system of health care professions 
and education. It was installed as an independent regulatory body, governed by 
several parties involved in health care education (the medical association, nursing 
association, association of mental health care and the associations of hospital 
institutes). The CBOG operated as a ‘single point of contact’ with the ministry on 
professional and training matters and so InVIVO became one of its core projects. 
It is important to note that although the associations formally supported the 
establishment of the CBOG (the medical profession was even one of the founders), 
in practice they sought to restrict its influence as much as possible. We will 
elaborate on this below.
The educational instruments played an important role in the balancing act of 
the InVIVO doctors. The instruments were enacted as boundary objects to bring 
together the worlds of medicine, policy and education. According to Star and 
Griesemer, boundary objects are “plastic enough to adapt to local needs and the 
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constraints of the several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain 
a common identity across sites” (Star and Griesemer 1989: 393). As boundary 
objects, the educational tools created a common language and common objective 
for a modern medical education but at the same time had different meanings and 
embodied different purposes for educationalists, policy makers and medical doctors. 
The world of education saw the instruments as important tools to improve residency 
training by incorporating modern educational insights (including competency-based 
training, steering the individual learning process by following the rules for providing 
good feedback, and reflexive learning methods). Believing these instruments would 
quickly reform and improve professional training without encroaching on traditional 
training methods, the medical world embraced the educational tools as useful 
dependable instruments as they relied on sound scientific research. The policy 
world regarded them as useful tools that would lead to a more transparent training 
practice. 
Acting as boundary objects, the instruments mediated the relationships between 
the worlds in two important ways. First, reliance on educational instruments 
rendered medical training increasingly visible and, as such, opened up the medical 
training system to external scrutiny. It allowed the state to transcend previous 
narrowly-defined professional boundaries in medical training governance (for similar 
observation see Hasselbladh and Bejent 2007—this topic will be discussed more 
thoroughly below). Second, the emphasis on using educational tools in everyday 
residency training gradually led to shifting notions of ‘good’ residency training. 
Whereas it used to be about medical expertise, now the emphasis shifted to 
principles of adult learning and evidence-based medical training. A growing group of 
clinicians embraced the new training methods in a relatively short time. 
A striking example was the introduction and implementation of D-RECT (Dutch 
Residency Educational Climate Test), an instrument to measure and evaluate the 
quality of the clinical learning environment. D-RECT includes aspects as quality 
of supervision and teamwork (Boor et al. 2011). Initially clinical teachers and 
medical residents initially were highly reluctant to use the new instrument. The 
medical residents feared they would suffer negative consequences if they expressed 
any criticism, and the physicians feared damage to their reputation as clinical 
teachers. Despite this initial resistance, many groups of physicians incorporated the 
instrument. One surgeon explained, “It’s just a part of these days, and it’s here to 
stay. Other hospitals are using it, we need to do it as well” (Surgeon, S3).
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The surgeon’s quote illustrates that conforming to the goals of modernization 
began to seem a more appropriate and rational attitude to take than nonconformity 
(see also Dixon-Woods et al. 2011). Teaching physicians also incorporated new 
training structures in daily clinical practice. A surgeon explains:
I made a schedule listing which attending must assess which residents each 
week. Now I’m sure these assessments happen. That’s important, I think. I also 
rescheduled the surgical program to make sure that all residents can do enough 
operations at their own level of competence.(Surgeon, S5)
Drawing on Knorr Certina (1999), we can see how the educational instruments 
gradually have become managing epistemic objects as they brought about 
new forms of knowledge, expertise and evaluation in residency training. The 
incorporation of new training methods and tools reconfigured existing work 
practices. The surgeon above points out that the surgical program was rescheduled 
in order to enact a resident-oriented training program. Put it differently, 
redesigned surgical programs and the incorporation of clinical assessment tools 
have restructured traditional clinical training practice and have reconfigured ‘old 
school’ methods in which residents fully depended on an attending’s willingness to 
provide learning space or feedback. Instead of educational methods complementing 
the traditional method of learning through expertise, educational tools and, 
more broadly, educational structures have become prominent in rethinking daily 
residency training.
Shifting interests and the defense of 
professional jurisdiction
The growing reliance on educational mechanisms rendered medical training 
practice visible and, in consequence, increasingly opened up the medical training 
system to outside regulation. An important turnaround in that respect was the 
introduction of the Education Fund in 2007 as part of the broader shift towards 
regulated competition in the Dutch health care system (see Helderman et al. 2005, 
Wallenburg et al. 2012). Up until then, medical training was largely paid for through 
health insurance premiums. Teaching hospitals received more money (were more 
expensive) than hospitals without training programs. However, the difference in 
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costs impeded the aim of competition between hospitals. As medical training was 
considered a common good, the Ministry of Health decided to establish a tax-
based fund (“the Education Fund”) to subsidize residency training. The fund was 
administered by the Ministry of Health. 
Initially, the medical profession agreed, considering the fund a purely 
administrative tool to protect residency training from the possible harmful 
consequences of competition. Yet, the Education Fund soon appeared to accompany 
a new form of ambiguity in the governance of medical training as it not only gave 
insight into the profession’s policies on the distribution of training posts, but also 
provided the means to interfere in this process. In 2008 the government announced 
that the allocation of training posts would partly depend on measured teaching 
quality. Better training quality would be rewarded with more training posts. 
Interestingly, the government plan pointed to a new form of rationalized agency 
in medical training governance, as well as decreasing acceptance of professional 
control over medical training. 
The Ministry of Health subsequently commissioned a group of educationalists 
and civil servants to develop a set of quality indicators for medical training. A few 
months later the working group presented an extensive framework of educational 
principles, quality instruments and competence levels, as well as a toolbox of 
clinical assessment tools to measure residents’ skills. They argued that training 
quality could not be measured based on a few rough indicators but needed a 
tailor-made approach comprising all aspects of residency training. However, the 
framework was received with much skepticism from both the medical profession 
and the Ministry of Health. Physicians argued that the framework went far beyond 
what residency training is and should be about. Policy makers, in turn, stated that 
the framework was too complicated to decide upon training quality. They demanded 
a more simplified set of indicators. Subsequently, the ministry commissioned the 
CBOG to use an existing measurement instrument as a proxy to measure local 
training quality. This instrument became D-RECT (as mentioned above). However, 
clinicians collectively refused to cooperate. Although many of them already used 
D-RECT in their hospitals, they said it was a learning device to improve local 
training practice and should not be used as an accountability instrument. 
The clinicians’ resistance to applying D-RECT to account for training quality also 
revealed that the medical profession did not accept the CBOG’s authority over 
medical training. Instead, the medical profession aimed to defend its jurisdictions 
and sought to control which matters they allowed the CBOG to be involved in. The 
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quality of medical residency training and how physicians should account for it were 
regarded a professional matter that only medical doctors should deal with.
Supported by the medical association, a few physicians (including the InVIVO 
doctors) collaborated in an attempt to counter the ministry’s plans. Drawing on 
the government’s desire to compete on quality, they came up with a plan which 
allowed residents to choose an internship at the end of their residency. According to 
the plan, local teaching groups would compete for the senior residents (attractive 
workers because of their ability to act autonomously) based on (1) offered learning 
opportunities (e.g., an internship in a clinical sub-specialization) and (2) training 
quality (as determined by the introduced performance indicators). The plan was 
presented in a closed meeting at the Ministry of Health, attended by two physicians 
involved in the ‘counter plan’, the director and vice-director of the CBOG and two 
educationalists from the group that had developed the quality indicators. The 
physicians gave a sparkling presentation on the need to reshape current policy 
developments and relink them to the reality of everyday clinical work: “We tend to 
lose contact with the doctors. Clinical work should be at the forefront—in the end 
it is all about contents” (Physician, representative of a medical association). The 
CBOG said they supported the plan and suggested that it should be executed under 
its protection. The physicians, however, publicly resisted the CBOG’s involvement 
and argued that the project should be a doctor’s initiative to win the support of 
rank-and-file physicians. The plan was finally approved and—like InVIVO a few 
years before—it was generously funded by the Ministry of Health. 
Noticeably, although the medical profession had resisted the idea of measuring 
quality to meet the purpose of competition between training sites (and thus 
between colleague physicians) they incorporated the quality indicators in their 
plans nonetheless. An important motivation for using quality indicators was the 
fact that a great deal of public resources was involved (a single training placement 
costs approximately 150,000 euro a year). The physicians felt strongly they had 
to compromise so as not to lose funding. Yet, and this is crucial, the incorporation 
of the quality indicators also demonstrated the increasing acceptance of quality 
evaluation in medical work.
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The increasing diffuseness of interests 
in medical training
How did the hospitals enact the reform of medical training? The arrival of the 
Education Fund and a more broadly competitive hospital market were accompanied 
by a renewed interest in medical training among hospital administrators. 
Traditionally, residency training was conceived of as “a doctor’s thing”. The 
Education Fund, however, offered a new source of income to teaching hospitals 
(money from the Education Fund was paid to the hospitals boards instead of 
directly to the clinical teachers, which led to fierce negotiations between hospital 
administrators and clinical teachers about the allocation of the money). Moreover, 
at the time many hospitals wanted to obtain the predicate “teaching hospital” 
to enhance their position and reputation on an increasingly competitive market 
(also Power et al. 2009).The predicate comprised a formal license with associated 
requirements for equipment (e.g., skills lab, library, study facilities) and a quality 
monitoring system (Rombouts 2012). Increasingly “teaching hospital” stood for a 
modern, high-tech and highly qualified hospital. Such a reputation was believed to 
be important not only in negotiations with third-party payers (particularly health 
insurers) but also in attracting highly qualified physicians. To position their hospital 
as a sophisticated teaching institute many hospital boards have invested in modern 
teaching facilities in recent years. As part of this, educationalists were hired to 
improve training programs, for instance by developing courses and setting up 
quality monitoring systems. As a result, health care education, and medical training 
in particular, increasingly have become “system properties” (Waring 2007). 
Physicians have also contributed to this institutional transition process. In the 
past few years, they have become more interested in the hospital’s reputation 
for both economic and professional-technical reasons. First, a good reputation 
means more investment by health insurers and thus more opportunities to conduct 
highly complex  medical procedures. Second, in the light of increasing competition 
for training posts, the better the hospital’s reputation, the better it can attract 
good residents. This interest has made physicians increasingly dependent on the 
hospital’s broader policies.  Besides this, the new CCMS rules on training quality 
and assessment of competence have encouraged the clinical teachers’ reliance on 
hospital boards to accomplish these requirements. 
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The entwinement of different purposes and requirements have had important 
consequences for both the content and the authority over local residency training 
practice:
I used to contact the hospital administrator directly to discuss issues related to our 
residency program, but now they forward me to the manager of the teaching clinic. 
He’s an educationalist and interested most of all in the education programs of the 
entire hospital”. 
(Surgeon, S3).
Besides, with the investment in developing training facilities, clinicians are 
more often forced to purchase local [in-house] courses, even if they doubt their 
suitability:
This course was developed by our institute. It’s far from perfect. Residents 
complain, they should be doing things that they obtained a doctor’s degree in. It’s 
ridiculous. But [the course] was created here, so we have no choice. It certainly 
needs improvement. 
(Surgeon, S3)
The surgeon quoted above is reporting on a course developed by local 
educationalists. He points out that the quality of the course is insufficient but that 
surgical residents must attend it anyway as it was been created (and paid for) by 
the hospital. The quote nicely reflects the ambiguity of current shifts in medical 
training governance. To improve teaching facilities, attract good residents and obey 
new formal requirements, teaching physicians have increasingly become dependent 
on other, formerly marginalized stakeholders in medical education. Yet, this 
dependency also restricts the medical profession’s abilities to manage and control 
the training of their residents.
In sum, physicians’ interests and the interest of hospital administrators have 
become more entwined, leading to a more diffused constellation of authority over 
medical training. This diffuseness makes it hard for the medical profession to regain 
control over residency training, which would have suited the sociological conflict 
model explained above. Instead, the case of medical training reform reveals that 
physicians do not intend to regain control as the conflict would go against the 
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(changing) private interest of clinicians to improve a hospital’s teaching reputation 
and to obey new, professional requirement for residency training.
Conclusions and discussion
In this chapter we have taken the critical case of medical residency training reform 
to examine contemporary shifts in medical governance. Reform was driven by two 
parallel developments. First was government’s aim to create a new educational 
structure to tackle upcoming problems in health care (e.g., rising health care costs, 
rising numbers of chronically ill patients). Second was the wish of medical doctors 
to adapt medical residency training to shifts in clinical work (for example, technical 
developments, severe patient load). Both aims were brought together in the 
renewal of residency training programs. Although medical doctors initially believed 
that the reform would “only make explicit what we always have done implicitly”, the 
chapter has revealed how the reform gradually turned into a process of institutional 
change.  
Three broad, related processes underpinned the changes in medical training 
governance. First, a group of medical entrepreneurs (“InVIVO’s physicians”) aimed 
to enhance the quality and timeliness of medical residency training. The physicians 
acted as mediators between the broader medical professions and the government. 
They sought to enhance medical training by implementing educational methods and 
principles in residency training, and entered into new coalitions with government 
representatives and educationalists to accomplish their aims. 
Second, educational principles and tools turned out to be important carriers 
and mediators of institutional change. As managing epistemic objects (Knorr 
Certina 1999), the educational instruments reconfigured traditional clinical 
training practice and reframed the notion of “good residency training”. Residency 
became more about structured training programs, competency-based models and 
quality evaluation. An important explanation for the transferring role of education 
instruments was the fact that the tools fitted in with wider trends in evidence-
based medicine and steering by (measurable) performance in the health care 
field. Moreover, the educational instruments not only represented this trend but 
physicians also actively contributed to the performance trend as the instruments 
were enacted and shaped by clinicians themselves. The research has shown that 
physicians rapidly embraced the educational tools and mechanisms, for example 
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by redesigning operating programs to render a resident-oriented working process 
possible. Also, performance measurement was extended from residents’ skills and 
knowledge to the quality of the learning environment and teaching capabilities 
of individual physicians. Thus, performance measurement and steering by 
performance were also consequences of medical professional activities (see also 
Niezen et al. 2012).
The third underlying process was the shifting interests of other stakeholders in 
medical training. Following substantial changes in the policy context (particularly 
the introduction of competition into the health care system), formerly marginalized 
stakeholders in postgraduate medical education developed a renewed interest in 
residency training. This chapter has demonstrated that medical training not only 
offered a new income source to hospital boards, but also played an important role 
in establishing a good hospital reputation in the light of an increasingly competitive 
hospital market. The educational tools rendered residency training more visible 
and hence evaluable to other stakeholders. For example, the evaluation tools to 
measure training quality provided the government with new means to gain a grip 
on the allocation of training placements, which was traditionally one of the key 
objects in medical training governance. 
The research has revealed how the convergence of both “internal” and “external” 
reforms led to an increasingly diffused constellation of interests and authority in 
medical residency training. Stakeholders’ interests entwined, despite the basic 
differences and conflicting aims. In the hospital, for example, new coalitions of 
physicians, educationalists and hospital administrators arose to serve both the aim 
of the medical profession to contract excellent residents and the hospital’s goals of 
generating income and enhancing its reputation. Although physicians regarded such 
collaborations as an unwanted loss of control over training practice, at the same 
time they felt that new governing arrangements were inevitable if they were to be 
able to live up to new expectations and requirements. In short, the basic explaining 
factor for the transitions in Dutch medical training seems not to be “conflict” but 
rather the entanglement of interests and objectives. 
The principle of entanglement provides us with an interesting theoretical concept 
for the understanding of medical governance change. It is important to note 
that entanglement does not mean convergence of interests, or that coalitions of 
stakeholders are rid of conflicts and power plays. As we have shown, the fact that 
quality indicators gained a prominent place in the medical association’s project to 
forestall government control over the distribution of training posts was not so much 
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because the profession embraced the idea of competition on quality, but because 
they needed the government’s support to remain entitled to resources from the 
Education Fund. 
Seen this way, the internal-external distinction, which is key in the sociology of 
professions, appears to be far more diffuse. During the reform process of residency 
training it became increasingly unclear what was internal and external as interests 
and activities increasingly intermingled. The medical profession appeared not to 
be such a closed shop but comprised entrepreneurs who sought to reform clinical 
practices, for instance, by engaging in new alliances with outside stakeholders to 
encourage the reform process in the medical profession. 
The chapter has demonstrated that a multiple-sited ethnographic research 
approach allows one to make complex reform processes visible as it accurately 
captures the dynamic interplay between policy developments and stakeholders 
as well as between instruments and epistemic shifts. A multiple-sited approach 
enables one to elucidate on contingent developments and renders visible the 
seemingly small yet crucial shifts in governance arrangements that otherwise tend 
to remain unnoticed.
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Conclusions: The Timelessness and 
Dynamics of Residency Training
Introduction
Fifteen years ago, Sinclair noted that “medical training has remained fundamentally 
unchanged for the last 150 years or so” (Sinclair 1997: 1). Similar to other 
ethnographic accounts of medical residency training, Sinclair’s account depicts 
residency training as a solid and closed world in which junior doctors gradually 
embody the medical identity. Our research, however, has shown a more dynamic 
process of medical training evolvement. Moving beyond the world of doctors and 
their education, and traveling around other sites that enacted the medical training 
reform, we employed a multiple-sited approach to analyze the reform. The main 
research question was: How is medical training reform enacted? How do the 
reforms influence the learning process of medical residents and what do they teach 
us about medical governance in general?
Drawing on the insights and concepts of three academic disciplines (sociology 
of professions, science and technology studies and political sciences), this book 
has revealed changes made in medical residency training. These changes are due 
to the interplay of political aims, broader policy developments, the introduction 
of new epistemic objects, changing expectations, and physicians’ ideology and 
ideas of what medical training is and should be about. All of this, however, does 
not imply that we reject Sinclair’s claim of ‘timeless’ medical training. During our 
hospital fieldwork, and in numerous encounters with physicians, medical residents, 
nurses, midwives, and patients, we often experienced flashbacks to the literature 
(sometimes relatively old) on medical education. The reform of medical training, we 
will argue in this final chapter, does not encompass a complete shift from “old” to 
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“new”. “The modern doctor” will not be so much different from the doctors treating 
us today. Old values, traditional practices, and new ideologies and expectations 
have intertwined in everyday clinical practice. 
The research has revealed that the entwinement of various aims and principles in 
medical education is also reflected in the governance of medical training. Medical 
training governance has shifted from a predominantly professionally controlled 
system to a system of co-regulation where the medical profession shares authority 
with other actors. Although medical doctors are still responsible for training medical 
residents, they have become increasingly dependent on other actors setting and 
fulfilling their training duties. 
This concluding chapter is structured as follows. First, we will summarize the main 
findings of the study by answering the research questions introduced in the first 
chapter. Then, we will discuss the contribution to the societal debate by focusing on 
three topics that emerged during the research: the governance of medical doctors, 
the changing master-apprentice relationship, and patient safety. Finally, we will 
elucidate the theoretical contribution this study makes to fill in some blind spots at 
the crossroads of the sociology of professions, science and technology studies, and 
institutionalism.
Main findings
The main research question contained the following sub-questions.
1.  What are the objectives of reform in medical training? How are they 
enacted in practice?
The reform of medical residency training was stimulated by both “external” 
and “internal” factors. There was political pressure to enhance the quality of 
care delivery and prepare young doctors better for changing health care needs. 
Meanwhile, inside the profession, people felt a need to adapt residency training 
to meet the shifts in clinical practice, where junior doctors traditionally played an 
important role. The reform included broader policy goals. In the United Kingdom, 
for example, the government set out a commitment to a health service system 
delivered by fully trained doctors instead of those in training; a restructured (in 
fact, shortened) training trajectory was believed would accomplish this. The Dutch 
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Ministry of Health saw the medical training reform as part of a broader occupational 
restructuring that would better equip the health care system for future health 
care needs. Thus, from the political point of view, medical training reform was 
considered a useful instrument to wield in pursuit of other goals in health care 
policy. 
Medical doctors, in turn, argued that the traditional residency training system, 
based on master-apprentice relationships and role modeling, lagged behind major 
transitions in medical care delivery, such as a more severe patient load (patients 
admitted to hospital are sicker and have shorter lengths of stay than in the past), 
technical developments and a sharp reduction of resident duty hours. Some 
physicians maintained that residents were insufficiently prepared to provide good 
care to patients in hospitals, something especially problematic considering that 
residents play a crucial role in daily medical care delivery. 
Our research has shown how these “external” and “internal” issues increasingly 
intertwined during the reform process. From the interplay of the various aims 
and purposes, three main issues emerged. First, the efficiency and quality of the 
medical training system. Debates initially centered on the role and position of 
medical training in the whole educational and occupational structure of the health 
care system. During the reform, discussions increasingly shifted toward the quality 
of medical training in hospitals. Second, the shift from personal relationships 
between attending physicians and residents that underpinned the quality of 
residency training, to group-based medical training and quantifiable methods of 
testing and judging resident performance. This transition was due to external 
pressures to limit working hours, the wish among a growing group of medical 
doctors to combine medical work with a private life (Chapter Two) and the shift to 
personalized learning trajectories, which enable residents to be trained at different 
hospital sites. In Chapter Five we argued that the shift to more formalized ways 
of residency training tends to create social distance between attending physicians 
and residents and, therefore, underplays the crucial process of residents becoming 
integrated into the local medical community of practice. 
The third issue concerns the credibility of resident performance. The credibility 
issue centered on the shift from resident assessment—accompanied by the room 
to practice medicine autonomously—as ‘hands-on’ practice, which external actors 
could barely evaluate, to standardized, quantified skills testing to enhance the 
transparency, transferability and accountability of medical training. 
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The various issues were brought together in an educational renewal of existing 
residency training programs. The reform included the creation of training programs 
with clear end goals, the introduction of personal learning plans and regular 
assessment of competence with standardized assessment tools. 
This research has demonstrated that the educational reform of medical residency 
has reframed traditional training practice. Whereas physicians initially believed 
that an educational-oriented reform would improve residency training and bring 
“old school” practices in line with new requirements without reconfiguring medical 
training, the research has revealed that educational tools brought about new forms 
of knowledge, expertise and evaluation, which have increasingly gained ground 
in residency training. New structures (for example, standardized assessment 
of resident performance during surgical procedures—see Chapter Five) were 
incorporated in clinical practice and performance measurement was extended from 
rating residents’ capabilities to encompass the hospital’s learning climate and the 
teaching competence of clinicians. 
The research has shown that the increasing attention for evidence-based training 
and the learning climate, as well as the enhanced formalization of training programs 
have lifted residency out of the daily routine of medical work. Therefore, attention 
has shifted from the residency as a group-based process to individual learning 
trajectories. We conclude that this shift has enhanced the educational value of 
the training of medical residents but at the same time, it tends to lead to more 
peripheral training processes as the formalization of training programs has created 
social distance between attending physicians and medical residents (see also the 
answer to question three, below).
2. What are the consequences of the reforms for the governance of 
medical training? 
The comparative analysis of historical medical training reform in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and The Netherlands (NL) (Chapter Three) showed that back in the 
1960s and 1970s both countries laid the foundations for the reforms of the 2000s 
when “external” stakeholders were incorporated in medical regulatory bodies 
supervising medical education. Though medical doctors still controlled medical 
education governance, other stakeholders (the state, and in the UK lay participants 
as well) became part of the regulatory frameworks of the medical training regime. 
These stakeholders’ influence strengthened during the 1990s. Driven by the need 
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to bring the medical education system in line with new European requirements 
(UK) and to adapt the number of physicians in training to future health care needs 
(NL) they introduced new governance arrangements that pointed at more state 
regulation in medical education. These transitions paved the way for more basic 
reforms in the 2000s. 
The analysis revealed that reforms in medical training mainly depended on 
two elements of institutional change: the institutional embedding of the health 
care system and developments in the broader political context. An important 
development in the UK political context was the disclosure of medical scandals, 
which forced the government to show firmness in the face of huge public anger 
(Dixon-Woods et al. 2011). In The Netherlands, the introduction of regulated 
competition in health care allowed the government to intervene in the formerly 
closed policy domain of medical education. These two substantial shifts in 
professional regulation created a moment for other actors (especially government) 
to intervene in the governance of medical education. 
Note that the changes in the medical training regime happened alongside a wider 
movement towards distinctive forms of governance and regulation. Since the 1980s 
New Public Management (NPM) policies have attracted much attention on the 
international agenda for institutional change through requirements for cost control, 
market mechanisms and accountability, and for managerial rather than political 
prerogatives in defining the aims of public sector identity (Hood 1991, Hasselblad 
and Bejent 2007). The introduction of NPM mechanisms in health care permitted 
different constellations of power to arise in medical governance, accompanied by 
new knowledge structures and policy instruments. NPM has given rise to increasing 
measures and systems of measurable performance in the public sector, what 
Power has termed “The Audit Society” (Power 1997). Accordingly, in medicine 
attention has shifted toward transparency and accountability mechanisms in the 
past two decades, with the attempt to open the medical domain to outside scrutiny 
(Bal 2008). The changes in medical training governance are part of this broader 
transition process. 
This research has revealed that the transitions in control over medical training 
cannot be understood as a shift in countervailing powers (Light 1995). Authority did 
not shift from the medical profession to other stakeholders, but instead led to the 
rise of new, complex coalitions of stakeholders sharing influence and authority (over 
the governance of) medical residency training. 
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For example, the UK government rigorously tried to reform residency training by 
introducing a new training structure and establishing a new recruitment system 
for residents. Yet, these measures provoked a revolt by medical practitioners that 
forced the government to back down, having discovered that such radical reforms 
could not succeed without the medical practitioners’ support and expertise. The 
Modernizing Medical Career debate led to the establishment of new governance 
arrangement of co-regulation (Chapter Three). 
In The Netherlands, where we zoomed in on the changes in the governance 
of everyday residency training in hospital practice (Chapter Six), the research 
demonstrated how new coalitions of clinical teachers, hospital administrators and 
educationalists were established to meet new training requirements. Educationalists 
had been barely involved in postgraduate medical education up to then but now 
they were recruited to facilitate the renewal of residency training programs. 
Hospital administrators became involved as the Education Fund provided a new 
source of hospital income. The predicate, “teaching hospital” (attached to formal 
requirements for amenities such as skills labs and a training quality system) was 
considered highly desirable for enhancing a hospital’s position in an increasingly 
competitive market. Clinical teachers, in turn, depended on the expertise of 
educationalists as well as the hospital’s facilities to attract good medical residents. 
Put it differently, despite their basic differences and even conflicting aims, the 
various stakeholders needed each other to fulfill their aims. Although physicians 
felt such collaborations led to unwanted loss of control over professional training 
practice, they also acknowledged that the new governing arrangements enabled 
them to live up to the new expectations and requirements. 
However, this does not mean that educationalists have become key actors in 
the primary process of residency training. The research demonstrated that while 
attending physicians have embraced educational tools (and reconstituted them in 
the dynamics of daily clinical practice—see Chapter Five) educationalists have been 
relegated to the supportive staff of the teaching clinics of hospital institutes.
We can conclude that medical training governance has shifted from predominantly 
self-regulation to coregulation wherein the medical profession shares authority 
with other stakeholders in medical education. Importantly, these new governing 
coalitions are not imposed from “above” but emerge out of complex interplays 
between the actors involved and are driven by wider political developments. Despite 
the increasing emphasis on formal regulations and dependency on other actors to 
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meet new training requirements, medical doctors have clearly stayed responsible 
for the daily training of medical residents. 
3. What are the consequences of the reform for what and how residents 
learn in everyday clinical practice? 
Residency involves learning-by-doing and hands-on learning. Residents learn the 
medical craft in “real life” clinical situations and thus practice on “real” human 
bodies. The research has shown that space is not predetermined for residents 
to perform medical procedures but must be negotiated in the social interactional 
order of a local community of practice. Personal relationships, especially “trust”, 
underlie the negotiation processes. Residents must learn to find their way around 
the hospital building. They must get to know the nurses and the wishes and 
expectations of attending physicians to be able to present themselves as reliable, 
skilled (future) physicians and obtain a central place in the social interactional 
order. The center of medical care, we have argued, is a protected arena. The hard 
work that residents must do to gain entrance to this center is aimed at protecting 
the patient’s health—as well as the clinical reputation of the supervising physician. 
The aspect of reputation, we have argued, is a subtle yet strong element of 
enhancing patient safety in clinical training situations. Attending physicians only 
let their residents treat their patients if they have full confidence in the resident’s 
capabilities. 
Chapter Four showed that in daily clinical practice the purposes of patient care 
and medical training coexist, and that both attending physicians and medical 
residents tinker with these, in principle, conflicting aims. Safe patient care asks 
for experience, expertise and the close supervision of the junior doctors providing 
the care. Residency training, on the other hand, requires space to practice and 
the opportunity for medical residents to act autonomously (be “invisible” to 
supervisors), also in clinical situations where residents lack full knowledge and 
experience. If things go well, confidence increases—both the resident’s confidence 
in their own clinical capability and the attending’s confidence in the resident—and 
the resident is allowed to move up in the hierarchy of the professional community 
(Chapter Four). 
In the past decade, learning and resident assessment as part of hands-on patient 
care have been put under challenge. The emphasis has shifted from practicing in 
clinical settings to practicing in skills labs and competence assessment. Following 
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the new requirements, residents must first prove their capability before treating 
patients. This shift, our research has shown, is not only due to safety requirements 
but also takes place in the background of the sharp reduction in resident duty 
hours, enhanced mobility of residents around hospital sites and the use of 
visualizing technologies in daily clinical practice. The shift to more formalized 
ways of judging residents’ abilities can be characterized by a shift from “trust” to 
“accountability” (Chapter Two). 
Steve Shapin (1992) has distinguished two forms of credibility, meaning the 
acceptance of claims of “truth” in scientific practice. Credibility of experts, Shapin 
argues, can be based on familiarity (sharing the same background, conducting the 
same kind of work, having personal relationships) and on laity (personal distance, 
unfamiliarity with working practices and methods). Shapin argues that in a world 
characterized by familiarity, taking each other’s claims at face value is normal, 
whereas in a world of laity formal warrants of credibility are needed to obtain trust, 
such as the use of accepted research methods and quantification of outcomes (see 
also, Porter 1995). Drawing on Shapin’s distinction, the research revealed a shift 
from medical residency training based on familiarity to residency training based on 
laity.
In Chapter Five we showed that the shift towards formal and structured residency 
training creates social distance between attending physicians and residents. It 
hampers the integration of residents in the medical professional community and 
limits opportunities for residents to perform more complex medical procedures. We 
also showed that attending physicians are aware of these unexpected, unwanted 
effects of the shift to residency training based on laity. Physicians have attempted 
to realign both forms of trust in daily practice. One striking example is the use of 
clinical assessment tools. In Chapter Five we pointed out that assessment tools are 
used both to detect ill-performing residents through “objectively” measuring their 
performance and to challenge residents to become excellent physicians. Objective 
measurement, thus using the tools as prescribed, aims to test residents’ skills and 
prove incompetence to force ill-performing residents to quit residency (something 
that used to be much harder in the implicit training system). However, bad marks 
are also used to encourage good residents to become even better, thus making 
grading part of familiarity learning. 
We conclude by claiming that precisely this flexible balance (“tinkering”) between 
patient care and residency training should be protected. More than three decades 
ago Charles Bosk in his study on surgery training noted that a medical error 
Iris BW 3.indd   166 03-09-12   15:32
167
Timelessness and Dynamics of Residency Training
committed on an individual patient may outweigh the costs as “[o]ne individual 
suffers, but legions of patients yet unseen have the lesson gleaned from this 
error passed on to them” (Bosk 2003 [1979]: 41). Revisiting Bosk’s observation 
now, we may say that individual patient safety increasingly outweighs (future) 
collective safety. Yet, when residents are only allowed to act after demonstrating 
competence they do not learn to act in emergency and uncertain clinical situations. 
Consequently, individual patient safety may be enhanced in clinical training 
situations, but possibly at the cost of good and safe care in the future. We argue 
that precisely the coexistence and alignment of familiarity learning and measuring 
performance enacts good learning while protecting patients against incapable 
residents (we elaborate on this below when discussing the contributions to the 
societal debate). 
4. What does the reform of medical training teach us about processes of 
medical governance change?
Elaborating on the answer to research question two, where we claimed that 
governance of medical training has shifted to forms of co-regulation, in this section 
we aim to elucidate the mechanisms of medical governance change. Borrowing 
from Levi-Strauss (1962), we may say that as a core institution of the medical 
profession’s self-regulation, medical education is “a good case to think with” to 
analyze medical governance evolvement. Traditionally, medical training is where 
new members are recruited and socialized and where medicine’s core knowledge 
and practices are defined and transferred. This research has shown that the medical 
training governance has gradually shifted to regimes of co-regulation, with the 
medical profession now sharing authority with other stakeholders. 
Drawing on insights and concepts of the sociology of professions, science and 
technology studies and institutional theories, our research has provided insight into 
three related mechanisms of change in medical governance: institutional layering, 
the role of instruments as carriers of institutional change, and the entanglement 
of interests. First is the concept of institutional layering. Layering points at the 
introduction of new institutional elements that are grafted onto an existing system, 
thereby touching on powerful vested interests (Schlicker 2001, Thelen 2004). 
Institutional layering may alter the overall trajectory of institutional development 
as such alternative trajectories may grow into new structures of governance and 
enable non-dominant actors to gain power and enforce institutional change. An 
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example of institutional layering was the establishment of the Dutch Capacity Board 
in the late 1990s (Chapter Three). The Capacity Board was introduced to advise the 
government on the number of training placements to bring the number of trained 
physicians in line with (future) health care needs. The Capacity Board co-existed 
with the traditional profession-controlled system of allocating training placements 
to teaching hospitals. Although the Capacity Board did not interfere with the 
profession’s allocation policies, it gave entrance to the closed domain of medical 
training governance. The Education Fund, introduced a few years later, provided the 
government with a more powerful tool to intervene in medical training governance 
(see Chapter Three). 
Second, educational tools turned out to be important carriers of institutional 
change (Chapter Six). Borrowing from the work of Knorr-Certina, we have shown 
that educational instruments, as epistemic objects, changed the notion of goods 
residency “from inside out”. Measuring quality was increasingly seen as a good 
modern way of providing feedback to residents and signaling (and excluding) 
ill-performing residents. Annual evaluations of training quality (both training 
environment quality and the quality of attending physicians’ individual capacities) 
have become crucial aspects of local residency training evaluation. Importantly, 
the research has shown that the educational instruments not only represented and 
facilitated the trend in measurable performance, but also actively contributed to it 
as the medical practitioners enacted the instruments themselves. 
It is important to note that these “internal” developments were mediated by 
practices of power in the state apparatus. We have shown that clinical teachers 
were not only willing to include educational instruments in their residency training 
programs (in the sense that they believed the instruments would improve residency 
training), but they also felt they had to incorporate the instruments to remain 
entitled to the Education Fund (Chapter Six). The policy literature describes this 
phenomenon as “acting under the sword of Damocles” (for example, Helderman 
2007). Our research has revealed that the apparently strategic activities designed 
to protect private interests happened alongside and were enforced by ‘internal’ 
shifts toward evidence-based, measurable forms of organizing and evaluating 
residency training. In other words, “outside” and “inside” processes increasingly 
intertwined.
Here we come to the third mechanism of institutional change: “entanglement”. 
It provides an interesting concept for studying medical governance change as it 
allows one to dissociate from the ubiquitous conflict model of many sociological 
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and institutional accounts of medical governance. Entanglement points at the 
intertwinement of internal and external purposes and interests, as well as 
the increasing interdependency of actors seeking to obtain their goals. In The 
Netherlands, for example, clinical teachers depend on a hospital’s training facilities 
(skills labs, local courses) to comply with new training requirements. We have 
stressed that entanglement does imply neither a convergence of interests nor that 
coalitions of stakeholders are rid of their conflicts and power plays. Instead, the 
concept of entanglement points at the emergence of more diffuse coalitions of 
actors who need each other to pursue private goals (see Chapter Six). 
In the process, reform purposes are reconstituted and shaped. For example, 
Dutch policymakers initially considered medical training reform as a way of creating 
an efficient health care educational system capable of tackling the upcoming health 
care problems. Yet, the reforms turned into an educational renewal that went much 
further than a simple adaptation of traditional residency training practice (including 
attention to the needs of individual residents and evaluating the teaching ability of 
attending physicians, see below).
Although the reforms had a huge impact on the governance of medical training, 
the broader educational structure of the health care system remained unchanged. 
Medical training was unstandardized, despite the increased focus on incorporating 
educational tools and methods in residency training practice. Our study revealed 
that training practices are still highly situated and cannot be disconnected from 
hands-on patient care, residents’ embeddedness in concrete practices, and 
individual assessment by supervisors (Chapters Four and Five). We can only 
conclude that despite the considerable reforms in postgraduate medical education 
in recent years, its successes and failures will probably be judged differently by the 
various stakeholders involved.
Contributions to the societal debate
What are the implications of the research for policy? And what does the study imply 
for citizens, meaning the patients of today and sometime in the future? This section 
clarifies the societal implications of our research by focusing on three topics that 
emerged from the study: the governance of medical doctors, the changing master-
apprentice relationship, and patient safety.
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The governance of medical doctors
The research shed a new light on the ongoing societal debate about the governance 
of medical doctors. Generally, the debate is centered along two opposing 
viewpoints: the medical profession’s resistance to change and the ‘alienation’ from 
professional work. The first group (comprising scholars, politicians, journalists 
and professional workers) states that medical practice is stubborn to change 
as physicians seek to defend their professional jurisdiction against outside 
interference. Proponents of the ‘resistance’ stance often argue that the professional 
culture requires a change to make physicians more sensitive to other forms of 
practice and enhance the quality of medical care delivery or, in our case, residency 
training. For example, recently published studies on postgraduate medical education 
focused on the development of valid evaluation tools to improve residents’ learning 
processes (see Boor 2010, Overeem 2011, Jansma 2011). These studies state 
that more attention should be paid to the implementation process of the newly 
developed instruments in clinical practice (e.g., by developing special courses) to 
convince physicians of the advantages and necessity of using such instruments 
(e.g., Overeem 2011). 
Taking the “alienation” stance in the debate, others argue that due to growing 
outside interference, professional practice has become bureaucratized and attention 
has shifted from service content, constituted in professional-client interactions, to 
the transparency and efficiency of service delivery. It is claimed that professionals 
experience a loss of autonomy in their professional-client interactions (Harrison and 
Ahmed 2000, Evetts 2003), and have trouble identifying with the policies they have 
to implement. Professionals feel alienated from their work and, as a result, would 
be less willing to implement government reforms (Tummers 2012).
Both perspectives (professional ‘resistance to change’ and ‘alienation’) underlie 
a static, discordant perspective on professional governance. In the literature on 
medical education, for example, medical training reform is seen as something 
“external” to professional work that needs to be “implemented” in training practice. 
Physicians must be “convinced” by demonstrating the advantages and necessity 
of the “new approach”. Likewise, in the concept of alienation, policy measures 
are seen as something coming from outside which upsets (and even injures) 
professional work. 
Our study has shown that medical training reform is not something external 
and “clear-cut” but is instead re-established and reconstituted through working 
practices. New training structures, duty hour regulations and assessment 
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procedures are intertwined with existing working practices. Through these 
processes, new training methods have become incorporated in daily residency 
training, albeit in a somewhat different form and perhaps less radically than 
intended by policymakers or educationalists beforehand. Likewise, even if medical 
doctors feel alienated by (announced) policy measures, the research has shown 
that how these measures “flesh out” in actual practice depends on the entwinement 
of private interests, the enactment of instruments in daily work, and political aims, 
among other factors. Put differently, professional culture change is not imposed 
from above but, instead, is the result of the enactment and entwinement of reforms 
in practices. Conducting a multiple-sited study allows one to make these actual 
processes visible. 
The changing master-apprentice relationship
Our research revealed a changing master-apprentice relationship. Many sociological 
accounts of medical education have underscored the hierarchical relationship 
between attending physicians and junior doctors, requiring juniors to bear the cruel 
behavior of attendings to be integrated in the medical team and allowed to do more 
interesting work. The world of doctors and their training is also an appealing image 
to film and television producers as well as novelists (e.g., Shem 1995). 
Our study partly echoed the classic observations of the education of doctors. 
We demonstrated that medical residents need the acceptance of attending 
physicians to be able to move into the center of medical work and perform clinical 
procedures (see Chapter Five). However, we also showed that due to the increasing 
formalization and structuring of residency training programs, attention has shifted 
to the individual learning trajectory (see answer to question one, above). No longer 
at the sole mercy of attending physicians to be allowed to practice medicine, 
residents are increasingly regarded as individuals with rights (obtaining feedback, 
outlining a personal learning plan, having enough rest) and duties or responsibilities 
(keeping a portfolio, attending courses, regularly clinical assessment). 
Besides, the formalization of medical training has influenced the role of the 
clinical teacher. The post of clinical teacher used to be more or less an honorary 
job, granted after a successful medical career. New formal requirements (for 
example, following courses on the use of educational tools) and duties (designing 
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local training programs, accounting for grants from the Education Fund) have 
both formalized the job of clinical teacher and severely increased the workload.34 
Moreover, the enhanced mobility of medical residents between teaching hospitals 
has encouraged collaboration between local clinical teachers in a particular 
specialty. Whereas clinical teachers used to focus solely on the training program 
and medical residents on their own department, now they share judgments of 
individual residents as well as private training strategies and habits (e.g., giving low 
marks to stimulate high potentials—see Chapter Five). The more frequent contact 
between clinical teachers and use of evaluation tools to measure training quality 
have rendered local residency training programs and attending physicians’ teaching 
skills increasingly visible and hence evaluable to a growing group of colleague 
clinical teachers. 
The research revealed that limiting residents’ duty hours coming together with 
the enhanced visibility and “evaluability” of residency training has encouraged the 
formalization of medical training. We claim that this formalization has strengthened 
the position of medical residents. Clinical teachers now feel they must consider 
the needs and wishes of individual residents—and can be hold accountable for 
that. Whereas this accountability used to involve only a small group of (colleague) 
physicians, now it has shifted to a much broader domain in which non-medical 
professionals also play a role (Nettleton et al. 2008). We argue that these shifts 
accompany both a “normalization” and “demystification” of medical residency 
training. 
Patient safety
The enhancement of patient safety has been a driving force behind medical 
educational reform. As argued above (question three), this research revealed an 
important risk of the increasing focus on the formalization of training requirements. 
If formal training structures and assessment requirements become most important, 
meaning that residents must first demonstrate competence before carrying out 
clinical procedures on “real” patients, and if attending-resident interactions are 
further limited—because of the residents’ shorter duty hours and increasing mobility 
between training sites—residents will tend to be relegated to more peripheral forms 
of residency learning. As a result, future physicians will be less routinized and may 
34 The cl inical teachers we met were usually at the start or in the middle of 
their professional careers. This was a big contrast with our preconceptions of 
a somewhat older doctor.
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lack the capability to deal with emerging, unanticipated contingencies in clinical 
situations. We have revealed that the informal unarticulated mechanisms of patient 
safety present in everyday training situations35, such as the fear of damage to 
reputations (both attending and resident’s reputations, Chapters Four and Five), are 
based on close personal relationships between residents and attending physicians. 
A formalized training system, we have argued, may create social and physical 
distance between attending physicians and residents and, as a result, undo such 
safety mechanisms.  
However, we do not want to suggest that patient safety was sufficiently secured 
in the “old school” method of master-apprentice training. Many studies have 
pointed at the dangers of master-apprentice training with respect to patient safety 
(e.g., Overeem 2011) and with regard to the health of medical residents (Prins 
et al. 2007). During our field work we encountered situations where it was highly 
questionable whether patient care could be qualified as ‘safe’ or ‘good’36 (a striking 
example was presented in Chapter four in which a patient was bleeding, challenging 
a resident to solve a severe clinical situation). The research demonstrated that 
the emphasis on measurable performance and the shift to “visibility” generally 
enhanced awareness of the importance of patient safety in daily training situations. 
These shifts restricted the residents’ space to cover up errors or feelings of 
uncertainty. Thus, as we argued above (question three), the safety of individual 
patients seems to have improved, albeit perhaps at the expense of future care. 
The point we want to make is that it is the balance between structures, rules 
and ‘visibility’, on the one hand, and the professional judgment and ‘practices of 
invisibility’ on the other that shape a medical training system that allows residents 
to gradually integrate with the local medical community while protecting patients 
against poorly performing or inexperienced residents. As Mol points out (Mol 
2008: 53), balance is not a matter of adding and subtracting advantages and 
disadvantages but is more like tinkering; something that needs to be established, 
actively, by attuning variables to each other (also Mol et al. 2010, Pols 2012). 
In medical training, it is about being both visible and invisible, testing skills and 
35 For similar argumentation see (Mesman 2009, 2012).
36 Crucial questions are: what is “safe” care and when becomes care “unsafe”? 
What actually is the difference between “safe care” and “good care”? And 
when is care “good enough”‘? For example, a novice resident stitches up a 
patient who has just given birth. The care may be safe (the bleeding has 
stopped) but ‘safe’ does not take the quality of the stitching into account, or 
the possible short and long-term effects of adhesions on the functionality of 
the pelvic f loor. Further research is warranted.
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‘letting go’. This study has revealed that the tinkering with rules and regulations 
and work processes enact—and enable—new training practices which pay more 
attention to the quality of health care delivery and patient safety, even if these 
practices are different from the ones that the rules and regulations literally 
prescribe. For instance, residents still practice on patients without having obtained 
qualification beforehand. We claim that precisely this tinkering forces actors to 
change traditional work practices while enabling them to preserve what needs to 
be kept. It is crucial for policy makers to recognize this dynamic, and appreciate it 
by not deploying further restrictions but leaving room to medical professionals to 
shape ‘modern’ training practices. 
This does not mean, however, that policy makers should play only a marginal 
role in medical education and trust the medical profession to come up with a new 
and safer training system. Instead, we argue that government (specifically the 
Ministry of Health and Health Inspectorate) should play a crucial role in developing 
requirements and monitoring training practices to which physicians have to 
respond. A continuous dynamic interplay between government activities and 
medical training practices is most fruitful in achieving a safer albeit “good” training 
system.
Crossing theoretical boundaries
This section discusses the theoretical contributions of our research. We started out 
by stating that sociological studies of medical education usually have a strong focus 
on the socialization of medical residents in the medical professional community. 
We argued with other scholars (e.g., Brosnan and Turner 2009, Chamberlain 2009, 
Elston 1997) that a focus on medical training processes is insufficient to unpack 
the relationship between contemporary challenges in medical work and medical 
practitioners’ educational activities. To come to a more thorough understanding of 
contemporary reforms in medical education we have drawn upon three academic 
disciplines: the sociology of professions, science and technology studies (STS), 
and political sciences. What did these academic disciplines contribute to the 
understanding of medical training reform, and what are the limitations of bringing 
these three disciplines together?
The sociology of medical education is closely connected to the sociology of 
professions. Both share a focus on (the shaping of) professional behavior. Yet, 
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whereas the sociology of medical education possesses an “inward looking” 
perspective through the focus on the training process, the sociology of professions 
has shifted toward the changing roles and position of professions in the broader 
social policy context of the past decade. Accounts of change point at a shift from 
professional partnership, collegiality and trust to forms of “new professionalism” 
(Kuhlmann and Saks 2008, Light 2009) comprising notions of managerialism, 
bureaucracy, standardization and performance evaluation. The concept of new 
professionalism has yielded revealing empirical and theoretical insights into how 
professions respond to changing societal and political demands. However, its 
basic reliance on conflict theories, where professions aim to protect professional 
autonomy while “external” actors attempt to gain a grip on professional work, 
tends to lead to a deadlock in the analysis of medical training reform as it misses 
out on the far more gradual yet crucial changes in the governance of medical work 
(Noordegraaf 2011). It is here that we introduced STS and institutional theories. 
For instance, the notion of tinkering has allowed us to move past the conflict 
debate, whereas notions of institutional change have helped us to understand how 
medical practices can also be changed from the “inside out” (see below).
The STS perspective allowed us to show the fluidity, multiplicity and situatedness 
of residency reform. Using an “exnovative” approach, meaning that we tried 
to foreground what is already present—though hidden and overlooked—in 
training practices (see Mesman 2009, 2012), we were able to demonstrate 
the embeddedness of residency training in the socio-technical environment of 
everyday clinical work. We revealed the informal mechanisms of protecting patient 
safety in training situations, and showed how these mechanisms rely on personal 
relationships between attending physicians and residents. Drawing on the STS 
concepts of multiplicity and normativity we could show that in daily clinical practice 
the purposes of “good patient care” and “good residency training” coexist. The 
research has shown how both attending physicians and residents tinker with these 
in principle conflicting aims (see Chapter Four and the answer to question three 
above). The notion of tinkering has shed a new light on the notion of professional 
“resistance”. In the sociological-oriented literature, resistance is usually explained 
as the profession’s aim to protect the professional jurisdiction against outside 
interference. Tinkering shows that resistance can also be part of a broader attempt 
to preserve traditional practices that (in the end) serve the public good. 
Whereas the STS perspective proved valuable to gain in-depth understanding of 
medical residency training reform, it is less suitable to explain how new governance 
Iris BW 3.indd   175 03-09-12   15:32
176
Chapter 7
arrangements become institutionalized. To explain processes of institutional change, 
we drew on theoretical insights from political sciences, more specifically theoretical 
concepts developed in the realm of institutionalism. Institutional theories emphasize 
the structuring effect of existing governance arrangements on the ways practices 
develop and change. The “path dependency view” enabled us to gain insight into 
the shift from professional self-regulation to forms of co-regulation in the medical 
training regime. It let us understand that state control over professional training 
was impossible due to vested professional authority as well as the necessity of 
professional expertise in the governance of medical training (see Chapter Two).
Theoretical concepts of institutional change have also provided insight into how 
the profession’s capacity to control medical education has weakened, due to 
broader changes in the health care context. Theories of institutional change have 
shed light on how such processes evolve. We have shown that shifts in governance 
arrangements are not only due to confrontations between countervailing powers, 
but may also be the result of subtle, seemingly negligible shifts in knowledge 
structures and policy measures that bring together various actors, introduce new 
forms of ambiguity and reshape governance arrangements, pathing the way for 
more substantial change over time. As such, we have been able to develop a 
dynamic understanding of medical governance change. 
At this point precisely, the three academic disciplines come together and enable 
the provision of in-depth insight into the dynamics of medical residency training 
reform. The notion of tinkering has helped us to understand the conflicting aims 
and purposes that needs to be dealt with, while institutional notions have elucidated 
the ambiguity embedded in shifts in governance arrangements, opening up 
existing regulatory patterns. These theoretical notions have appeared fruitful in 
moving us past the conflict model, which underlies many sociological and policy 
accounts of medical professional practice. It has allowed us to study how different 
developments come together (or not), and the consequences hereof for actual work 
practices. Specifically, our theoretical approach has provided new insights both in 
terms of changes of authority over the medical training system and the effects and 
“timelessness” of daily training activities. 
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Reflections on methodology
Ethnographic studies usually explore specific processes or situations from the point 
of view of one particular actor. In this research we conducted a multiple-sited 
research approach to unravel the different ideas, purposes, activities and logics at 
stake in the reform of medical residency training. By making “partial connections” 
(Strathern 1991) between the different sites we aimed to come to an in-depth 
understanding of current medical residency training reform. A multiple-sited 
approach implies that the often mentioned difficulties of doing ethnographic 
research (gaining access and winning trust, becoming familiar with the environment 
and being ‘of use’) are multiplied as well. In this section we reflect on our 
methodology and account for the choices we made. We will first highlight some 
arguments in current debates on ethnographic work and then explain how we dealt 
with these issues.
A large and still growing body of literature on ethnographic research has described 
the challenges, opportunities and frictions accompanying ethnographic work 
(e.g., Atkinson et al. 2001; Bosk 1992, 2008). Some scholars have depicted the 
ethnographer as ‘a fly on the wall’, meaning that ethnographic researchers overhear 
and watch the ones they study without influencing the people or situations being 
observed. Others have argued that such a neutral stand is not only impossible but 
is also undesirable as it tends to miss out on crucial information about contextual 
issues or historical events that influence situated activities. Instead, researchers 
should ‘act with’ the ones they study and, the other way around, the ones being 
studied must get involved in the research to explore the settings and activities 
under study (Bijker et al. 2009). Zuiderent-Jerak (2007) stresses an interventionist 
approach to studying practices to explore and produce robust forms of knowledge. 
Following this approach, researchers should not only participate in local activities 
but also aim to change these practices to elucidate the frictions and normative 
complexities embedded in them (Zuiderent-Jerak 2007). 
In this research we followed an “interactive” approach. During the study we often 
had the role of “invited guest” (Bosk 1992), meaning that the actors invited us to 
observe them. As appointed evaluators we were included in the InVIVO project 
team, comprising physicians, medical residents and educationalists. Our role 
enabled us to closely interact with key actors of the reform over a long period, 
generating both the insider and outsider’s perspective on the changes in medical 
residency training. The collaboration also helped us to get in touch with other 
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actors in the field and facilitated access to other research sites, such as the clinical 
workplace. 
Close collaboration between researchers and the ones studied also involves risks. 
The risks involve not just the commonly known risk of ‘going native’ (meaning 
that researchers become so deeply immersed in the culture under study that they 
lose the sense of perspective needed to produce balanced reports—see Bijker et 
al. 2009: 37-38). They also involve the risk of restricted access to just the places 
and actors that act in line with the ideas and purposes (‘share the mindset’) of 
the actors the researcher collaborates with. In this research we tried to avoid 
developing a one-sited perspective by moving between settings that held different 
stances towards medical training reform. In addition, we organized ongoing 
reflection within our own research group, and regularly shared our analyses with 
other sociologists back at our own university and at national and international 
conferences. We wrote in-depth notes (‘thick descriptions’, Geertz 1973) of our 
observations and kept a diary of the expectations, experiences, and frictions we 
encountered
Bosk has pointed out that although the role of invited guests renders easier access 
to the research field (including its ‘back stage spaces’) it usually also accompanies 
high expectations on the side of the host (Bosk 1992). We encountered several. 
First, there were epistemic expectations. As co-members of the project team we 
were expected to support the implementation of the redesigned residency training 
programs. For example, we were asked to develop a survey to monitor the use of 
the various elements of the training programs (clinical assessment tools, portfolio) 
at local hospital sites. The central idea behind the survey was that high scores (‘the 
instruments are used’) reflected support, whereas low scores mirrored ‘aversion’ 
and ‘resistance’. Yet, from our point of view non-compliance did not necessarily 
reflect resistance, but could also point at reasonable objections against (part of) 
the reform plans. Besides, we were not only interested in whether the tools were 
used, but how they were used. Whereas the project team sought for clarity, as 
sociologists we were more interested in the ambiguities and complexities of clinical 
training practice. 
Second, there were practical expectations. When we gained access to the clinical 
work floor we agreed with the local clinical teacher that an ethnographic study of 
hospital-based residency training study was important to gain better insight into the 
opinions and expectations of medical residents, as this group was hardly heard in 
the reform process. During the study, the attending physicians expressed the hope 
that we would help them improve their local training programs. The expectations 
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had shifted. As we were neither educationalists nor medical doctors, we felt 
inadequate to come up with practical solutions for local problems.  We attempted to 
meet the clinical teachers’ needs by reflecting on the daily frictions and complexities 
we observed, yet it was obviously clear that they had hoped for more practical 
solutions. 
The coming together of differing expectations (epistemic and practical) points at 
a much broader and underlying theme of our research: the movement between 
“simplicity” and “complexity”. Whereas the medical doctors, educationalists and 
policy makers often sought simple measures or instruments to come to a more 
resident-oriented or evaluable training practice, we were especially interested in the 
complexity and interplay between the various practices—for which no easy solutions 
exist. Yet, as Mol and Law (2002) point out, simple and complex are not opposites 
but two ends of a continuum. Perspectives may shift along this continuum, 
incorporating processes of “simplification” and “complexification”. We attempted to 
move alongside the continuum by co-operating with the development of a survey 
and performing a Q-methodological study to reveal ‘clear’ viewpoints on medical 
training reform, and at the same time used the same activities to explore the 
frictions and the normative complexities embedded in residency training reform.
Third, we moved between and participated in different settings that, at the time 
of the study, were in conflict with each other. Sometimes we spent a morning at 
the Ministry of Health in The Hague, discussing new forms of medical training 
governance, and then traveled to Utrecht to participate in a medical association 
meeting, discussing a new project on training quality to forestall government 
regulations. Our double role implied that we knew the plans and strategies of 
both countervailing parties and thus we had to be extra careful not to share ‘real’ 
confidences, yet still provide enough information to be able to actively participate 
and intervene in both settings. Our strategy was to outline basic developments 
and then focus on the topics that were at stake in a particular setting. This 
strategy allowed us ‘act with’ the actors at the different sites without taking sides 
beforehand. 
Interestingly, topics of debate at the various sites rarely overlapped and often they 
had other meanings. For example, ‘trust’ in the policy context meant introducing 
accountable forms of demonstrating competence (Shapin’s trust as ‘laity’), while 
in the medical context, trust meant personal relationships and confidence in 
someone’s professional ability and behavior (‘familiar trust’). Multiple-sited research 
thus not only brings actors and settings together, it also reveals their deeply rooted 
differences.
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This book concerns the reform of medical residency training. In short, the reform 
takes in the shift from apprenticeship-based training models of “learning-by-doing” 
and role modeling to structured training programs based on educational insights 
as competency-based training and standardized performance assessment. Up to 
now, many sociological accounts of medical education have narrowly focused on 
the world of doctors and how they are educated. This book aims to contribute to 
a more comprehensive understanding of current transitions in medical education. 
The overall research aim is to reveal how medical residency has changed due to the 
interplay of policy development, transitions in the medical profession, traditional 
values and training practices, and new ideologies.
The book discusses and relates two closely related, yet usually distinct topics. 
First, we explore the changing objectives and processes of medical training itself, 
and examine how current reforms affect the learning process of medical residents. 
Second, medical education is generally seen as a core institution of medical 
professional self-regulation. Through exploring medical training reform we seek to 
gauge the dynamics of present trends in medical governance. 
We explore these research aims through a multiple-sited ethnographic study of 
medical training reform in the Netherlands. For five years, we traveled around 
and participated in various sites that enacted the reform of medical training: 
the Ministry of Health, medical associations, the clinic, local meetings of clinical 
teachers, medical residents and educationalists, conferences pertaining to the 
reform and scientific conferences on medical education. We ‘acted with’, observed 
and interviewed local and national actors. Drawing on theoretical insights of medical 
sociology, the sociology of professions, science and technology studies and political 
sciences the book reveals the multiple ontologies of medical training reform, and 
provides in-depth insight in the processes and mechanisms of changes in medical 
governance more in general.
Chapter Two sketches the various perspectives on medical training reform. How 
do the actors involved in residency training give meaning to the reform and what 
are their expectations? We conducted a Q-methodological study. Q methodology 
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is a mixed quantitative-qualitative research method to studying subjectivity, such 
as people’s viewpoints, beliefs, attitudes and opinions. The study revealed four 
different perspectives on medical training reform: the accountability perspective, 
the educational perspective, the work-life balance perspective, and the trust-based 
perspective. The different perspectives reflect current debates in medical training 
on, on the one hand,  the importance of transparency about and the quantification 
of residents’ capabilities and accountability in taking care of patients, and protecting 
‘old school’ models of professional training which basically rely on relationships of 
trust on the other. The work-life balance is a slightly different perspective, as this 
is more about the importance of the learning climate and possibility to combine 
residency training with a private life. The work-life balance perspective reflects 
current normalization - and, with that, demystification- of medical training and 
medical work more broadly.
Chapter Three turns to the topic of medical professional governance. Here we 
conduct a comparative historical institutional analysis of medical training reform 
in the United Kingdom and The Netherlands. Drawing on theories of institutional 
change we explore current transformations in the medical training regime and 
the consequences for the capacity of the medical profession to govern medical 
residency training. The chapter shows that in both countries the medical training 
regimes have shifted from a predominantly professionally controlled system into 
regimes of coregulation, though in quite different ways and pace. In the United 
Kingdom, the transformation process had already started in the 1960s and 1970s. 
The more gradual process was interrupted in the late 1990s, when growing distrust 
in the medical profession provided the British government with the authority to 
claim partial control over the medical training system. However, by attempting to 
wield medical education to improve the NHS, and by rushing past the objections 
of the medical profession it provoked a revolt of practicing clinicians against 
the government as well as their own professional bodies. The debacle led to a 
renegotiation of authority in the medical training regime, putting in place new 
governance arrangements of coregulation. 
Compared to the British case, the Dutch reforms underwent a far more deliberate 
process, though not less contested. Here the reforms can be characterized by a 
process of institutional layering through which new governance arrangements have 
been introduced along existing ones. It is along these alternative trajectories that, 
from the 1960s onwards, changes in regulatory bodies gradually enforced state 
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authority in the medical training regime. These changes induced state-profession 
coalitions in which hospital organizations increasingly took part. The introduction of 
regulated competition in the overarching health care system in the 2000s - more 
particularly the introduction of the Education Fund- seemingly unintentionally 
enhanced the process of governance change. The fund opened up the traditional 
closed practices of training post allocation, providing other stakeholders (that is, the 
government and hospital boards) with new incentives and means to intervene in 
the process, enforcing mutual dependency in the medical training regime. 
Overall, the analysis contributes to the current debate on institutional 
transformation by demonstrating the necessity of detailed (historical) empirical 
analysis for our understanding of on- and off-path change. We stress the need to 
study the interactions among political context, the properties of institutions, and 
negotiating authority processes as they are crucially important to understanding 
institutional transformation.
In Chapter Four we turn to the clinical work place to explore the governance 
of residency training in daily practice. The chapter examines current trend 
of increasing visibility among medical residents. Following the new training 
requirements, residents have to act under close supervision of clinical supervisors 
and are only allowed to perform clinical procedures on “real patients” when 
they have proven their capabilities. Drawing on the medical sociological body of 
literature on medical education, we explore how the visibility of medical residents is 
enacted in everyday clinical work, what aims these visibilities serve and how they 
are coordinated.
The chapter shows that in everyday clinical work multiple practices of residents‘ 
visibility coexist. We list four of these visibilities: staging residents, negotiating 
supervision, playing the invisibility game and filming surgical procedures. The 
chapter demonstrates how the different visibilities are flexibly brought together 
to serve the two central and in principal conflicting goals of good patient care and 
good education. Whereas patient care asks for experience, expertise and close 
supervision, medical training requires practice and ‘invisibility‘ of medical residents. 
We show how both attending physicians and residents persistently tinker with 
visibility to serve both of these aims and how they are coordinated in everyday 
work. 
Moreover, the chapter adds to traditional sociological accounts of medical 
education by shifting the focus from medical education as a social institution to the 
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practices of residency training itself. A practice-oriented approach not only focuses 
on the social implications of medicine but highlights the practices and contingencies 
of everyday clinical work, the (sometimes conflicting) values and purposes that 
emerge as well as the way in which medical practitioners deal with these. Such 
a focus on practice helps to gain an understanding of how the current reform 
challenges clinicians’ educational activities.
In Chapter Five we take the analysis of daily training of medical residents further by 
examining how contemporary reforms in medical training intervene in the social 
interactional order of clinical practice and in the position of medical residents, and 
how this influences the learning opportunities for medical residents. We use Erving 
Goffman’s concept of social interactional order and Trevor Pinch’ recent social 
technical explanation of Goffman’s work to examine how the social interactional 
order of medical training practice is reconfigured through contemporary reforms 
in medical training and how participants seek to (re)negotiate these changes. We 
argue that physician-resident interactions can be conceived as a social interactional 
order of clinical care delivery in which residents must negotiate a more central 
position by performing well in order to conduct clinical procedures. During training, 
residents move from the periphery to the center of medical work in a process that is 
embedded in, and mediated by, the socio-technical environment of clinical practice. 
Personal relationships, based on numerous resident-attending interactions underpin 
this transition. Residents must become familiar with and act along with (tacit) local 
rules and habits, they must to get to know the nurses and the geography of the 
building, as well as the (personal) expectations and preferences of the attending 
physicians to be able to present themselves as reliable and skilled practitioners and 
obtain a central place in the social interactional order. 
However, current reforms in medical training such as the limitation of resident 
duty hours and the standardization of resident assessment, tend to underplay this 
process as they create social distance between attending physicians and residents. 
As a consequence, residents are relegated to more peripheral stages of learning. 
Yet the paper also shows how these unexpected and unwanted consequences of 
current reforms are repaired by relinking changes with clinical work. 
The chapter adds to current policy debate on medical training reform by pointing 
out that personal relationships of trust and hands-on practices of training are crucial 
for good medical education.
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In chapter Six we conduct a multiple-level analysis of medical training governance 
change.  We deal with the question how medical training reform is enacted at 
different sites (in policy making, the clinical workplace, the medical associations, 
educationalists and all kinds of meetings pertaining to the reform of residency 
training) and how the interplay between these reform activities leads to new 
governance arrangements. The chapter seeks to provide broader lessons about 
medical governance evolvement by examining how policies and policy ideas 
are developed and negotiated, how they ‘travel’ between sites and how these 
are ‘fleshed out’ in everyday practice. As such, we aim to overcome the classic 
sociological conflict model that sets the (medical) profession on the one site and 
‘external actors’ (the state, managers) on the other. 
The chapter shows how the convergence of both ‘internal’ and ‘external’ reforms 
have led to an increasingly diffused constellation of interests and authority 
in medical residency training. This shift has been driven by three related and 
interacting processes. First, a group of entrepreneurial physicians aimed to 
enhance the quality and timeliness of medical residency training by introducing 
educational tools and methods. To this purpose they entered into new coalitions 
with educationalists and government representatives. Second, educational tools 
turned out to be important carriers and mediators of institutional change as they, 
as managing epistemic objects, reconfigured traditional training practice and 
framed the notion of ‘good residency training’. Third was the shift of interest of 
other stakeholders. In the chapter we show that following substantial changes 
in the policy context (particular the introduction of regulated competition in 
Dutch health care) formerly marginalized stakeholders in postgraduate medical 
education developed a renewed interest in residency training. These three broad 
processes led to an increasingly diffused constellation of interests and authority 
in medical residency training. Stakeholders’ interests increasingly have become 
entangled, despite their basic differences and conflicting aims. We argue that the 
concept of entanglement provides an interesting concept to the understanding of 
contemporary medical governance change.
Chapter Seven are the Conclusions. Here we turn to the main questions of the 
book, reflect on our methodological and theoretical approach, and sketch the 
societal implications of the research. We argue that the ‘modern doctor’ will be 
not so much different from the doctors treating us today. Old values, traditional 
practices, new ideologies and expectations have intertwined in everyday clinical 
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practice. This entwinement of ‘old’ and ‘new’ is also visible in the governance of 
medical education; although medical doctors are still responsible for training new 
recruits, they have become increasingly dependent on other actors setting and 
fulfilling their training duties.
Drawing on the work of Steven Shaping and Charles Bosk we point at two 
important findings of our study. First is the shift from attending- residents 
relationships based on trust as ‘familiarity’ to trust based on ‘laity’ (measurable 
performance). We argue that the loss of personal relationships is at the expense 
of residents’ learning space. Yet learning space is crucial when learning to doctor. 
Second, we observe a shift from patient safety as a collective practice to an 
emphasis on patient safety in single doctor-patient interactions. Although we 
underscore the importance of patient safety, we also point at the danger if residents 
are not longer able to learn to deal with uncertain clinical situations.
Finally, the chapter emphasizes the importance of multidisciplinary and multiple-
sited research to come to an in-depth understanding of (the consequences of) 
medical (educational) reform. 
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Dit proefschrift gaat over de hervorming van de medische vervolgopleidingen, 
de opleiding tot medisch specialist. Kort samengevat betreft de hervorming een 
verschuiving van het oude meester-gezel systeem waarin een arts-in-opleiding-
tot-specialist (aios) het vak stapsgewijs leerde te beheersen door te oefenen 
onder begeleiding van een medisch specialist (‘learning by doing’), naar een 
gestructureerd opleidingsprogramma gebaseerd op moderne onderwijskundige 
inzichten zoals competentie-gericht opleiden en gestandaardiseerde toetsing van 
het individueel functioneren. Het doel van het onderzoek is om inzicht te krijgen 
in hoe de medische vervolgopleiding verandert als gevolg van het samenspel 
van veranderingen in het beleid, verschuivingen binnen de medische professie, 
veranderende normen en waarden in de gezondheidszorgpraktijk en de opkomst 
van nieuwe ideologieën en leerstrategieën.
De sociologie van het medisch onderwijs heeft zich tot nu toe vooral gericht 
op de besloten wereld van een zorginstelling (veelal ziekenhuizen) en het 
socialiseringsproces dat zich hierin afspeelt. Dit onderzoek heeft tot doel bij te 
dragen aan een breder begrip van de huidige veranderingen van de medische 
vervolgopleiding door niet alleen te kijken naar de socialisering van jonge artsen 
maar door de opleiding te begrijpen als onderdeel van een bredere en dynamische 
politieke context van (veranderende) maatschappelijke eisen. 
In het boek bespreken we twee, gewoonlijk afzonderlijk besproken thema’s 
die nauw samenhangen met de hervorming van de opleiding. In de eerste 
plaats onderzoeken we de gevolgen van de veranderingen voor de medische 
vervolgopleiding zelf. Wat is de betekenis van de hervormingen voor de opleiding 
en daarmee voor het functioneren van de toekomstig medisch specialist? In de 
tweede plaats onderzoeken we de veranderingen in de besturing (governance) van 
de medische beroepsgroep. In de sociologie van professionals en beleidsliteratuur 
wordt de medische opleiding vaak beschreven als een belangrijke pilaar onder het 
systeem van professionele zelfregulering. Wat is de betekenis van de hervormingen 
voor de professionele zelfregulering van de medische vervolgopleiding? En wat leert 
dit ons over de governance van medisch professionals meer in het algemeen?
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Om bovenstaande onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden is een meervoudig 
gesitueerd (multiple-stited) ethnografisch onderzoek uitgevoerd naar de 
hervormingen van de medische vervolgopleidingen in Nederland. Gedurende 
vijf jaar hebben we geparticipeerd in, en gereisd tussen de verschillende 
plaatsen waar de hervormingen zijn gevormd en betekenis hebben kregen (of 
beter: “gemaakt, naar de Engelse term enacted): het ministerie van VWS, 
koepelorganisaties, de opleidingspraktijk, lokale bijeenkomsten van opleiders, 
aios en onderwijskundigen, en conferenties en workshops over de hervormingen 
van de medische vervolgopleiding. We hebben hierbij nauw samengewerkt met 
lokale en nationale actoren in het veld van de medische vervolgopleidingen. We 
hebben hen geobserveerd en geïnterviewd. Voor de analyse is gebruik gemaakt 
van theoretisch inzichten uit de sociologie van het medisch onderwijs, de sociologie 
van professionals, het wetenschap- en techniekonderzoek, en de beleids- en 
bestuurskunde. 
Hoofdstuk Twee beschrijft de verschillende perspectieven op de hervorming van 
de medische vervolopleidingen. De vraag die in dit hoofdstuk centraal staat is: 
Hoe geven de verschillende actoren betrokken bij de medische vervolgopleidingen 
betekenis aan de hervormingen van de medische vervolgopleiding en welke 
verwachtingen hebben zij ten aanzien van deze veranderingen? Om deze vraag 
te beantwoorden hebben we een Q-methodologisch onderzoek uitgevoerd. Q 
methodologie is een gemengd kwantitatief-kwalitatieve onderzoeksmethode 
om subjectiviteit te bestuderen, zoals verwachtingen, perspectieven, attituden 
en opinies. Het onderzoek leverde vier verschillende perspectieven op: het 
verantwoordingsperspectief, het onderwijskundig perspectief, het werk-privé 
balans perspectief en het vertrouwensperspectief. De verschillende perspectieven 
weerspiegelen de huidige discussies over de medische opleiding waarin aan de ene 
kant de nadruk wordt gelegd op het belang van transparantie en het kwantificeren 
van de kennis en vaardigheden van aios, en aan de andere kant het belang van het 
bewaken van traditionele leermodellen die gebaseerd zijn op persoonlijk contact 
en onderling vertrouwen. Het werk-privé balans perspectief wijkt hier iets vanaf 
en raakt een ander prominent debat binnen de medische beroepsgroep dat gaat 
over het afstemmen van werk en privé. Dit perspectief onderstreept het belang 
van een goed en gestructureerd leer-werk klimaat waarin het mogelijk is om een 
medische opleiding te combineren met een privé leven. Het werk-privé balans 
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perspectief weerspiegelt de normalisering - en daarmee ook de demystificatie- van 
de medische opleiding en medisch werk.
In Hoofdstuk Drie onderzoeken we de (veranderende) governance van de 
medische beroepsgroep. We voeren een vergelijkende institutionele analyse uit 
van de hervormingen van de medische vervolgopleidingen in Groot-Brittanie en 
Nederland. De vraag die in het hoofdstuk centraal staat luidt: welke mechanismen 
van institutionele reproductie en verandering spelen een rol in de voortdurende 
transformatie van het medische opleidingsregime in Groot-Brittanië en Nederland, 
en wat zijn de consequenties van deze transformaties voor de zelf-regulering van 
de medische opleiding in beide landen? In het hoofdstuk wordt gebruik gemaakt 
van recente theoretische inzichten over institutionele verandering.
Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat zowel in Groot-Brittanië als in Nederland het medisch 
opleidingsregime is verschoven van een door de professie gecontroleerd systeem 
naar een systeem van co-regulering waarin de beroepsgroep zeggenschap moet 
delen met andere actoren. De veranderingen, zowel wat betreft de inhoud (wat 
er is veranderd) als het tempo waarin de veranderingen zich hebben voltrokken 
verschillen tussen beide landen. In Groot-Brittanië werd het transformatieproces 
ingezet in de jaren ’60 toen de overheid meer grip probeerde te krijgen op 
de medische vervolgopleiding, onder andere door niet-medici te benoemen in 
toezichthoudende organen. Het aanvankelijk meer geleidelijk verlopende proces 
van institutionele verandering werd onderbroken in de jaren ’90 toen een groeiend 
publiek wantrouwen jegens de medische professie de overheid legitimeerde meer 
autoriteit te claimen over het Britse medisch opleidingssyteem. De analyse laat 
zien hoe toenemende overheidsinvloed in het begin van deze eeuw, en pogingen 
van de regering om de medische opleiding in te zetten voor de realisatie van 
andere NHS doelstellingen zonder daarbij oog te hebben voor de bezwaren van 
de medische beroepsgroep, leidde tot heftig verzet onder beroepsbeoefenaren. 
Dit verzet was niet alleen gericht tegen de overheid maar ook tegen de eigen 
beroepsorganisaties. Het uiteindelijke debacle van de hervormingen leidde tot een 
nieuwe onderhandelingen over de autoriteit over het Britse opleidingsregime.
Vergeleken met de Britse casus verliep het Nederlandse hervormingsproces 
veel geleidelijker, al waren de veranderingen niet minder omstreden. Het 
hervormingsproces kan worden gekarakteriseerd als ‘instituionele gelaagdheid’ 
(institutional layering) waarbij nieuwe sturingsmechanismen werden gepositioneerd 
naast -en interacteerden met-bestaande sturingsmechanismen. De analyse 
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laat zien dat via deze alternatieve routes de regulering van het medisch 
opleidingssysteem sinds de jaren ’60 geleidelijk is veranderd en de invloed van de 
overheid stapsgewijs is toegenomen. De invoering van gereguleerde concurrentie 
in de Nederlandse gezondheidszorg in het begin van deze eeuw, en meer in het 
bijzonder de invoering van het opleidingsfonds, zette het veranderingsproces 
niet alleen in een stroomversnelling maar voegde daar ook een nieuwe dimensie 
aan toe. Het opleidingsfonds opende de gesloten praktijken van de verdeling 
van opleidingplaatsen (traditioneel een belangrijk controle mechanisme in het 
medisch opleidingsregime), en voorzag andere actoren (met name de overheid en 
ziekenhuisbestuurders) van nieuwe financiële en bestuurlijke prikkels (incentives) 
om invloed uit te oefenen op de medische vervolgopleiding. Dit heeft geleid tot 
toenemende bestuurlijke afhankelijkheid tussen de medische beroepsgroep, 
ziekenhuisbestuurders en overheid in het medisch opleidingsregime.
De analyse in Hoofdstuk Drie draagt bij aan het huidige theoretische debat 
over institutionele verandering. Het laat de noodzaak zien van gedetailleerd 
historisch empirisch onderzoek om inzicht te krijgen in institutionele transities. We 
benadrukken het belang van het bestuderen van interacties tussen de politieke 
context, de eigenschappen van instituties en de onderhandelingen over autoriteit en 
controle om inzicht te krijgen in processen van institutionele verandering.
In Hoofdstuk Vier richten we ons op de kliniek en onderzoeken we de sturing 
van de medische opleiding in de dagelijkse zorgpraktijk. Het hoofdstuk 
bestudeert de trend om steeds meer nadruk te leggen op de zichtbaarheid 
(en daarmee controleerbaarheid) van aios in het dagelijks werk. Volgens de 
nieuwe opleidingsvoorschriften dienen aios te werken onder direct toezicht van 
een medisch specialist en mogen zij alleen zelfstandig handelingen uitvoeren 
bij “echte patiënten” als ze hebben aangetoond over de benodigde kennis en 
vaardigheden te beschikken. Leunend op de sociologische literatuur over het 
medisch onderwijs onderzoeken we hoe aios zichtbaar worden “gemaakt” in de 
dagelijkse opleidingpraktijk, welke doelstellingen in de verschillende praktijken van 
zichtbaarheid versleuteld zitten en hoe deze zichtbaarheden met elkaar worden 
gecoördineerd. We bespreken vier van deze zichtbaarheden: het “tentoonstellen” 
(staging) van aios, onderhandelde supervisie, het onzichtbaarheidsspel, en 
het filmen van operaties. In het hoofdstuk laten we zien hoe de verschillende 
zichtbaarheden in de praktijk op flexibele wijze worden samengebracht om aan de 
twee centrale en in principe conflicterende doelstellingen van goede patiëntenzorg 
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enerzijds en een goede opleiding anderzijds te voldoen. Waar goede patiëntenzorg 
vraagt om ervaring, expertise en stringente supervisie van de aios, vereist een 
goede opleiding juist ruimte om te oefenen en “onzichtbaarheid” van de aios. In het 
hoofdstuk laten we zien hoe supervisoren en aios “tinkeren” met zichtbaarheid door 
verschillende praktijken van zichtbaarheid met elkaar te coördineren.
Het hoofdstuk draagt bij aan de traditionele sociologische literatuur over de 
het medisch onderwijs door de focus te verschuiven van de opleiding als een 
social instituut waarin de aios wordt gesocialiseerd tot dokter naar de dagelijkse 
praktijk van het opleiden. Een dergelijke praktijkgerichte benadering onderzoekt 
niet alleen de sociale implicaties van de opleiding maar heeft ook oog voor de 
onvoorspelbaarheid van het dagelijks werk en de botsingen van waarden en 
doelstellingen die zich hierbij voordoen, evenals het zoeken naar gesitueerde 
oplossingen voor voorkomende problemen en tegenstrijdigheden. 
In Hoofdstuk Vijf gaan we dieper in op de invloed van de hervormingen van 
de medische vervolgopleiding op de opleiding van aios. We maken hiervoor 
gebruik van het concept van de social interactional order van Erving Goffman 
en Trevor Pinch’ recente sociaal-technische uitleg van Goffman’s werk (Pinch 
2010). Het hoofstuk laat zien dat de interacties tussen medisch specialisten (de 
supervisoren) en aios kunnen worden begrepen als een sociale interactionele 
orde waarin aios gedurende hun opleiding opschuiven van de periferie naar het 
centrum van het medisch handelen. Werken in het centrum betekent meer ruimte 
en zelfstandigheid om medische handelingen uit te voeren, routine op te doen, 
klinische verantwoordelijkheid te dragen en vaardigheden aan te leren en te 
verbeteren. De beweging van de periferie naar het centrum wordt gemedieerd door 
de sociaal-technische omgeving van de alledaagse klinische praktijk. Persoonlijke 
relaties, gebaseerd op talloze ontmoetingen tussen de aios en supervisor spelen 
hierbij een belangrijke rol. Aios moeten bekend raken met en handelen naar de 
veelal impliciete lokale regels en persoonlijke gewoonten van supervisoren. Ze 
moeten de verpleegkundigen en andere zorgwerkers leren kennen, net als het 
gebouw waarin ze werkzaam zijn. Dergelijke kennis is noodzakelijk om steeds 
opnieuw in te kunnen spelen op voorkomende klinische situaties waarbij aios hun 
betrouwbaarheid, kennis en kunde moeten tonen. Een goede performance betekent 
een meer centrale plaats in de sociale interactionele orde. 
In het hoofdstuk onderzoeken we hoe de huidige veranderingen van de 
medische vervolgopleiding ingrijpen op de sociale interactionele orde van de 
Iris BW 3.indd   193 03-09-12   15:32
194
 Samenvatting
klinische praktijk, de (veranderende) positie van aios binnen die orde, en hoe de 
leermogelijkheden van aios door deze veranderingen worden beïnvloed. We laten 
zien dat huidige hervormingen zoals de werktijdverkorting en de standaardisatie 
van toetsing en beoordeling het overgangsproces van perifeer handelen naar 
centraal handelen dreigt te verstoren doordat sociale afstand wordt gecreëerd 
tussen de supervisoren en aios. Aios worden daardoor teruggedrongen tot leren in 
de periferie van de klinische praktijk waarbij de meer complexe handelingen steeds 
vaker zullen worden uitgevoerd door medisch specialisten. Aios dreigen hierdoor 
minder vaardigheid te ontwikkelen in het handelen in onvoorspelbare en complexe 
klinische situaties. Echter, het hoofdstuk laat ook zien hoe deze onverwachte en 
onwenselijke gevolgen van de hervormingen in de praktijk worden verzacht door 
zowel de hervormingen als de traditionele klinische praktijk te heronderhandelen; 
de onderwijskundige instrumenten worden op creatieve wijze ingezet en het 
klinische proces wordt anders georganiseerd om aios zoveel mogelijk gelegenheid 
te geven om kennis en vaardigheden op te doen.
Hoofdstuk Vijf draagt bij aan het huidige beleidsdebat over de hervormingen van 
de medische vervolgopleiding door de nadruk te leggen op het cruciale belang 
van vertrouwensrelaties en “hands-on” praktijkervaring voor een goede medische 
opleiding.
Hoofdstuk Zes bevat een meervoudig gesitueerde analyse (multiple-level analysis) 
van de hervorming van de medische vervolgopleiding. We onderzoeken hoe de 
hervormingen op verschillende plaatsen zijn “gemaakt” (in het beleid, in het 
ziekenhuis, bij de beroepsverenigingen, tijdens conferenties en vergaderingen) 
en hoe de interacties tussen deze verschillende activiteiten hebben geleid tot de 
vorming van nieuwe governance arrangementen. In het hoofdstuk onderzoeken 
we hoe beleidsinitatieven vervormen tijdens de “reis” van beleidsvoornemen naar 
de praktijk, hoe veranderingen van en in medisch werk worden onderhandeld 
en uitkristalliseren, en wat dat dit doet met de inrichting en aansturing van 
de opleiding. Door deze methode van onderzoek en analyse proberen we een 
alternatief te bieden voor het klassiek sociologische conflict model waarbij de 
medische professie en “externe actoren” (de staat, managers) tegenover elkaar 
worden gezet en waarbij medisch professionals hun domein (jurisdictie) trachten te 
beschermen tegen aanvallen van buitenaf terwijl externe actoren juist proberen het 
professionele bolwerk open te breken. 
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In het hoofdstuk laten we zien hoe de samenkomst en interactie van “interne” 
en “externe” veranderingen hebben geleid tot een toenemende diffuse constellatie 
van belangen en autoriteit in het veld van de medische vervolgopleidingen. 
De veranderingen worden gedreven door drie gerelateerde en interacterende 
veranderingsprocessen. Het eerste veranderingsproces werd geïnitieerd door de 
beroepsgroep zelf. Een selecte groep van ondernemende en innovatieve artsen 
heeft midden 2000 het voortouw genomen in de hervorming van de opleiding 
met als doel de opleiding (en daarmee de zorgverlening) te verbeteren en deze 
beter te laten aansluiten bij veranderende wensen van zowel patiënten als aios. 
De gewenste hervormingen werden voornamelijk gezocht in een onderwijskundige 
verbetering van de opleiding. Hiervoor werd een nieuwe coalitie gevormd met 
onderwijskundigen en de overheid. Het tweede veranderingsproces betreft de 
werking van de onderwijskundige instrumenten. De onderwijskundige instrumenten 
en de onderwijskundige principes (bijvoorbeeld de gestandaardiseerde 
toetsinstrumenten en de aandacht voor het geven van goede feedback) zijn in 
korte tijd verworden tot belangrijke “dragers” en mediators van de institutionele 
veranderingen. Als sturende epistemische objecten (Knorr-Certina 1999) hebben de 
onderwijskundige instrumenten de notie van goed opleiden veranderd. Het derde 
veranderingsproces komt voort uit het groeiend belang van andere stakeholders 
bij de medische vervolgopleiding. Deze verschuiving is het gevolg van bredere 
veranderingen in de beleidscontext van de gezondheidszorg, meer in het bijzonder 
de invoering van het systeem van gereguleerde concurrentie. De interactie 
tussen deze drie veranderingsprocessen heeft ertoe geleid dat de belangen 
van de verschillende betrokken actoren (artsen, zorgbestuurders, de overheid, 
onderwijskundigen) steeds verder verstrengeld zijn geraakt. Men heeft elkaar in 
toenemende mate nodig om eigen doelstellingen te realiseren. We introduceren 
hiervoor het concept “entanglement” en betogen dat dit concept helpt om beter 
inzicht te krijgen in de aard en het proces van de huidige veranderingen in de 
governance van medisch professionals en medisch werk.
Hoofdstuk Zeven bevat de conclusies en discussie. In dit hoofdstuk keren we 
terug naar de hoofdvragen van het onderzoek, we reflecteren op de gekozen 
methodologische en theoretische aanpak en schetsen de sociale implicaties van 
het onderzoek. We betogen dat de moderne arts wordt opgeleid volgens nieuwe 
èn traditionele waarden, gebruiken en ideologieën. De medische opleiding is zowel 
tijdloos als dynamisch. De samenkomst van oude en nieuwe elementen is ook 
Iris BW 3.indd   195 03-09-12   15:32
196
 Samenvatting
zichtbaar in de governance van het stelsel van de medische opleiding waarin artsen 
nog altijd verantwoordelijk zijn voor de recruitering en opleiding van de volgende 
generatie artsen, maar waarbij zij in de uitvoering steeds meer afhankelijk zijn 
geworden van andere stakeholders zoals ziekenhuisbestuurders, de overheid en 
onderwijskundigen. 
Voortboordurend op het werk van o.a. Steven Shapin (1992) en Charles Bosk 
(1979, 2006) levert dit onderzoek drie belangrijke bevindingen op. In de eerste 
plaats de verschuiving van de aloude meester-gezel relatie dat was gebaseerd 
op “familiar vertrouwen” (ik vertrouw op jou omdat ik je ken, omdat je één van 
ons bent) naar vertrouwen op basis van gemeten prestaties. Het onderzoek 
heeft laten zien dat deze verschuiving in het soort van vertrouwen ten koste 
dreigt te gaan van de leerruimte en daarmee de (klinische) ervaring van 
toekomstig medisch specialisten. Op de tweede plaats wijst het onderzoek uit 
dat er een verschuiving is van patiëntveiligheid als een collectieve praktijk naar 
de patiëntveiligheid als een individuele activiteit waarbij de nadruk steeds meer 
is komen te liggen op de rol en positie van de individuele arts. Hoewel we de 
aandacht voor de veiligheid van patienten ten volle ondersteunen, wijzen we ook 
op de keerzijde van deze verschuiving indien dit ertoe leidt dat de leerruimte voor 
aios zal afnemen. Aios moeten kunnen blijven leren (dat wil zeggen, handelen 
en verantwoordelijkheid dragen) in onzekere en complexe klinische situaties om 
ook in toekomstige klinische situaties adequaat te kunnen handelen. Een te grote 
nadruk op bekwaamheidsverklaringen, toetsing en zichtbaarheid staat dergelijke 
leerervaringen in de weg. We betogen dat het juist de ruimte is tussen de regels en 
opleidingseisen enerzijds, en de “oefenruimte” mogelijk gemaakt door persoonlijk 
contact en expertise van de supervisor anderzijds die moet worden benut èn 
beschermd om zowel de veiligheid van patiënten te garanderen als leerervaringen 
voor aios mogelijk te maken. 
Het is ook juist deze ruimte tussen regels en professionele autonomie die verder 
dient te worden geëxploreerd in het onderzoek naar de governance van medisch 
professionals. Dit onderzoek heeft laten zien dat de veranderende governance 
in de zorg niet alleen gaat over een beroepsgroep die steeds verder onder druk 
komt te staan door veranderingen in regelgeving en toenemende belangen van 
voormalig gemarginaliseerde stakeholders in medisch werk, maar dat het ook 
gaat over de verstrengeling van professionele en “externe” belangen en de 
toenemende afhankelijkheid van de actoren van andere partijen om eigen belangen 
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te beschermen en doelstellingen te realiseren. Multidisciplinair en meervoudig 
gesitueerd ethnografisch onderzoek maakt deze processen zichtbaar.
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In de nadagen van het schrijven aan dit proefschrift zat ik in de kantine van het 
Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis (IISG) in Amsterdam, een plek 
waar ik het afgelopen jaar heel wat uren heb doorgebracht. Achter mij overwogen 
twee studenten een proefschrift. Het grootste nadeel leek hen de eenzaamheid: 
“Ik weet niet of ik dat kan hoor, vier jaar alleen in een kamertje!” Ik overwoog 
om me om te draaien en te zeggen dat de grootste kunst, en lastigheid, van het 
schrijven van een proefschrift juist is om de eenzaamheid te creëren die nodig is 
om te kunnen schrijven. (Ik deed het overigens niet; iedereen verdient zijn eigen 
afwegingen, misschien was dit juist wel mijn frustratie- en bovendien kent ieder 
vakgebied zijn eigen dynamiek).
Maar dit is wel de plek om de mensen te bedanken die mij in de gelegenheid 
hebben gesteld dit proefschrift te schrijven. Door samen onderzoek te doen en 
hierover te discussiëren, door me juist niet met rust te laten als ik dat graag wilde, 
en door me op andere momenten de tijd en gelegenheid te geven om uren alleen 
achter een laptop door te brengen (dan wel door werk over te nemen, me te 
ontzien of door weer eens op te passen).  
In de eerste plaats bedank ik mijn promotoren en co-promotor: Pauline Meurs, 
Fedde Scheele en Antoinette de Bont. Pauline, als student hing ik aan je lippen en 
het voelt nog steeds als een groot voorrecht om bij jou te mogen promoveren. Je 
hebt me laten zien hoe de medische, universitaire en politieke wereld ‘werkt’, en 
hoe daarop te reflecteren en over te schrijven. Ik heb veel van je geleerd.
Fedde, jij hebt me leren denken als een dokter. Met onze vele discussies had ik me 
geen rijker onderzoek kunnen wensen. Dank voor alle deuren die je hebt geopend - 
en de ruimte die je me vervolgens gaf om daar mijn eigen ding mee te doen.
Antoinette, jij hebt een bijzondere gave om onderzoek te doen. Je combineert 
theoretische kennis met originele inzichten, durft daarin vernieuwend te zijn en 
weet mensen aan je te binden. Dank ook voor alle kansen die je me de afgelopen 
jaren hebt gegeven. 
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Naast mijn promotoren en co-promoter waren er ook andere onderzoekers bij dit 
proefschrift betrokken. Roland Bal, jij was een kritische noot op de achtergrond. Als 
je chagrijning werd wist ik dat het niet goed (genoeg) was (in die zin ben je wel een 
beetje een ouderwetse opleider -) maar je enthousiasme was nog vele malen groter 
als het wel lukte. Ik heb je betrokkenheid  enorm gewaardeerd. 
Jan Kees Helderman, je maakte me assistent-coördinator (hulpje!) van de master 
HEPL in de aanloop naar een promotieonderzoek. Als een soort coach (en vriend) 
ben je de afgelopen jaren steeds betrokken gebleven. Het samen schrijven aan het 
institutionele artikel was voor mij ‘leren in een snelkookpan’- en bovendien heel erg 
leuk. Ik blijf graag met je samenwerken.
Tom van der Grinten, jij hebt me begeleid bij mijn afstudeerscriptie van de master 
HEPL en me de kans gegeven binnen de wetenschap te gaan werken. De afgelopen 
jaren ben je ook steeds op een afstandje betrokken geweest. Ik ben je daarvoor 
niet alleen dankbaar, maar voel me ook vereerd. 
Jeannette Pols, ik ben een bewonderaar van je werk. Dat je mee wilde schrijven 
aan een artikel was voor mij een eer, en ook een grote uitdaging. Dank je wel voor 
je ideeën, hulp en commentaar
Ik wil alle respondenten heel hartelijk bedanken voor de inzichten die zij hebben 
gegeven. Omwille van de beloofde anonimiteit blijven de meesten van jullie ook 
hier anoniem. Een paar uitzonderingen; Maas-Jan Heineman, Dick Bekedam, Jan 
Ijzermans, Ted den Hoed en Niels Hopmans: dank voor jullie gastvrijheid, de 
samenwerking en de vele interessante gesprekken die iedere keer weer tot nieuwe 
inzichten en ideeën hebben geleid. In het bijzonder wil ik de projectleden van 
InVIVO bedanken: Maarten Schutte, Scheltus van Luijk, Hanneke Mulder, Ronnie 
van Diemen, Kor de Kroon, Wouter Meijer, Ilja de Vreede, Pascale Roovers, Jamiu 
Busari, Marieke van der Waal en Joke Baar. Door jullie gastvrijheid, openheid en 
interesse hebben we dit onderzoek kunnen doen. 
Ik promoveer bij de VU in Amsterdam, maar mijn ‘intellectuele thuis’ is bij het iBMG 
in Rotterdam - en dan in het bijzonder de sectie Health Care Governance. Marleen, 
Wendy, Kim, Wilma, Annemiek, Jeroen, Stans, Lieke, Katharina, Maarten, Jolanda, 
Hester, Maartje, Esther, Tineke, Sam, Kor, Teun, Rik, Sonja, Julia, Jos, Lonneke, 
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Marlies, Femke, Bethany, Suzanne, Sharon, Thomas, Bert, Anneloes, Anne, 
Lisa, - en al die anderen die de afgelopen jaren bij HCG hebben gewerkt bedank 
ik graag voor hun commentaar, ideeën maar vooral ook voor de gezelligheid. Een 
proefschrift schrijven bij en met jullie is zeker geen eenzaam proces!
Ook bedank ik graag Petra voor haar hulp om steeds weer een plekje in de agenda 
van Pauline te bemachtigen.
Een proefschrift schrijven is ook een opleiding, en veel van de lessen die ik heb 
beschreven gelden niet alleen voor dokters-in-opleiding maar ook voor AIO’s. Ik 
heb die lessen niet alleen geleerd bij iBMG, maar ook bij de onderzoeksschool 
WTMC. Dank aan Sally Wyatt, Els Rommes, Willem Halffman, Teun Zuiderent-Jerak 
en alle AIO’s die ik daar de afgelopen jaren heb leren kennen. In het bijzonder 
Daan- jij hebt het vermogen om op cruciale momenten op te duiken en zaken dan 
haarscherp neer te zetten. Blijf dat vooral doen!
Ragini, dank je wel voor het ‘editen’ van mij teksten; ze werden er iedere keer 
weer (veel) mooier van. Je vrolijke mailtjes gaven moed bij het afschrijven van de 
artikelen. Dank ook voor alle Engelse lesjes die je me over de mail hebt geleerd.
Mijn paranimfen, Barbara en Elsbeth. Het is alweer een tijd geleden dat we 
bewegingswetenschappen studeerden - al blijft het beeld van de tramhalte bij Artis 
me scherp voor de geest: dat was het begin! Van kamers gingen we naar huizen, 
vriendjes werden mannen en etentjes zijn nu met (veel) kinderen - maar: wat 
heerlijk dat jullie er nog steeds zijn en straks naast me zullen staan!! 
Els en Tom, dank jullie voor jullie belangstelling, gastvrijheid, het klussen aan onze 
opeenvolgende huizen en het vele oppassen.
Saskia, bedankt voor het maken van de foto voor de omslag en de leuke fotoshoot. 
Jeroen, dank voor je betrokkenheid- en vooral: wat heerlijk dat je nu ook in 
Amsterdam woont!
Ank en Dick, lieve ouders, zonder jullie had ik dit proefschrift nooit kunnen 
schrijven. Dank jullie wel voor jullie oneindige steun en betrokkenheid, de vele 
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optimaal verzorgde schrijfweekendjes in Oegstgeest, en dat jullie zulke fantastische 
opa en oma zijn voor Lars en Juul.
Lars en Juul, jullie zijn geboren vlak voor en tijdens dit proefschrift. Van kleine 
baby’tjes werden jullie kleuters die zelf boekjes gingen maken:”Stop maar in 
je boek, schiet het tenminste op!” Ik ben enorm trots op jullie - you make life 
beautiful. 
Lieve Chiel, dit proefschrift is misschien wel net zoveel van jou als van mij. Jij bent 
het die het steeds weer mogelijk heeft gemaakt dat ik kon schrijven, zonder te 
vragen wanneer het nu eindelijk eens af was. Dank je voor je geduld, humor en 
grenzeloze relativeringsvermogen. 
Het is klaar, over, gedaan. Time to move on.
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